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Abstract
There has been a tremendous growth in the size of distributed systems in the past three decades.
Today, distributed systems, such as the Internet, have become so large that they require highly
scalable algorithms; algorithms that have asymptotically-small communication, computation, and
latency costs with respect to the network size. Moreover, systems with thousands or even millions
of parties distributed throughout the world is likely in danger of faults from untrusted parties.
In this dissertation, we study scalable distributed algorithms that can tolerate faults from
untrusted parties. We consider three different security models: adversarial, rational, and costcompetitive. Throughout this work, we balance two important and often conflicting characteristics
of distributed protocols: security and efficiency.
Our first contribution is building an asynchronous algorithm for secure Multi-Party Computation
(MPC) over n players. MPC is a fundamental problem in distributed computing that allows a set of
players to jointly compute an arbitrary function of their inputs, without revealing these inputs to
each other. We propose a scalable MPC algorithm assuming strictly less than a 1/8 fraction of the
players are controlled by a static adversary. For any function f over a field that can be computed by
a circuit with m gates, our algorithm requires each player to send a number of field elements and
√
perform an amount of computation that is Õ( mn + n). This significantly improves over traditional
algorithms, which require each player to both send a number of messages and perform computation
that is Ω(nm).
To achieve this result, we define and solve a new problem called threshold counting problem in
the asynchronous setting. Our solution is load-balanced, with computation, communication, and
latency complexity of O(log n), and may be useful for designing other load-balanced applications
in the asynchronous communication model.
As an important building block of MPC algorithms in the rational setting, we study the classical
secret sharing problem in a model where all players are rational. To the best of our knowledge, all
known mechanisms for this problem require each player to send O(n) messages in expectation.
As our second contribution in this dissertation, we describe mechanisms for rational secret
sharing. Our first result is a mechanism for n-out-of-n rational secret sharing that is Nash equilibrium,
iv

rather than just -Nash equilibrium. Our second result is a mechanism for rational t-out-of-n secret
sharing that is everlasting -Nash equilibrium. Both our mechanisms are scalable in the sense
that they require each player to send only an expected O(log n) bits. Furthermore, the latency of
these mechanisms is O(log n) in expectation, compared to O(n) expected latency of the best known
result due to Kol and Naor [KN08]. Both of our mechanisms are non-cryptographic and are not
susceptible to backward induction.
Finally, we propose a new algorithm for interactive communication when the noise rate is
unknown. We achieve this result by using resource-competitive approach, where the adversary is
assumed to pay a certain cost for each corruption he makes to the protocol. Most secure distributed
algorithms pay a huge cost just due to the possible existence of an adversary. We conjecture by
ensuring that a protocol does not pay more than the adversary, one can achieve a highly efficient
algorithm protocol.

v

Table of Contents
Table of Contents

vi

List of Figures

x

1 Introduction

1

1.1

Communication Models

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.2

Selfish and Adversarial Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.2.1

Computation secure against an adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.2.2

Computation robust against Rational Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.3.1

Scalable Multi-Party Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.3.2

Rational Secret Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.3.3

Interactive Communication over Noisy Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

1.3

2 Secure Multi-Party Computation in Large Networks
2.1

6

Our Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.1.1

Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2.1.2

Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

2.1.3

Our Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

2.2

Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

2.3

Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.4

Our Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.5

2.4.1

Synchronous MPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.4.2

Asynchronous MPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2.4.3

Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Proof of Theorem 2.1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.1

The UC Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
vi

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.5.2

Proof Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2.5.3

Security of Input Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2.5.4

Security of Circuit Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2.5.5

Security of Output Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2.5.6

Security of Protocol 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

2.5.7

Cost Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Asynchronous Threshold Counting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.1

Up Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

2.6.2

Down Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2.6.3

Handling Sublinear Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2.6.4

Proof of Theorem 2.6.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

2.6.5

Using Quorums as Nodes in the Count Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Asynchronous Quorum Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.7.1

The Election Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

2.7.2

Static Network with Polylog-Bounded Degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

2.7.3

Communication Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

2.7.4

SRS-Agreement Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

2.7.5

Proof of Build-Quorums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3 Scalable Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing

63

3.1

The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

3.2

Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

3.3

Our Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

3.4

Our Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

3.5

chapter Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

3.6

Notation and Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

3.7

3.6.1

Utility Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

3.6.2

Game Theoretic Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

3.6.3

Information-Theoretic Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Algorithm for n-out-of-n Secret Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.7.1

The Communication Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

3.7.2

Labeling the Communication Tree: Short and Long Players . . . . . . . . . 74

3.7.3

Our Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

vii

3.7.4
3.8

Analysis of Algorithm for All Players Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.8.1

3.9

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Some Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Algorithm for t-out-of-n Secret Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.9.1

Creating the Shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

3.9.2

Reconstruction phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

3.9.3

MAC Scheme for t-out-of-n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

3.9.4

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

3.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4 Interactive Communication with Unknown Noise Rate

96

4.1

Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

4.2

Formal Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

4.3

Overview of Our Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

4.4

Chapter Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

4.5

Bounded T - Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

4.6

4.7

4.8

4.9

4.5.1

Overview, Notation and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

4.5.2

Helper Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

4.5.3

Remaining Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

4.5.4

Algorithm Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Bounded T - Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.6.1

Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

4.6.2

Correctness and Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

4.6.3

Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Unbounded T - Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.7.1

Helper Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

4.7.2

Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Unbounded T - Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.8.1

Alice and Bob are both present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

4.8.2

Bob plays alone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

4.8.3

Failure Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

4.8.4

Putting everything together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Some Additional Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

4.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

viii

5 Conclusion and Open Problems

129

5.1

Two Party Computation Over a Noisy Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

5.2

Cost-Competitive MPC Over Secure Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

5.3

Cost-Competitive MPC over Noisy Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Bibliography

132

ix

List of Figures
2.1

The gate gadgets for gate u and its left and right children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2.2

Evaluation of gate u: (a) generating ru , (b) providing inputs to CMPC, (c) receiving the
masked outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2.3

Circuit of gate u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2.4

1232
The count tree for n = 2048 and τ = 1232. D = dlog 14×11
e = 3. The node marked R is

the root, nodes marked A are adding nodes, and nodes marked C are collection nodes. . 37
2.5

616
The count tree for n = 2048 and τ = 616. D = dlog 14×11
e = 2. The node marked R is

the root, nodes marked A are adding nodes and nodes marked C are collection nodes.
The filters, marked F, are complete binary trees of depth 7, with 128 leaves each, for a
total of 512 filter leaves.
3.1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Construction of the iterated shares. We define hSi1 as the first share and hSi2 as the
second share generated from the 2-out-of-2 Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. . . . . . . 73

3.2

Communication trees for 5 players (left) and 6 players (right) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

4.1

Glossary of Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

x

Chapter 1
Introduction
Today, companies, governments, and consumers depend on secure and reliable information systems.
A new generation of cyber-attacks is costing millions and straining the structure of the Internet.
Unfortunately, as technology becomes more complex, security and privacy threats also become
more complicated. The primary motivation of this dissertation is to design distributed algorithms
that can provably resist sophisticated attacks conducted by powerful adversaries.
As a part of this dissertation, we develop techniques for securing large-scale distributed systems
that consist of millions or even billions of nodes. Such systems may service many countries, and be
used as the building blocks for communication, computation, and storage of information. When
designing protocols for large systems, resources should be used carefully. Our first goal in this
dissertation is to design secure algorithms that are scalable: communication, computation, and
latency costs are asymptotically small with respect to the system size.
Moreover, in practice it is not always the case that the behavior and specifically the budget of
the adversary for corruption is known by the algorithm in advance. Having this unknown factor
in mind, we design an algorithm that adapts to the behavior of the adversary. Thus, our second
goal in this dissertation is to design a protocol such that the cost of the algorithm is a slow-growing
function of the budget of the adversary. Furthermore, we ensure that the algorithm is not paying too
much if the adversary is not corrupting.
After describing our model, We briefly summarize the core contributions of this dissertation.
These include scalable and efficient algorithms for three fundamental distributed problems: multiparty computation (MPC), rational secret sharing, and interactive communication.

1

1.1

Communication Models

Throughout this dissertation, we consider a network of n parties whose identities are common
knowledge. We assume there is a channel between every pair of parties. We do not assume a
broadcast channel. Communication can be via synchronous or asynchronous message passing. In a
synchronous network, all parties have a common global clock and all the messages has pre-defined
delays. In the asynchronous model, the sent messages may be arbitrarily delayed by the adversary.
Latency in the asynchronous model is defined as the maximum length of any chain of messages
(see [CD89, AW04]). We assume a synchronous model unless we explicitly say in the problem that
the communication model is asynchronous.

1.2

Selfish and Adversarial Behavior

We study three secure distributed computing problems mentioned above in the three settings each
with a different adversarial or selfish behavior.

1.2.1

Computation secure against an adversary

In this model, we assume the presence of an adversary who is willing to corrupt the protocol. Here
we sketch some key parameters in this model.
Control over the parties. In the fail-stop corruption model, parties may crash randomly. Passive
adversary can eavesdrop on the internal state of the corrupted parties, trying to obtain some
information he is not entitled to. Byzantine (malicious or Active) adversary can additionally make
the corrupted parties deviate in an arbitrary manner from the protocol specification. These parties
are bad (i.e., Byzantine or dishonest) and the remaining parties are good (i.e., honest or semi-honest).
The good parties run our algorithm, but the bad parties may deviate from the protocol specification.
Byzantine model is the strongest adversarial model.
Control over the channel. The adversary might have different abilities to corrupt or eavesdrop on
the communication channel between the parties. In a secure channel, we assume the adversary has
no control over the channel and cannot read the bits on the channel. In private unauthenticated
channel, the adversary can only flip the bits of the channel, but he cannot eavesdrop the bits. In
authenticated channel, the adversary can eavesdrop the bits, but he has not the ability to corrupt
them. Finally, in unauthenticated insecure channel, the adversary has the ability to corrupt or
eavesdrop the communication.
2

Computational power. The adversary can be computationally-bounded or computationally-unbounded.
Computationally bounded adversary is capable of only polynomial-time computation. In computationally unbounded model, we cannot assume any bound on the adversary’s computational powers,
or any cryptographic hardness assumptions. Throughout this dissertation, we assume the adversary
is computationally unbounded.
Adaptivity. The adaptive adversary can take over players at any point of the protocol. The static
adversary must select the set of bad parties at the start of the algorithm. We assume that the
adversary is static.

1.2.2

Computation robust against Rational Behavior

We deploy game theory to model the rational behavior of the parties while computing a protocol
together. In this model, the parties are participating in a game together, thus we call parties, players
interchangeably. We assume each player has a utility function and can computes its payoff at the
end of the game (protocol) and its outcome based on his utility function. In this model, rationality
implies that every player always maximizes his utility. In other words, every player is motivated by
maximizing his own payoff.
In this setting, the goal is to design a protocol (mechanism) that can build an equilibrium between
the players. We say a protocol (mechanism) is a Nash equilibrium in the sense that no player can
improve its utility by deviating from the protocol, given that all other players are following the
protocol. Similarly, we define -Nash equilibrium when no player can gain more than  utility by
unilaterally deviating from it. Furthermore, the equilibrium is everlasting if after any history that is
consistent with all players following the protocol, following the protocol continues to be an -Nash
equilibrium.

1.3
1.3.1

Contributions
Scalable Multi-Party Computation

In secure multi-party computation (MPC), a set of parties, each having a secret value, want to
compute a common function over their inputs, without revealing any information about their inputs
other than what is revealed by the output of the function. Usually, a malicious adversary who
makes the parties deviate arbitrarily from the protocol controls a certain fraction of the parties.
Although much theoretical progress has been made in the MPC literature to achieve scalability in
3

the malicious setting, practical progress is slower. In particular, most known schemes suffer from
either poor or unknown communication and computation costs in practice. Another challenge is
that most large-scale distributed systems are composed of nodes with limited resources. This makes
it of extreme importance to balance the protocol load across all parties involved.
In the Section 2, we first propose an efficient MPC protocol for computing arithmetic circuits
in the synchronous communication model. Our protocol is secure against a Byzantine (malicious)
adversary who can corrupt less than a 1/3 fraction of the parties. To achieve efficiency, we reduce
the communication cost of our protocol by performing local communications in logarithmic-size
groups of parties called quorums, where the number of malicious parties in each quorum is at most a
certain fraction. Our paper is the first publication in a line of research on the use of communication
locality in multi-party computation.
We also adapted our protocol to the asynchronous communication model. The asynchronous
protocol is secure against a malicious adversary corrupting less than a 1/8 fraction of the parties.
To deal with asynchrony problems arising from delayed inputs, we propose a novel distributed
data structure called threshold counter. Surprisingly, our MPC algorithm requires each party to
send only a sub-linear number of bits with respect to the network size. This significantly improves
over traditional works, which require each party to both send a number of messages and perform
computation that is linear in the network size.

1.3.2

Rational Secret Sharing

Secret sharing is one of the most fundamental problems in computer security, and is an important
primitive in many cryptographic protocols. In this problem, a secret message is converted into n
pieces called shares, which are dealt to n parties. The shares are generated in such a way that makes
it possible for all or a fraction of parties to reconstruct the secret later from the shares, but no smaller
subset of parties can reconstruct the secret.
Recently, there has been an interest in solving the rational secret sharing problem, where
all parties are rational: they want to maximize their pay-offs from a game-theoretic perspective.
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, all previous mechanisms for this problem require each
agent to send O(n) messages in expectation; they do not scale well to large networks. In Section 3,
we address this issue by describing scalable mechanisms for rational secret sharing that are designed
for large n in the sense that the amount of communication and the latency of the protocol are a slow
growing function of the number of players.
Our first result is a non-cryptographic mechanism for n-out-of-n rational secret sharing that
is Nash equilibrium, rather than just -Nash equilibrium. Our second result is a cryptographic
4

mechanism for rational t-out-of-n secret sharing that is everlasting -Nash equilibrium. Both our
mechanisms require each player to send an expected O(log n) bits and has O(log n) latency in
expectation.

1.3.3

Interactive Communication over Noisy Channels

In interactive communication, a network protocol is run by two parties over a communication
channel in order to compute a desired functionality. Such a protocol usually considers the channel as
a reliable medium that always transfers information sent by either party correctly. This assumption
is, however, not always valid in practice; channels are usually subject to some random or adversarial
noise corrupting some fraction of the symbols transmitted between the parties. In such cases, a
mechanism is required to simulate the original protocol using another protocol over a noisy channel
such that it achieves the same outcome as the original protocol over an abstract noise-free channel.
In Section 4, we argue that, in most practical scenarios, the exact resource budget of the adversary
in corrupting the communication is finite but unknown to the parties in advance. We then propose
a simple and efficient technique for simulating the protocol when the noise rate is unknown. The
parties run one block of the original protocol, as if there was no noise. Then, they verify whether an
error has occurred or not by checking the some fingerprints of the block sent along with the block.
We design an adaptive algorithm during which parties estimate the number of bit-flips so far and
adapt their running protocol based on that.
If an adversary flips T bits, our algorithm sends L + O

p


L(T + 1) log L + T bits in expectation

and succeeds with high probability in L. It does so without any a priori knowledge of T. Assuming a
conjectured lower bound by Haeupler, our result is optimal up to logarithmic factors. Our algorithm
critically relies on the assumption of a private channel. We show that such an assumption is
necessary when the amount of noise is unknown.
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Chapter 2
Secure Multi-Party Computation in Large
Networks
In secure multi-party computation (MPC), a set of parties, each having a secret value, want to
compute a common function over their inputs, without revealing any information about their inputs
other than what is revealed by the output of the function.
Recent years have seen a renaissance in MPC, but unfortunately, the distributed computing
community is in danger of missing out. In particular, while new MPC algorithms boast dramatic
improvements in latency and communication costs, none of these algorithms offer significant
improvements in the highly distributed case, where the number of parties is large.
This is unfortunate, since MPC holds the promise of addressing many important problems
in distributed computing. How can peers in BitTorrent auction off resources without hiring an
auctioneer? How can we design a decentralized Twitter that enables provably anonymous broadcast
of messages. How can we create deep learning algorithms over data spread among large clusters of
machines?
Most large-scale distributed systems are composed of nodes with limited resources. This makes
it of extreme importance to balance the protocol load across all parties involved. Also, large
networks tend to have weak admission control mechanisms which makes them likely to contain
malicious nodes. Thus, a key variant of the MPC problem that we consider will be when a certain
hidden fraction of the nodes are controlled by a malicious adversary.
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2.1

Our Contribution

In this chapter, we describe general MPC protocols for computing arithmetic circuits. In terms of
communication and computation costs per party, our protocols scale sublinearly with the number of
parties and linearly with the size of the circuit.
To achieve sublinear communication and computation costs, our protocols critically rely on the
notion of quorums. A quorum is a set of O(log n) parties, where the number of corrupted parties in
each quorum is guaranteed not to exceed a certain fraction. We describe an efficient protocol for
creating a sufficient number of quorums in the asynchronous setting.
To adapt to the asynchronous setting, we introduce the general problem of threshold counting.
We show how this problem relates to the problem of dealing with arbitrarily-delayed inputs in our
asynchronous MPC protocol, and then propose an efficient protocol for solving it.
When a protocol is concurrently executed alongside other protocols (or with other instances of
the same protocol), one must ensure this composition preserves the security of the protocol. We
show that our protocols are secure under such concurrent compositions by proving its security in
the universal composability (UC) framework of Canetti [Can01].

2.1.1

Model

Consider n parties P1 ,...,Pn in a fully-connected network with private and authenticated channels.
In our asynchronous protocol, we assume communication is via asynchronous message passing,
so that sent messages may be arbitrarily and adversarially delayed. Latency (or running time) of a
protocol in this model is defined as the maximum length of any chain of messages sent/received
throughout the protocol (see [CD89, AW04]).
We assume a malicious adversary who controls an unknown subset of parties. We refer to these
parties as corrupted and to the remaining as honest. The honest parties always follow our protocol,
but the corrupted parties not only may share information with other corrupted parties but also can
deviate from the protocol in any arbitrary manner, e.g. , by sending invalid messages or remaining
silent.
We assume the adversary is static meaning that it must select the set of corrupted parties at the
start of the protocol. We assume that the adversary is computationally-unbounded; thus, we make
no cryptographic hardness assumptions.
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2.1.2

Problem Statement

Multi-Party Computation. In the MPC problem, n parties, each holding a private input, want to
jointly evaluate a deterministic n-ary function f over their inputs while ensuring:
1. Each party learns the correct output of f ; and
2. No party learns any information about other parties’ inputs other than what is revealed from
the output.
Constraints for the Asynchronous Model. Consider a simple setting, where, the n parties send
their inputs to a trusted party P who then locally computes f and sends the result back to every
party. In the asynchronous setting, the MPC problem is challenging even with such a trusted party.
In particular, since the t corrupted parties can refrain from sending their inputs to P, it can only wait
for n − t inputs rather than n inputs. Then, it can compute f over n inputs consisting of n − t values
received from the parties and t dummy (default) values for the missing inputs. Finally, the trusted
party sends the output back to the parties. The goal of asynchronous MPC is to achieve the same
functionality as the above scenario but without the trusted party P.
Quorum Building. A quorum is a set of Θ(log n) parties, where the fraction of corrupted parties
in this set is at most t/n +  for a small positive constant . In the quorum building problem, there
are n parties up to t < n of whom may be corrupted. The goal is to ensure all parties agree on a set
of n quorums such that each party is mapped to O(log n) quorums.
Threshold Counting. In this problem, there are n honest parties each with a flag bit initially set to
0. At least τ < n of the parties will eventually set their bits to 1. The goal is for all the parties to
learn when the number of bits set to 1 becomes greater than or equal to τ.

2.1.3

Our Results

The main results of this chapter are summarized by the following theorems proved in Section 2.5.
We consider an n-ary function, f , represented as an arithmetic circuit of depth d with m gates.
Theorem 2.1.1. There exist a universally-composable protocol that with high probability solves
the synchronous MPC problem and has the following properties:
• It is secure against t < (1/3 −  )n corrupted parties, for some fixed  > 0.
√
• Each party sends Õ(m/n + n) field elements.
8

• Each party performs Õ(m/n +

√

n) computations.

• The expected running time is O(d polylog(n)).
Theorem 2.1.2. There exist a universally-composable protocol that with high probability solves
the asynchronous MPC problem and has the following properties:
• It is secure against t < (1/8 −  )n corrupted parties, for some fixed  > 0.
√
• Each party sends Õ(m/n + n) field elements.
√
• Each party performs Õ(m/n + n) computations.
• The expected running time is O(d polylog(n)).
Chapter Organization. In Section 2.2, we discuss related work. In Section 3.6, we define our
notation and discuss the building blocks used in our protocols. We present our MPC protocols
in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we prove the security of our MPC protocols. Section 2.6 is a
self-contained presentation of the threshold counting problem and our solution to this problem. In
Section 2.7, we describe an asynchronous protocol for the quorum building problem. Finally, we
conclude in Section 2.8 and discuss future directions.

2.2

Related Work

Due to the large body of work, we do not attempt a comprehensive review of the MPC literature
here, but rather focus on seminal work and, in particular, schemes that achieve sublinear per-party
communication costs. The MPC problem was first described by Yao [Yao82]. He described an
algorithm for MPC with two parties in the presence of a semi-honest adversary. Goldreich et
al. [GMW87] propose the first MPC protocol that is secure against a malicious adversary. This
work along with [CDG88, GHY88] are all based on cryptographic hardness assumptions. These
were later followed by several cryptographic improvements [BMR90, GRR98, CFGN96].
In a seminal work, Ben-Or et al. [BGW88] show that every function can be computed with
information-theoretic security in the presence of a semi-honest adversary controlling less than half
of the parties, and in the presence of a malicious adversary controlling less than a third of the parties.
They describe a protocol for securely evaluating an arithmetic circuit that represents the function.
This work was later improved in terms of both communication and computation costs in
[CCD88, Bea91, GRR98]. Unfortunately, these methods all have poor communication scalability.
In particular, if there are n parties involved in the computation, and the function f is represented by
9

a circuit with m gates, then these algorithms require each party to send a number of messages and
perform a number of computations that is Ω(nm).
These were followed by several improvements to the cost of MPC, when m (i.e. , the circuit
size) is much larger than n [DI06, DN07, DIK+ 08]. For example, the protocol of Damgård et
al. [DIK+ 08] incurs computation and communication costs that are Õ(m) plus a polynomial in n.
Unfortunately, the additive polynomial in these algorithms is large (at least Ω(n6 )) making them
impractical for large n. One may argue that for large circuits the circuit-dependent complexity
dominates the polynomial complexity. However, we believe there are many useful circuits such as
the ones used in [MSZ15, HKI+ 12] which have relatively small number of gates.
Asynchronous MPC. Foundational work in asynchronous MPC was presented by Ben-Or et
al. [BCG93]. They adapt the protocol of [BGW88] to the asynchronous setting and show that asynchronous MPC is possible for up to n/3 fail-stop faults and up to n/4 malicious faults. Improvements
were made by Srinathan and Rangan [SR00] and Prabhu et al. [PSR02] with a final communication cost of O(n3 ) per multiplication achieved by Beerliová-Trubíniová and Hirt [BTH07] for
perfectly-secure asynchronous MPC with the optimal resiliency bound of up to n/4.
Damgård et al. [DGKN09] describe a perfectly-secure MPC that guarantees termination only
when the adversary allows a preprocessing phase to terminate. However, their protocol is not fully
asynchronous, as they assume a few synchronization points; hence, they can achieve a resiliency
bound of up to n/3.
Choudhury et al. [CHP13] propose an amortized asynchronous MPC protocols with linear
communication complexity per multiplication gate meaning that the communication done by
an individual party for each gate does not grow with the number of parties. This protocol is
unconditionally-secure against up to n/4 corrupted parties with a small failure probability. In this
chapter, we are directly addressing the third open problem of [CHP13] as we quote here:
“If one is willing to reduce the resilience t from the optimal resilience by a constant fraction,
then by using additional techniques like packed secret sharing, committee election and quorum
forming, one can achieve additional efficiency in the synchronous MPC protocols, as shown in [...].
It would be interesting to see whether such techniques can be used in the asynchronous settings to
gain additional improvements.”
MPC with Sublinear Overhead. We first introduced the notion of using quorums to decrease
message cost in MPC in a brief announcement [DKMS12]. In that paper, we described a syn√
chronous protocol with bit complexity of Õ(m/n + n) per party that can tolerate a computationally
10

unbounded adversary who controls up to (1/3 −  ) fraction of the parties for any fixed positive .
As network size scales, it becomes infeasible to require each party to communicate with all other
parties.
The current chapter is the detailed version of our later extended abstract [DKMS14], where
we described algorithms to improve [DKMS12] by handling asynchronous communication. One
important challenge in the asynchronous communication model is to ensure that at least n − t inputs
are committed to, before the circuit evaluation. To address this issue we introduce and solve the
threshold counting problem.
Boyle et al. [BGT13] describe a synchronous MPC protocol for evaluating arithmetic circuits.
The protocol is computationally-secure against an adversary corrupting up to (1/3 − ) fraction
of parties, for some fixed positive . Similar to [DKMS12], the protocol of [BGT13] also uses
quorums to achieve sublinear per-party communication cost. Interestingly, the communication
cost of this protocol is independent of circuit size. This is achieved by evaluating the circuit over
encrypted values using a fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [Gen09]. Unfortunately,
the protocol is not fully load-balanced as it evaluates the circuit using only one quorum (called the
supreme committee). The protocol requires each party to send polylog (n) messages of size Õ(n)
bits and requires polylog (n) rounds.
Chandran et al. [CCG+ 14] address two limitations of the protocol of [BGT13]: tolerating
an adaptive adversary and achieving optimal resiliency (i.e. , t < n/2 malicious parties). They
replace the common reference string assumption of [BGT13] with a different setup assumption
called symmetric-key infrastructure, where every pair of parties share a uniformly-random key
that is unknown to other parties. The authors also show how to remove the SKI assumption at a
√
cost of increasing the communication locality by O( n). Although this protocol provides small
communication locality, the bandwidth cost seems to be super-polynomial due to large message
sizes.
Boyle et al. [BCP14] describe a scalable technique for secure computation of RAM programs [GO96] in large networks by performing local communications in quorums of parties. For
securely evaluating a RAM program Π, their protocol incurs a total communication and computation
of poly (n) + Õ(Time(Π)) while requiring Õ(|x| + Space(Π)/n) memory per party, where Time(Π)
and Space(Π) are time and space complexity of Π respectively, and |x| denotes the input size.
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Table 2.1: Recent MPC results with sublinear communication costs
Protocol

Security

Resiliency
Bound

Async?

Assumes
Broadcast
Channel?

Total Message
Complexity

Total
Computation
Complexity

Latency

[BGT13]

Crypto

(1/3 − )n

No

No

Õ(n)

Ω̃(n) +
Ω̃(κmd 3 ) †

Õ(1)

[BCP14]

Perfect

(1/3 − )n

No

Yes

poly (n) +

Õ T i me(Π)

poly (n) +

Õ T i me(Π)

Õ T i me(Π)

[CCG+ 14]

Crypto‡

n/2

No

No

O(n log1+ n)
√ or
O(n n log1+ n)

Ω(n log1+ n)
√ or
Ω(n n log1+ n)

Our result
(sync)

Perfect

(1/3 − )n

No

No

Õ m + n

√ 
n

Õ m + n

√ 
n

Our result
(async)

Perfect

(1/8 − )n

Yes

No

Õ m + n

√ 
n

Õ m + n

√ 
n

0
O(log

Msg Size

LoadBalanced?

O(n` ·

No

polylog (n))

O(`)

Yes


Ω loglog n n
√or

Ω n log n

Yes

O(`)

Yes



O(`)

Yes



n)

O d+
polylog (n)

O d+
polylog (n)



Parameters: n is the number of parties; ` is the size of a field element; d is the depth of the circuit; κ is the the security
parameter; , 0 are the positive constants; Time(Π) is the worst-case running time of RAM program Π.
Notes:
† The

cost is calculated based on the FHE scheme of [BGV12].
a symmetric-key infrastructure. However, unlike the rest, this protocol is secure against an adaptive
adversary.
‡ Assumes

In Table 2.1, we review recent MPC results that provide sublinear communication locality. All
of these results rely on some quorum building technique for creating a set of quorums each with
honest majority.

12

Counting Networks. The threshold counting problem can be solved in a load-balanced way using
counting networks that were first introduced by Aspnes et al. [AHS91]. Counting networks are
constructed from simple two-input two-output computing elements called balancers connected to
one another by wires. A counting network can count any number of inputs even if they arrive at
arbitrary times, are distributed unevenly among the input wires, and propagate through the network
asynchronously.
Aspnes et al. [AHS91] establish an O(log2 n) upper bound on the depth complexity of counting
networks. Since the latency of counting is dependent on the depth of the network, minimizing
this depth has been the goal of many papers in this area. A simple explicit construction of an
∗

O(clog n log n)-depth counting network (for some positive constant c), and a randomized construction of an O(log n)-depth counting network that works with high probability are described
by Klugerman and Plaxton in [KP92, Klu95]. These constructions use the AKS sorting network [AKS83] as a building block. While this sorting network and the resulting counting networks
have O(log n) depth and require each party (or gate in their setting) to send O(log n) messages,
large hidden constants render them impractical.

2.3

Preliminaries

In this section, we define standard terms, notation, and known building blocks used throughout this
chapter.
Notation. We denote the set of integers {1,...,n} by [n]. We say an event occurs with high probability, if it occurs with probability at least 1 − 1/nc , for some c > 0 and sufficiently large n. A protocol
is called t-private if no coalition of t corrupted parties can learn anything more than what is implied
by their private inputs and the protocol output. A protocol is called t-resilient if no set of t or less
parties can influence the correctness of the outputs of the remaining parties.
We also assume that all arithmetic operations in the circuit are carried out over a finite field F.
The size of F depends on the specific function to be computed and is always Ω(log n). All of the
messages transmitted by our protocol are logarithmic in F and n.
Let r be a value chosen uniformly at random from F and D
x = x + r, for any x ∈ F. In this case,
we say x is masked with r and we refer to r and D
x as the mask and the masked value respectively.
Universal Composability Framework. When a protocol is executed several times possibly concurrently with other protocols, one requires to ensure this composition preserves the security of the
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protocol. This is because an adversary attacking several protocols that run concurrently can cause
more harm than by attacking a stand-alone execution, where only a single instance of one of the
protocols is executed.
One way to ensure this is to show the security of the protocol in the universal composability
(UC) framework of Canetti [Can01]. A protocol that is secure in the UC framework is called
UC-secure. We describe this framework in Section 2.5.
Verifiable Secret Sharing. An (n,t)-secret sharing scheme is a protocol in which a dealer who
holds a secret value shares it among n parties such that any set of t < n parties cannot gain any
information about the secret, but any set of at least t + 1 parties can reconstruct it. An (n,t)-verifiable
secret sharing (VSS) scheme is an (n,t)-secret sharing scheme with the additional property that after
the sharing stage, a dishonest dealer is either disqualified or the honest parties can reconstruct the
secret, even if shares sent by dishonest parties are spurious. When we say a set of shares of a secret
are valid, we mean the secret can be uniquely reconstructed solely from the set of shares distributed
among the parties.
In this chapter, we use the (dn/3e − 1)-resilient VSS scheme of Ben-Or et al. [BGW88] for the
synchronous setting and the (dn/4e − 1)-resilient VSS scheme of Ben-Or et al. [BCG93] for the
asynchronous setting. When run among n parties, both protocols incur poly(n) communication cost
and O(1) latency. We refer to the sharing stages of these protocols as VSS-Share and AVSS-Share,
and to their reconstruction stages as VSS-Reconst and AVSS-Reconst, respectively.
Classic MPC. Our main protocols rely on the classic (dn/3e − 1)-resilient MPC protocol of BenOr et al. [BGW88] for the synchronous setting and the classic (dn/4e − 1)-resilient MPC protocol
of Ben-Or et al. [BCG93] for the asynchronous setting. When run among n parties to compute a
circuit with d gates, both protocols send poly(n) bits and incur a latency of O(d). We refer to the
former protocol as CMPC and to the latter as ACMPC.
In this chapter, we use the above VSS and classic MPC protocols only among logarithmic-size
groups of parties and only for computing logarithmic-size circuits. Thus, the communication
overhead per invocation of these protocols will be polylog(n).
Byzantine Agreement. In the Byzantine agreement problem, each party is initially given an input
bit. All honest parties must agree on a bit which coincides with at least one of their input bits.
When parties only have access to secure pairwise channels, a protocol is required to ensure
secure (reliable) broadcast. This guarantees all parties receive the same message even if the
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broadcaster (dealer) is dishonest and sends different messages to different parties. Every time a
broadcast is required in our protocols, we use the Byzantine agreement algorithms of Feldman and
Micali [FM88]. We refer to their (dn/3e − 1)-resilient synchronous algorithm as BA and to their
(dn/4e − 1)-resilient asynchronous algorithm as ABA. When all parties participating in a run of a
broadcast protocol receive the same message, we say these messages are consistent.

2.4

Our Protocols

We now describe our protocols for scalable MPC in large networks. Throughout this section, we
consider the network model defined in Section 2.1.1. We first describe our synchronous protocol,
and then adapt this protocol to the asynchronous setting.
We assume that the parties have an arithmetic circuit C computing f ; the circuit consists of
m addition and multiplication gates. For convenience of presentation, we assume each gate has
in-degree and out-degree 2.1 For any two gates x and y in C, if the output of x is input to y, we say
that x is a child of y and that y is a parent of x. We assume the gates of C are numbered 1,2,. . . ,m,
where the gate numbered 1 is the output (root) gate.

2.4.1

Synchronous MPC

The high-level idea behind our protocols is to first create a sufficient number of quorums and assign
to each gate in the circuit one of these quorums. Then, for each party Pi holding an input x i ∈ F,
Pi secret-shares x i among all parties in the quorum associated with the i-th input gate. We refer to
such a quorum as an input quorum.
Next, the protocol evaluates the circuit gate-by-gate starting from input gates. Each gate is
jointly evaluated by parties of the quorum associated with this gate over the secret-shared inputs
provided by its children. In a similar way, the result of the gate is then used as the input to the
computation of the parent gate. Finally, the quorum associated with the root gate, constructs the
final result and sends it to all parties via a binary tree of quorums.
This high-level idea relies on solutions to the following main problems.
Quorum Building. Creating a sufficient number of quorums. In Section 2.7, we describe a randomized protocol called Build-Quorums that achieves this goal with high probability.
1 Our

protocol works, with minor modifications, for gates with arbitrary constant fan-in and fan-out.
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Protocol 1 Synchronous MPC
1. Quorum Building. All parties run Build-Quorums to agree on n good quorums Q1 ,...,Q n . The i-th gate of C is assigned to
Q (i mod n) , for all i ∈ [m].
2. Input Commitment. For all i ∈ [n], party Pi holding an input value x i ∈ F runs the following steps concurrently:
a) Pick a uniformly random element r i ∈ F, set D
x = x i + r i , and broadcast D
x to Q i .
b) Run VSS-Share to secret-share r i in Q i .
3. Circuit Evaluation. All parties participate in a run of Circuit-Eval to securely evaluate C.
4. Output Reconstruction. For the output gate z, parties in Q z ,
a) Run VSS-Reconst to reconstruct r z from its shares.
b) Set the circuit output message: y ← D
yz − r z .
c) Send y to all parties in the Q2 and Q3 .
5. Output Propagation. For every i ∈ {2,...,n}, parties in Q i perform the following steps:
a) Receive y from the Q bi/2c .
b) Send y to all parties in Q2i and Q2i+1 .

Circuit Evaluation. Securely evaluating each gate over secret-shared inputs by the parties inside a
quorum. In Section 2.4.1.2, we describe a protocol called Circuit-Eval that achieves this goal.
Share Renewal. Sending the result of one quorum to another without revealing any information to
any individual party or to any coalition of corrupted parties in both quorums. We solve this as part
of our gate evaluation protocol described in Section 2.4.1.2.
Protocol 1 is our main protocol. When we say a party VSS-shares (or secret-shares) a value s in
a quorum Q (or among a set of parties), we mean the party participates as the dealer with input s in
the protocol VSS-Share with all parties in Q (or in the set of parties).
The protocol starts by running Build-Quorums to create n quorums Q1 ,...,Q n . Then, it assigns
the gates of C to these quorums in the following way. The output gate of C is assigned to Q1 ; then,
every gate in C numbered i (other than the output gate) is assigned to Q (i mod n) . For each gate u ∈ C,
we let Qu denote the quorum associated with u, yu denote the output of u, ru be a random element
from F, and D
yv denote the masked output of u, where D
yu = yu + ru .
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CMPC

Same quorums

Same quorums

Qw

Qv

Qv

Qw

CMPC

CMPC

Figure 2.1: The gate gadgets for gate u and its left and right children
2.4.1.1

Input Commitment

Let Qi be the quorum associated with party Pi who holds input x i . At the start of our protocol, Pi
samples a value ri uniformly at random from F, sets D
x = x i + ri , and broadcasts D
x to all parties in Qi .
Next, Pi runs VSS-Share to secret-share ri among all parties in Qi .
2.4.1.2

Circuit Evaluation

The main idea for reducing the amount of communication required in evaluating the circuit is
quorum-based gate evaluation. If each party participates in the computation of the whole circuit, it
must communicate with all other parties. Instead, in quorum-based gate evaluation, each gate of the
circuit is computed by a gate gadget. A gate gadget (see Figure 2.1) consists of three quorums: two
input quorums and one output quorum. Input quorums are associated with the gate’s children which
serve inputs to the gate. The output quorum is associated with the gate itself and is responsible for
creating a shared random mask and maintaining the output of the quorum for later use in the circuit.
As depicted in Figure 2.1, these gate gadgets connect to form the entire circuit. In particular, for any
gate u, the output quorum of u’s gate gadget is the input quorum of the gate gadget for all of u’s
parents.
The parties in each gate gadget run CMPC among themselves to compute the gate operation. To
ensure privacy is preserved, each gate gadget maintains the invariant that the value computed by the
gadget is the value that the corresponding gate in the original circuit would compute, masked by a
uniformly random element of the field. This random element is not known to any individual party.
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Figure 2.2: Evaluation of gate u: (a) generating ru , (b) providing inputs to CMPC, (c) receiving the
masked outputs
Protocol 2 Circuit-Eval
Goal. Given a circuit C, the protocol securely evaluates C.
For every gate u ∈ C with children v,w ∈ C, parties in Q u , Q v , and Q w perform the following steps to compute the gate functionality:
1. Mask Generation. Parties in Q u run Gen-Rand to jointly generate a secret-shared random value r u ∈ F.
2. MPC in Quorums. The following parties participate in a run of CMPC with their corresponding inputs:
• Every party in Q u with his share of r u .
• Every party in Q v with his input

D
yv , his share of r v .
• Every party in Q w with his input

D
yw , his share of r w .

Instead, shares of it are held by the members of the output quorum. Thus, the output quorum can
participate as an input quorum for the evaluation of any parent gate and provide both the masked
version of the inputs and shares of the mask. The gate gadget computation is performed in the same
way for all gates in the circuit until the final output of the whole circuit is computed. After the input
commitment step, for each input gate u, parties in Qu know the masked input D
yu , and each has a
share of the mask ru .
The first step of the circuit evaluation is to generate shares of uniformly random field elements
for all gates. If a party is in a quorum at gate u, it generates shares of ru , a uniformly random
field element, by participating in the Gen-Rand protocol. These shares are needed as inputs to the
subsequent run of CMPC.
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Protocol 3 Gen-Rand
Goal. A set of parties P1 ,...,PN in a quorum want to agree on a secret-shared value r chosen uniformly at random from F.
1. For all i ∈ [N], party Pi chooses ρi ∈ F uniformly at random and VSS-shares it among all N parties.
2. For every j ∈ [N], let N 0 be the number of shares P j receives from the previous step, and ρ1 j ,..., ρ N 0 j be these shares. P j
PN 0
computes r j = k=1
ρk j .

Next, parties form the gadget for each gate u to evaluate the functionality of the gate using CircuitEval. Let v and w be the left and right children of u respectively. The gate evaluation process is

shown in Figure 2.2. The values yv and yw are the inputs to u, and yu is the its output as it would be
computed by a trusted party. Each party in Qu has a share of the random element ru via Gen-Rand.
Every party in Q v has the masked value yv + r v and a share of r v (respectively for Q w ).
As shown in Part (b) of Figure 2.2, all parties in the three quorums participate in a run of CMPC,
using their inputs, in order to compute D
yu = yu + ru . Part (c) of the figure shows the output of the
yu as well a share of ru .
gate evaluation after participating in CMPC. Each party in Qu now learns D
Therefore, parties in Qu now have the input required for performing the computation of parents of u
(if any). Note that both yu and ru remain unknown to any individual.
The gate evaluation is performed for all gates in C starting from the bottom to the top. The
output of the quorum associated with the output gate in C is the output of the entire algorithm. This
quorum will unmask the output via the output reconstruction step. The last step of the algorithm is
to send this output to all parties. We do this via a complete binary tree of quorums, rooted at the
output quorum.
2.4.1.3

Implementing the Gate Circuit

For every gate u ∈ C, the Circuit-Eval protocol requires a circuit (as we denote by Cu ) for unmasking
the masked inputs D
yv and D
yw , computing u’s functionality f u over the unmasked inputs, and masking
the output with the gate’s random value ru . This circuit is securely evaluated using the CMPC
protocol by the quorum associated with u.
For unmasking an input, Cu requires a reconstruction circuit, which given a set of shares, outputs
the corresponding secret. Since dishonest parties may send spurious shares, the circuit implements
the error-correcting algorithm of Berlekamp and Welch [BW86] to fix such corruptions. Then,
the resulting shares are given to an interpolation circuit which implements a simple polynomial
interpolation. Figure 2.3 depicts the circuit for gate u.
We now briefly describe the error correcting algorithm of Berlekamp and Welch [BW86]. Let
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Figure 2.3: Circuit of gate u
η

F p denote a finite field of prime order p, and S = {(x 1 , y1 ) | x i , yi ∈ F p }i=1 be a set of η points,
where η − ε of them are on a polynomial y = P(x) of degree τ, and the rest ε < (η − τ + 1)/2
points are erroneous. Given the set of points S, the goal is to find the polynomial P(x). The
algorithm proceeds as follows. Consider two polynomials E(x) = e0 + e1 x + ... + eε x ε of degree
ε, and Q(x) = q0 + q1 x + ... + qk x k of degree k ≤ ε + τ − 1 such that yi E(x i ) = Q(x i ) for all i ∈ [η].
This defines a system of η linear equations with ε + k = η variables e0 ,...,eε ,q0 ,...,qk that can be
solved efficiently using Gaussian elimination technique to get the coefficients of E(x) and Q(x).
Finally, calculate P(x) = Q(x)/E(x).
Since the Gaussian elimination algorithm over finite fields has O(n3 ) arithmetic complexity [Far88], the corresponding circuit has at most O(n3 ) levels. Since the interpolation circuit
consists of at most O(n2 ) arithmetic operations (using the Lagrange’s method [Abr74]), the overall
depth of the reconstruction circuit will be O(n3 ).

2.4.2

Asynchronous MPC

We now adapt our synchronous protocol to the asynchronous communication model. We do this by
modifying the following parts of Protocol 1:
1. We replace the synchronous subprotocols VSS-Share, VSS-Reconst, and CMPC with their
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corresponding asynchronous versions AVSS-Share, AVSS-Reconst, and ACMPC, respectively.
In Section 2.7, we describe a technique for adapting Build-Quorums to the asynchronous
setting.
2. At the end of the Input Commitment stage, the protocol should wait for at least n − t inputs
before proceeding to the Circuit Evaluation stage. To this end, we introduce a new subprotocol
called Wait-For-Inputs and invoke it right after step (b) of the Input Commitment stage. This
protocol is described in Section 2.4.2.1.
3. Although the protocol ACMPC terminates with probability one, its actual running time (i.e. ,
the number of rounds until it terminates) is a random variable with expected value O(D log N ),
where N is the number of parties participating in the MPC and D is the circuit depth [BCG93].
Since we run m instances of ACMPC (one for each gate of C), we need a method that allows
us to bound the running time of each gate, and thus to bound the expected running time
of our asynchronous MPC protocol. We describe a simple method for achieving this in
Section 2.4.2.2.
4. In the second step of Gen-Rand (Protocol 3), each party may receive less than N shares. This
is because
2.4.2.1

Implementing Wait-For-Inputs

The protocol Wait-For-Inputs counts the number of inputs that are successfully received by their
corresponding input quorums. This can be achieved using a solution to the threshold counting
problem: Count the number of inputs successfully received by each input quorum and return once
this number becomes greater than or equal to n − t. As a result of returning from Wait-For-Inputs,
the main protocol resumes and starts the circuit evaluation procedure.
In Section 2.6, we provide a solution to the threshold counting problem. We refer to this protocol
as Thresh-Count. This protocol creates a distributed tree structure called the count tree which is
known to all parties and determines how the parties communicate with each other to count of the
number of inputs.
Protocol 4 implements Wait-For-Inputs using our Thresh-Count algorithm. In Wait-For-Inputs,
the role of each party in Thresh-Count (i.e. , each node in the count tree) is played by a quorum of
parties. Once Thresh-Count terminates, the parties in each input quorum decide whether or not the
corresponding inputs are part of the computation.
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Protocol 4 Wait-For-Inputs
Goal. For every input quorum Q, all parties in a quorum Q wait until n − t inputs are received by the input quorums. For each party
Pi ∈ Q, Pi is initially holding two values D
x and r i , the i-th share of a random value r.
Each party Pi ∈ Q does the following:
1. Run Thresh-Count with flag bit bi initially set to zero.
2. If D
x and r i ’s are consistent and valid (based on the Byzantine agreement protocol and the verification stage of AVSS-Share
respectively), set bi ← 1 in Step 2(a) of Thresh-Count.
3. Upon receiving hDonei from the parent quorum, run ACMPC using bi as the input. d ← True if a 5/8-fraction of the parties
in Q have their bi ’s set to one. Otherwise, d ← False.
x ← Default and r i ← 0.
4. If d = False, then D

When run among quorums, Thresh-Count requires the quorums to communicate with each other.
We say a quorum Q sends a message M to quorum Q0, when every (honest) party in Q sends M to
every party in Q0. A party in Q0 is said to have received M from Q if it receives M from at least
7/8 of the parties in Q. When we say a party broadcasts a message M to a quorum Q, we mean the
party sends M to every party in Q, and then, all parties in Q run BA over their messages to ensure
they all hold the same message.
2.4.2.2

Bounding the Expected Running Time

Consider N parties in a quorum who want to jointly compute a circuit of depth D using the protocol
ACMPC. Let X denote the random variable corresponding to the number of rounds until an instance

of ACMPC terminates. From [BCG93], we have
E[X] = O(D log N ).
Instead of running only one instance of ACMPC, we run O(log N ) instances sequentially each for
2E[X] rounds. The output corresponding to the first instance that terminates will be returned as the
output of the gate. Using the Markov’s inequality,
Pr(X ≥ 2E[X]) ≤ 1/2.
In each gate of C, each party also participates in a run of Gen-Rand which itself calls AVSS-Share.
Similar to ACMPC, for each instance of AVSS-Share, we run O(log N ) instances sequentially each
for 2E[X] rounds. The sharing corresponding to the first instance that terminates will be accepted
by the parties.
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Since O(log N ) instances of ACMPC and AVSS-Share are executed in each gate, the computation
of the gate correctly terminates after at most
2E[X] log N = O(D log2 N )
rounds with high probability. Since C has m = poly (n) gates, using union bound over all gates of
C, our MPC algorithm correctly terminates with high probability. Finally, since C has depth d,
the expected running time of our asynchronous MPC protocol is O(Dd log2 N ). In Section 2.4.1.2,
we argued that the circuit computed by Circuit-Eval has depth D = polylog (n). Thus, the expected
running time of our protocol is O(d polylog(n)).

2.4.3

Remarks

As described in the introduction, the goal of MPC is to simulate a trusted third party in the
computation of the circuit, and then send back the computation result to the parties. Let S denote the
set of parties from whom input is received by the (simulated) trusted party. Recall that |S| ≥ n − t.1
Thus, for an arbitrary S, a description of S requires Ω(n) bits, and cannot be sent back to the parties
using only a scalable amount of communication. Therefore, we relax the standard requirement that
S be sent back to the parties. Instead, we require that at the end of the protocol each honest party
learns the output of f ; whether or not their own input was included in S; and the size of S.
Also note that although we have not explicitly included this in the input commitment step, it is
very easy for the parties to compute the size of the computation set S. Once each input quorum Qi
has performed the third step of Wait-For-Inputs and has agreed on the flag bi = 1, they can simply
use an addition circuit to add these bits together, and then disperse the result. This is an MPC, all of
whose inputs are held by honest parties, since each input flag bi is jointly held by the entire quorum
Qi , and all the quorums are good. Thus, the computation can afford to wait for all n inputs and
computes the correct sum.
In our both protocols, it may be the case that a party P participates more than one time in the
quorums performing a single instance of the classic MPC. In such a case, we allow P to play the
role of more than one different parties in CMPC and ACMPC, one for each quorum to which P
belongs. This ensures that the fraction of corrupted parties in any instance of the classic MPC is
always less than 1/3 for the synchronous case and 1/4 for the asynchronous case. We stress that
CMPC and ACMPC both maintain privacy guarantees even in the face of gossiping coalitions of
allow |S| > n −t because the adversary is not limited to delivering one message at a time; two or more messages
may be received simultaneously.
1 We
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constant size. Thus, each party will learn no information beyond the output and its own inputs after
running these protocols.

2.5

Proof of Theorem 2.1.2

We first describe the UC framework in Section 2.5.1, and then give a sketch of our proof in
Section 2.5.2. We prove the UC-security of Protocol 1 in sections 2.5.3 to 2.5.5. Finally, we
calculate the resource costs of this protocol in Section 2.5.7.

2.5.1

The UC Framework

The UC framework is based on the simulation paradigm [Gol00], where the protocol is considered
in two models: ideal and real. In the ideal model, the parties send their inputs to a trusted party
who computes the function and sends the outputs to the parties. We refer to the algorithm run by the
trusted party in the ideal model as the functionality of the protocol. In the real model, parties run
the actual protocol that assumes no trusted party. We refer to a run of the protocol in one of these
models as the execution of the protocol in that model.
A protocol P securely computes a functionality FP if for every adversary A in the real model,
there exists an adversary S in the ideal model, such that the result of a real execution of P with A
is indistinguishable from the result of an ideal execution with S. The adversary in the ideal model,
S, is called the simulator.
The simulation paradigm provides security only in the stand-alone model. To prove security
under composition, the UC framework introduces an adversarial entity called the environment,
denoted by Z, who generates the inputs to all parties, reads all outputs, and interacts with the
adversary in an arbitrary way throughout the computation. The environment also chooses inputs for
the honest parties and gets their outputs when the protocol is finished.
A protocol is said to UC-securely compute an ideal functionality if for any adversary A that
interacts with the protocol there exists a simulator S such that no environment Z can tell whether it
is interacting with a run of the protocol and A, or with a run of the ideal model and S.
Now, consider a protocol P that has calls to ` subprotocols P1 ,...,P` which are already proved
to be UC-secure. To facilitate the security proof of P, we can make use of the hybrid model, where
the subprotocols are assumed to be ideally computed by a trusted third-party. In other words, we
replace each call to a subprotocol with a call to its corresponding functionality. This hybrid model
is usually called the (P1 ,...,P` )-hybrid model. We say P is UC-secure in the hybrid model if P in
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the hybrid model is indistinguishable by the adversary from P in the ideal model. The modular
composition theorem [Can00] states that if P1 ,...,P` are all UC-secure, and P is UC-secure in the
hybrid model, then P is UC-secure in the real model.

2.5.2

Proof Sketch

Before proceeding to the proof, we remark that the error probability in Theorem 2.1.2 comes entirely
from the possibility that Build-Quorums or the threshold counting procedure may fail to output
correct results. All other components of our protocol are deterministic and thus have no error
probability. We also assume that, at the beginning of our MPC protocol, the parties have already
agreed on n good quorums, and the threshold counting procedure is performed successfully.1
As in [Gol04], we refer to the security in the presence of a malicious adversary controlling t
parties t-security. For every gate u ∈ C, let Iu denote the set of the corrupted parties in the quorum
associated with u. Also, let I denote the set of all corrupted parties, where |I | < t.
Our goal is to prove the UC-security of Protocol 1. To do this, we must show two steps. Step
1) is to show that each of our subprotocols are UC-secure. Step 2) is to show that our protocol is
UC-secure in the hybrid model. Once we show these two steps, then by the modular composition
theorem, we conclude that our protocol is UC-secure in the real model.
In Lemma 2.5.7, we show Step 2, that the adversary can not distinguish the execution of the
hybrid model from the ideal model.
We next describe our approach to Step 1, which is more challenging. For this step, we make use
of a theorem that will help us show that our subprotocols are UC-secure. Kushilevitz et al. [KLR10]
show Theorem 2.5.1. This theorem targets perfectly-secure protocols that are shown secure using a
straight-line black-box simulator. A black-box simulator is a simulator that is given only oracle
access to the adversary (see [Gol00] Section 4.5 for a detailed definition). Such a simulator is
straight-line if it interacts with the adversary in the same way as real parties, meaning that it proceeds
round by round without ever going back.
Theorem 2.5.1 ([KLR10]). Every protocol that is perfectly-secure in the stand-alone model and
has a straight-line black-box simulator is UC-secure.
We first define the ideal functionalities shown in Table 2.2 that correspond to the subprotocols
used in Protocol 1. We then prove that Protocol 1 is t-secure in the (FBA , FVSS-Share , FVSS-Reconst ,
1 For

simplicity, we assume the primitive Build-Quorums is run only once, and it does not run concurrently with
other protocols.
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Table 2.2: Ideal functionalities
Functionality Implemented by
FBA
Protocol BA
FVSS-Share
Protocol VSS-Share
FVSS-Reconst Protocol VSS-Reconst
FCMPC
Protocol CMPC
FGen-Rand
Protocol Gen-Rand
FInput
Input Commitment stage of Protocol 1
FCircuit-Eval
Protocol Circuit-Eval
FOutput
Output Reconstruction and Output
Propagation stages of Protocol 1
FCMPC , FGen-Rand , FInput , FCircuit-Eval , FOutput )-hybrid model. Finally, we use Theorem 2.5.1 to infer
the UC-security of Protocol 1.
In order to prove the t-security of Protocol 1 in the hybrid model, we first show that all of
our subprotocols are UC-secure. Similar to the above approach, we first prove t-security of every
subprotocol in its corresponding hybrid model using a straight-line black-box simulator, and then
use Theorem 2.5.1 to infer its UC-security.
To prove the t-security of a protocol Π, we describe a simulator SΠ that simulates the real
protocol execution by running a copy of Π in the ideal model. For each call to a secure subprotocol
π, the simulator calls the corresponding ideal functionality Fπ . A view of a corrupted party from
execution of a protocol is defined as the set of all messages it receives during the execution of
that protocol. At every stage of the simulation process, SΠ adds the messages received by every
corrupted party in that stage to its view of the simulation. This is achieved by running a copy of
Π for each corrupted party with its actual input as well as by running a copy of Π for each honest
party with a dummy input.1 The view of the adversary is then defined as the combined view of all
corrupted parties.

2.5.3

Security of Input Commitment

Before proceeding to the proof of security for Input Commitment stage, we show the following
auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2.5.2. If a quorum Q sends to a quorum Q0 a message M, it is eventually received by all
honest parties in Q0.
1S
Π

learns neither the actual inputs nor the actual outputs of the honest parties.

26

Protocol 5 FInput
Goal. The functionality guarantees valid inputs are received by at least n − t input quorums. Then, the functionality notifies all
input quorums to proceed to the next stage of the protocol with either a valid input or a default input.
Functionality:
1. Wait to receive at least n − t valid inputs from the set of all n parties. For every such input x i , the functionality receives
D
x i = x i + r i and r i from party Pi where i ∈ [n]. Let S denote the set of parties whose inputs have been accepted (Note that
if Pi ∈ S, then D
yi and r i are valid).
2. If Pi < S, then define D
yi = 0 and r i = 0.
3. Broadcast hDonei and yi ←x i + r i to Q i and run FVSS-Share to secret-share r i in Q i .

Proof. Recall that when Q sends M to Q0, every honest party in Q sends M to all parties in Q0. A
party in Q0 considers itself to have received the message M from Q if it receives M from at least 7/8
of the parties in Q. Since n quorums have successfully been formed, more than 7/8 of the parties in
each quorum are honest. In particular, this is true for Q. Thus, at least 7/8 of the members of Q send
M to each member of Q0. Since the adversary must eventually deliver all the messages that have
been sent, albeit with arbitrary delays, it follows that eventually each honest party in Q0 receives M


from at least 7/8 of the members of Q.



We now proceed to the proof of the Input Commitment stage. The ideal functionality, FInput ,
is given in Protocol 5. This functionality creates a set S containing the index of the parties whose
inputs have been accepted (as defined in Step 1 of Protocol 5) by the protocol to be used for the
computation. If a party’s input is not in S, then the functionality sets this input to the default value.
Next, the functionality sends each masked input xDi to quorum Qi and secret-shares the mask ri in
Qi . In Lemma 2.5.3, we show the Input Commitment stage in Protocol 1 correctly implements this
functionality. Thus, the parties in Qi eventually either have received consistent VSS-shares of x i
and have agreed on xDi = x i + ri as well as on i being in S or they have agreed that i < S and have set
these values to the predefined value and r v and all its shares to 0. We say that a quorum has come to
agreement on X if all honest parties in the quorum agree on X.
Lemma 2.5.3. The Input Commitment stage of Protocol 1 is UC-secure.
Proof. First, we show that corrupted parties cannot do anything but choose their input as they wish;
thus, the Input Commitment stage correctly computes FInput . This means that all honest parties
receive the hDonei message. Moreover, there exists a set S such that for every i ∈ [n], the following
statements hold:
1. All parties in Qi eventually agree whether i ∈ S or not.
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2. At least n − t input quorums agree that their corresponding party’s index is in S.
3. All parties in Qi agree that party i ∈ S if and only if they collectively hold enough shares to
reconstruct Pi ’s input. If all parties in Qi agree that i ∈ S, then party Pi ’s input will be used in
the computation. Otherwise, the default value will be used instead.
First, since there are n − t honest parties, at least n − t valid inputs are eventually sent to
Thresh-Count. Based on Theorem 2.6.1, all parties will be notified when n − t inputs are received.

Each party in Qi has set its flag bit to either 1 or 0 depending on whether it has received a valid
input share from Pi . Let q = |Qi |. Upon receiving the hDonei message, the parties in Qi run the
third step of Wait-For-Inputs to decide whether at least

5q
8

of them have set their flag bit to 1. If they

have, they assume i ∈ S.
If i ∈ S, then at least

7q
8

of the parties in Qi have received input shares from Pi before they

received the hDonei message. Of these, more than

3q
4

parties in Qi are honest and have set their

flag bit to 1. Since CMPC in Line 3 starts even if as many as q/8 inputs are missing, the parties in
Qi will correctly decide that at least

5q
8

flag bits among them are set to 1. Thus, the parties in Qi

all agree that i ∈ S. If i < S, then CMPC in Line 3 has determined that less than

5q
8

flag bits are set

to 1. Since Qi contains less than q/8 corrupted parties, more than q/2 parties set their flags to 0
and the parties in Qi all agree that i < S. As a result, at least n − t input quorums agree that their
corresponding inputs are in S, and hence |S| ≥ n − t.
We prove the t-security of the Input Commitment stage in the (FVSS-Share , FVSS-Reconst ,FCMPC )hybrid model which is similar to the Input Commitment stage of Protocol 1 except that every
call to its subprotocols is replaced with a call to their corresponding functionality. We define the
corresponding simulator SInput in Protocol 6.
Let V1 denote the view of the adversary from the hybrid execution, and V2 be its view from the
simulation. The inputs to Thresh-Count and Line 3 of Protocol 4 are completely independent of the
inputs of Protocol 1. Thus, V1 contains only the masked inputs, xDi ’s, and at most 1/8 fraction of
the shares for each random mask, ri ’s. The masked inputs convey no information about the inputs.
Moreover, a 1/8 fraction of the shares are not enough to reconstruct the random number. Since V2
contains all random elements, the adversary cannot distinguish V1 from V2 . Since our simulator
is straight-line and black-box, it follows from Theorem 2.5.1 that the Input Commitment stage is


UC-secure.
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Protocol 6 SInput
For every i ∈ [n], party Pi holds an input x i ∈ F. Associated with this input, we consider a quorum Q i . Let Ii denote the set of
corrupted parties in Q i , and let I denote the set of all corrupted parties among P1 ,...,Pn .
Inputs. {r i }i ∈[n] , and {D
x i }i ∈[n] from parties in I (set of all corrupted parties).
Simulation:
1. For every i ∈ [n], if Pi ∈ I, send x i + r i to all parties in Q i , and run FVSS-Share to secret-share r i in Q i .
2. If Pi < I,
a) Choose r i and x i uniformly at random from F and D
xi ← xi + ri .
b) Send D
x i to all parties in Q i .
c) Run FVSS-Share to secret-share r i in Q i .
d) For every party in Ii , add his share of r i and D
x i to his view.
3. For every party in Q i , run Wait-For-Inputs to wait for at least n − t inputs.
a) Run FThresh-Count with flag bi initially set to zero to count the number of received inputs.
b) If x i and r i are valid and consistent (based on the broadcast protocol and the verification stage of VSS-Reconst
respectively), raise an event to set bi ← 1 in FThresh-Count .
c) Upon receiving hDonei from the parent quorum, run CMPC using bi as your input to set d ← True if a 5/8-fraction
of the parties in Q have their bi ’s set to one. Otherwise, d ← False.
d) If d is set to False, then set y ← Default and r i ← 0.

Protocol 7 FGen-Rand
Goal. For a gate u ∈ C, generate a random value r ∈ F and VSS-share it among parties P1 ,...,PN in the quorum associated with u.
Functionality:
1. Receive inputs ρ1 ,..., ρ N ∈ F from P1 ,...,PN respectively. For every i ∈ [N], if Pi does not send an input, then define
ρi = 0.
2. Calculate r =

2.5.4

ρ
i=1 i

PN

and invoke FVSS-Share to send a share r i of r to Pi .

Security of Circuit Evaluation

We first prove the security of Gen-Rand. The ideal functionality FGen-Rand is given in Protocol 7.
At least 7n/8 of the inputs ρ1 ,..., ρ N are sent by honest parties and thus are chosen uniformly and
PN
independently at random from F. Hence, r = i=1
ρi is also a uniform and independent random
element of F. This is because the sum of elements of F is uniformly random if at least one of them
is uniformly random.
Lemma 2.5.4. The protocol Gen-Rand is UC-secure.
Proof. We prove the t-security of Gen-Rand in the FVSS-Share -hybrid model which is similar to
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Protocol 8 SGen-Rand
Inputs. For a gate u ∈ C, the inputs { ρ j } P j ∈Iu of the corrupted parties P1 ,...,PN in the quorum associated with u.
Simulation:
1. For every Pi ∈ (Q u − Iu ) (i.e. , for every honest party Pi ), call FVSS-Share with dummy input 0. Let s1i ,...,s iN denote the
outputs.
2. For every P j ∈ Iu ,
j
j
a) Run FVSS-Share with input ρ j . Let ρ1 ,..., ρ N denote the outputs. For every k ∈ [N], add ρkj to the view of P j .
PN
b) Compute r j = k=1
ρkj and add r j to the view of P j .

Protocol 9 FCircuit-Eval
Goal. For each gate u ∈ C with children v,w ∈ C, 3N parties P1 ,...,P3N provide inputs to the functionality to allow it evaluate the
functionality of u denoted by f u .
Functionality:
(i)
1. For every i ∈ [N], receive ρi from Pi , D
yv and r v(i) from Pi+N , and D
yw and r w
from Pi+2N respectively.

2. Run FGen-Rand with inputs ρ1 ,..., ρ N to generate r u(1) ,...,r u(N ) .
3. Run FCMPC to locally compute the following functionality:
a) r u ← FVSS-Reconst over r u(1) ,...,r u(N ) .
b) r v ← FVSS-Reconst over r v(1) ,...,r v(N ) .
(1)
(N )
c) r w ← FVSS-Reconst over r w
,...,r w
.

d) y1 ← D
yv − r v
e) y2 ← D
yw − r w
f) D
yu ← f u (y1 , y2 ) + r u

Protocol 3 except that every call to VSS-Share is replaced with a call to the ideal functionality
FVSS-Share . The corresponding simulator SGen-Rand is given in Protocol 8.
The views of the corrupted parties in the hybrid execution and the simulation are indistinguishable because the only difference between the two views is that SGen-Rand generates the shares from
dummy input 0 instead of actual inputs. Since FVSS-Share generates uniform and independent random
shares from any input, the two views are identically distributed. Since our simulator is straight-line


and black-box, Gen-Rand is UC-secure.



We now proceed to the security proof of Circuit-Eval. The ideal functionality FCircuit-Eval is given
in Protocol 9.
Lemma 2.5.5. The protocol Circuit-Eval is UC-secure.
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Protocol 10 SCircuit-Eval
For every gate u ∈ C with children v,w ∈ C, consider three groups of parties Q u ,Q v , and Q w , each of whom have N parties. In
each group, up to N/8 parties are corrupted.
Inputs. { ρi } Pi ∈Iu ,{r u(i) } Pi ∈(Iv ∪Iw ) , and D
yv and D
yw from parties in Iv ∪ Iw .
Simulation:
1. Run FGen-Rand with the following inputs: ρi for every Pi ∈ Iu and a dummy input for every party in Q u − Iu . Let
{r u(i) } Pi ∈Q u denote the outputs. For every Pi ∈ Iu , add r u(i) to the view of Pi .
2. Let Q 4 = Q u ∪ Q v ∪ Q w and I 4 = Iu ∪ Iv ∪ Iw . Run FCMPC to compute the functionality defined in Line 3 of FCircuit-Eval
with the following inputs: the input of every party in I 4 as described in FCircuit-Eval , and a dummy input for every party in
Q 4 − I 4 . Let D
yu denote the output. For every party in I 4 , add D
yu to the view of the party.

Proof. We first show that for each gate u ∈ C, FCircuit-Eval correctly computes D
yu = yu + ru . Based
on FInput and FGen-Rand , for each gate u ∈ C, the inputs of the honest parties in Qu are enough to
reconstruct ru . If u is an input gate not included in the computation from the Input Commitment
stage, then ru and its shares are 0. Thus, all three values of ru , r v , and r w can be correctly
reconstructed by the functionality since FVSS-Reconst can tolerate up to a 1/4 fraction of the inputs
being invalid.
We prove D
yu = yu + ru by induction on the height of u, where yu is the correct output of the gate
u. The base case is correct because based on the correctness of FInput , for each input gate v 0, we have
D
yv 0 = yv 0 + r v 0 and r v 0 can correctly be reconstructed from the inputs received from honest parties in
Q v 0 . Suppose that for all gates u0 whose height is less than the height of u, the functionality can
compute D
yu 0 = yu 0 + ru 0 and ru 0 . This induction hypothesis is valid for v and w.
We now describe the induction step. In the computation of u, the functionality runs FCMPC . We
now argue based on the definition of the function computed by FCMPC that the output of FCMPC is
D
yu = ru + yu . By the induction hypothesis, the functionality can reconstruct correct r v and r w and
consequently it can correctly find yv and yw even if a 1/8 fraction of the inputs are missing. It
is because the majority of the parties in Q v and Q w hold correct values of D
yv and D
yw . Thus, the
functionality can correctly compute f u (yv , yw ) + ru .
We now prove the t-security of Circuit-Eval in the (FGen-Rand ,FCMPC )-hybrid model which is
similar to Protocol 2 except that every call to CMPC and Gen-Rand is replaced with a call to FCMPC
and FGen-Rand respectively. The corresponding simulator SCircuit-Eval is given in Protocol 10.
We now show that the views of the corrupted parties in the hybrid execution and the simulation
are indistinguishable. After the evaluation of u, the following information will be added to the view
( j)

of every corrupted party Pi ∈ I4 : D
yu and {ru }P j ∈Iu . Recall that D
yu is the output of FCMPC during the
computation of u which is equal to yu + ru , and ru is a uniformly random element of F based on
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FGen-Rand , independent of all other randomness in the algorithm.
First, if a corrupted party Pi is not in any of the quorums associated with u,v, and w, then no
additional information will be added to its view during the computation of u; thus, its view will be
identically distributed in the hybrid execution and the simulation.
Second, a corrupted party Pi ∈ I4 may add a share ru as well as shares of the individual random
elements whose sum is ru to its view in the computation of FGen-Rand . Also, it adds yu + ru to its
view. However, Pi cannot learn any additional information about the shares of ru (and thus about
ru ) based on FCMPC and FGen-Rand . In other words, the parties in I4 are unable to directly determine
ru , since the only relevant inputs are the shares of ru , and they do not have enough of those since
they have fewer than half of them.
These parties also do not have enough shares of shares of ru to reconstruct it. However, they
add to their view shares of each of the other shares of ru multiple times: once during the input stage
of FCMPC in which u is involved, and once during the computation of the parent of u. Each time,
they do not get enough shares of shares ru to reconstruct any shares of ru . But, can they combine
the shares of shares from different runs for the same secret to gain some information? Since fresh
and independent randomness was used by the dealers creating these shares on each run, the shares
from each run are independent of the other runs, and so they do not collectively give any more
information than each of the runs give separately. Since each run does not give the parties in I4
enough shares to reconstruct anything, it follows that they do not learn any information about ru .
Second, parties in I4 add shares of shares for r v and r w to their views. However, with a similar
argument as ru , they cannot reconstruct r v and r w as well even if these parties participate in one or
more of the instances of FCMPC which involve v or w: the computation of v or w themselves or the
computations of u as their parents.
Moreover, D
yu is also a random element in the field since ru is uniformly random and D
yu = yu + ru .
Thus, D
yu holds no information about yu , and the corrupted parties cannot learn any information
about yu except what is implicit in his input and the circuit output. This means that the corrupted
parties cannot distinguish if they are participating in a run of the hybrid model or the simulation.
Finally, since SCircuit-Eval is straight-line and black-box, Circuit-Eval is UC-secure.

2.5.5





Security of Output Stages

The ideal functionality for the Output Reconstruction and the Output Propagation stages of Protocol 1
are given in Protocol 11.
Lemma 2.5.6. The Output Reconstruction and Output Propagation stages of Protocol 1 are UC32

Protocol 11 FOutput
Goal. The functionality guarantees the output is reconstructed correctly and it is learned by all honest parties.
Functionality:
1. Run FVSS-Reconst to reconstruct the output.
2. Send the output to all the parties.

Protocol 12 SOutput
Inputs. For the output gate z and the corresponding quorum Q z , the inputs of the simulator are {r z(i) } Pi ∈Iz , and D
yz from parties in
Iz .
Simulation:
1. Run FVSS-Reconst with inputs {r z(i) } Pi ∈Iz and dummy inputs for honest parties. Add the output to the view of parties in Iz .
2. For every i ∈ {2,...,n}, parties in Q i perform the following steps:
a) Receive y from Q bi/2c and add it to the view of every parties in I bi/2c .
b) Send y to all parties in Q2i and Q2i+1 .

secure.
Proof. We first show that the two stages correctly compute FOutput . Let z be the output gate of C. By
Lemma 2.5.5, all parties in the output quorum Q z eventually agree on y z + r z and hold shares of r z .
In the Output Reconstruction stage, these parties run the VSS-Reconst. Since at least a 7/8 fraction
of them are honest, they correctly reconstruct r z . Since all honest parties in Q z know y z + r z and
subtract from it the reconstructed r z , they all eventually learn y z . Thus, all parties in Q z eventually
learn y z .
We now show by induction that all honest parties eventually learn y z . Since Q1 is assigned to
the output gate, it provides a base case. For i > 1, consider the parties in Qi , and for all j < i assume
the correct output is learned by all parties in Q j . During the Output Propagation stage, the parties
in Qi receive putative values for the output from the parties at Q bi/2c . Since Q bi/2c is good, and by
induction hypothesis all honest parties in it have learned the correct output, it follows that all honest
parties in quorum Q bi/2c send the same message which is the correct output. By Lemma 2.5.2, all
honest parties in Qi eventually learn the correct output. By induction, all the parties learn the correct
value.
We now prove the t-security of the output stages in the FVSS-Reconst -hybrid model. The corresponding simulator SOutput is given in Protocol 12. The views of the corrupted parties in the hybrid
execution and the simulation are indistinguishable since the only message that is added to the view
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of the adversary is the output. Based on the security definition of MPC, the adversary is allowed to


learn the output.

2.5.6



Security of Protocol 1

We now show that our main protocol is UC-secure.
Lemma 2.5.7. Protocol 1 is UC-secure.
Proof. Canetti [Can95] proves the t-security of VSS-Share, VSS-Reconst, and CMPC using straightline black-box simulators. So, based on Theorem 2.5.1, these protocols are UC-secure. Moreover,
Lindell et al. [LLR06] show that any Byzantine agreement protocol in the standard model (such
as the protocol of [CR93]) is UC-secure. Hence, the Byzantine agreement of [FM88] is also
UC-secure.
Protocol 1 is t-secure since in lemmas 2.5.3, 2.5.5, and 2.5.6 we showed that all stages of the
Protocol 1 are t-secure. Based on Theorem 2.5.1, since we have proved the t-security of Protocol 1
using a straight-line black-box simulator, the protocol is also UC-secure.

2.5.7





Cost Analysis

We now analyze the resource costs of Protocol 1.
Lemma 2.5.8. During the Input stage, each quorum sends at most O(log n) messages.
Proof. For the input stage, each quorum is mapped to at most one of the input gates and hence one
of the nodes in the count tree. Thus, from Theorem 2.6.1 it follows that the total number of messages
sent by each quorum is O(log n). Since each quorum has log n parties, an additional polylog(n)
messages are sent by each quorum during VSS-Share and VSS-Reconst to check whether the input


is correctly secret-shared.



Lemma 2.5.9. If all honest parties follow Protocol 1, then with high probability, each party sends
√
at most Õ(m/n + n) messages.
√
Proof. By Theorem 2.7.1, we need to send Õ( n) messages per party to build the quorums.
Subsequently, each party must send messages for each quorum in which it is a member. Recall that
each party is in Θ(log n) quorums.
By Lemma 2.5.8, each quorum sends Õ(log(n)) messages during Input stage. Recall that each

quorum is mapped to Θ m+n
nodes of C. A quorum runs Gen-Rand and the gate evaluation
n
34

step of Circuit-Eval once per node it is mapped to in C. Since each gate has in-degree two and
out-degree at most two, a quorum runs CMPC at most three times for every node it is mapped to in
C. Also, at most polylog(n) messages are sent per party per instance of CMPC, Gen-Rand, and gate
evaluation. Finally, each quorum sends O(log n) messages in the dissemination of the output. Thus,
each quorum sends polylog(n) messages per node it represents. It follows that each party sends
√
Õ(m/n + n) messages.


Lemma 2.5.10. If all honest parties follow Protocol 1, with high probability, the total latency is
O(d polylog(n)) where d is depth of the circuit the protocol computes.
Proof. Based on Theorem 2.7.1, the latency for creating quorums is polylog(n). Based on Theorem 2.6.1, the latency for the Thresh-Count algorithm is O(log n) which implies that the Input
Commitment stage also has polylog(n) latency.
In the computation of the circuit, to evaluate the gate g in the upper level of the circuit, first its
input gates in lower level of the circuit must be evaluated. This implies that the evaluation of the
circuit is level by level and the latency for evaluating the circuit is O(d) times the latency of CMPC


over log n parties.

2.6



Asynchronous Threshold Counting

In this section, we present an asynchronous Monte Carlo algorithm called Thresh-Count which
solves the threshold counting problem and provides the following theorem proved in Section 2.6.4.
Our threshold counting algorithm runs in a setting with n honest parties in a fully-connected
network with private and authenticated channels and asynchronous communication. In our asynchronous MPC protocol presented in Section 2.4, we run Thresh-Count among a set of quorums,
where each quorum represents an honest party.
Theorem 2.6.1. The algorithm Thresh-Count solves the threshold counting problem with high
probability, while ensuring:
1. Each party sends at most O(log n) messages of constant size,
2. Each party receives at most O(log n) messages,
3. Each party performs O(log n) computations,
4. Total latency is O(log n).
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Recall that in the threshold counting problem there are n honest parties in an asynchronous
communication network with private channels. Each party has an input flag which is initially 0. At
least τ of the parties’ bits will eventually be set to 1 based on an external event. When this happens,
we say the threshold is reached. The goal is for each of the parties to terminate at some time after
the threshold is reached.
Although in our application τ is linear in n, we address the more general case, where τ = O(n).
Our algorithm depends on prior knowledge of τ. As specified in Theorem 2.6.1, each party
running the algorithm sends and receives O(log n) messages of constant size and performs O(log n)
computations; moreover the total latency is O(log n).
For ease of presentation, we first describe an algorithm which works when τ = Θ(n), in particular,
when τ is at least n/2. We then indicate why this fails when τ is smaller, and show how to modify it
so that it works for all τ. The formal algorithm is shown as Protocol 13.
Consider a complete binary tree where each party sends its input to a unique leaf node when it
is set to 1. Then, for every node v, each child of v sends v a message giving the number of inputs it
has received so far and it sends a new message every time this number changes. The problem with
this approach is that it is not load-balanced: each node at depth i has n/2i descendants in the tree,
and therefore, in the worst case, sends and receives n/2i messages. Thus, a child of the root sends
n/2 messages to the root and receives the same number of messages from its children.
To solve the load-balancing problem, we use a randomized approach which ensures with high
probability that each leaf of the data structure receives at least 7 log n messages and does not
communicate with its parent until it has done so. Subsequent messages it receives are not forwarded
to its parent but rather to other randomly chosen leaves to ensure a close to uniform distribution of
the messages.
Our algorithm consists of up and down stages. For the up stage the parties are arranged in a
predetermined tree data structure, which we call the count tree. The count tree consists of a root
node with O(log n) children, each of which is itself the root of a complete binary tree; these subtrees
have varying depths as depicted in Figure 2.4. In the up stage, parties in the trees count the number
of 1-inputs, i.e. , the number of parties’ inputs that are set to 1. The root then eventually decides
when the threshold is reached. In the down stage, the root notifies all the parties of this event via a
complete binary tree of depth log n. Note that the tree used in the down stage has the same root as
the count tree.
τ
Let D = dlog 14 log
n e. Note that D = O(log n). The root of the count tree has degree D. Each

of the D children of the root is itself the root of a complete binary subtree, which we will call a
collection subtree. For 1 ≤ j ≤ D, the jth collection subtree has depth D + 1 − j. Party 1 is assigned
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Figure 2.4: The count tree for n = 2048 and τ = 1232. D = dlog 14×11
the root, nodes marked A are adding nodes, and nodes marked C are collection nodes.

to the root and parties 2 to D + 1, are assigned to its children, i.e. , the roots of the collection subtrees,
with party j + 1 being assigned to the jth child. The remaining nodes of the collection trees are
assigned parties in order, starting with D + 2, left to right and top to bottom. One can easily see
that the entire data structure has fewer than n nodes, (in fact it has fewer than

τ
3 log n

nodes) so some

parties will not be assigned to any node.
The leaves of each collection subtree are collection nodes, while the internal nodes of each
collection tree are adding nodes.

2.6.1

Up Stage

When a party’s input is set to 1, it sends a hFlagi message, which we will sometimes simply refer to
as a flag, to a uniformly random collection node from the first collection subtree. Intuitively, we
want the flags to be distributed as evenly as possible among the collection nodes. The parameters of
the algorithm are set up so that with high probability each collection node receives at least 7 log n
hFlagi messages.
Each collection node in the j-th collection tree waits until it has received 7 log n flags. It then
sends its parent a hCounti message. For each additional flag received, up to 14 log n, it chooses a
uniformly random collection node in the ( j + 1)-st collection subtree and forwards a flag to it. If
j = D, then it forwards these 14 log n flags directly to the root. Subsequent flags are ignored. Again,
we use the randomness to ensure a close to even distribution of flags with high probability.
Each adding node waits until it has received a hCounti message from each of its children. Then,
it sends a hCounti message to its parent. We note that, with high probability, each adding node
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sends exactly one message during the algorithm. The parameters of the algorithm are arranged so
that all the hCounti messages that are sent in the the jth collection subtree together account for τ/2 j
of the 1-inputs. Thus, all the hCounti messages in all the collection subtrees together account for


τ 1 − 21D of the 1-inputs. At least 2τD 1-inputs remain unaccounted for. These 1-inputs and up to
O(log n) more are collected as flags at the root.

2.6.2

Down Stage

When party 1, at the root, has accounted for at least τ 1-inputs, it starts the down stage by sending
the hDonei message to parties 2 and 3. For j > 1, when party j receives the hDonei message, it
forwards this message to parties 2 j and 2 j + 1. Thus, eventually the hDonei message reaches all the
parties, who then learn that the threshold has been met.
Note that all three types of messages sent in this protocol, hFlagi, hCounti and hDonei, are
notifications only; they do not contain any numerical value. Since 2 bits are sufficient to distinguish
three different kinds of messages, all the messages sent in this protocol are 2-bit strings. Note that
we distinguish between flags and hCounti messages since the root receives both kinds. However it is
the only node for which this is a problem. We could add another node, as the (D + 1)st child of the
root, (equivalently as a collection subtree of depth 0,) which waits for 14 log n messages, and sends
a hCounti message to the root. In so doing, we could eliminate the need to explicitly distinguish
hFlagi and hCounti message, since they would be automatically distinguished by the role of the
receiving node. Thus, we could actually reduce all message lengths to a single bit.

2.6.3

Handling Sublinear Thresholds

Now, we consider the case where τ = o(n). It is easy to see that the worst load in terms of the
number of received messages is when all n inputs are 1. In this case, a collection node in the first
collection subtree receives, on average, 14(n/τ) log n flags. When τ = Θ(n), this is still O(log n),
but when τ = o(n) this is ω(log n). Before we describe how to fix this, we note that the problem
exists only in the leaves of the first collection subtree. Subsequent collection nodes receive only
O(log n) flags, because each node only forwards up to 14 log n flags.
For the sake of having a definite cutoff and tractable constants, we will apply the following fix
whenever τ < n/2. Below each collection node in the first collection tree, we put in a filter, which is
a complete binary tree of depth log n − 2 − D with

7n log n
2τ

leaves. This is equivalent to extending the

first collection tree to depth log n − 2 so that it has n/4 leaves. The collection nodes will remain at
depth D though. See Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: The count tree for n = 2048 and τ = 616. D = dlog 14×11
the root, nodes marked A are adding nodes and nodes marked C are collection nodes. The filters,
marked F, are complete binary trees of depth 7, with 128 leaves each, for a total of 512 filter leaves.

When a party’s input is set to 1, it selects a random collection node in the first collection tree,
but rather than sending a flag directly to it, it sends the flag to a random leaf of the collection node’s
filter. The nodes in the filter simply forward any flags they receive, up to 21 log n, to their parent in
the filter. Subsequent flags are ignored. Clearly, this means that the collection node at the root of the
filter cannot receive more than 42 log n flags, which solves the load problem. Moreover, we have
not simply transfered the problem to the leaves of the filter. Since there are so many more of them,
each one actually receives fewer flags on average and the parameters are adjusted to make their
maximum load O(log n) with high probability. As we will also see in the analysis, these filters do
not filter out too many flags; when there are only τ 1-inputs among the parties, with high probability
all the flags get through.

2.6.4

Proof of Theorem 2.6.1

In this section, we prove the correctness and resource costs of Protocol 13. The process of each
party independently selecting a random collection node to notify after its input has been set to 1 can
be modeled as a balls and bins problem and hence be approximated by the Poisson distribution.
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Protocol 13 Thresh-Count
Goal. n is the number of parties, τ is the threshold, b is a flag bit initially set to zero which may be set to one by an external event
τ
throughout the protocol and D = dlog( 14 log
n )e. The algorithm notifies all the parties upon receiving τ flag bits set to one.
1. Setup. No messages sent in this stage:
a) Build the count tree and set party 1 as the root:
For 1 ≤ j ≤ D, party j + 1 is a child of the root (and the root of the jth collection subtree with depth D + 1 − j).
Starting with party D + 2, the remainder of the nodes are assigned to parties, left to right and top to bottom. If
τ < n/2 the remaining parties are assigned to filters, left to right and top to bottom.
b) Let sum = 0 for the root.
2. Up Stage.
a) Upon b = 1, choose a uniformly random collection node v from collection subtree 1,
• If τ > n/2, send a hFlagi to v.
• Otherwise, choose a uniformly random leaf in v’s filter and send a hFlagi to it.
b) Upon receiving a hFlagi, if previously forwarded fewer than 21 log n flags, forward the flag to parent. Otherwise,
ignore it.
c) Perform the following steps to collect nodes in the collection subtree j:
• Upon receiving 7 log n hFlagis, send parent a hCounti message.
• Upon subsequently receiving a hFlagi, if j < D, send it to a uniformly random collection node in collection
subtree j + 1. If j = D, then send it directly to the root. Do this for up to 14 log n flags. Then, ignore all
subsequent hFlagi messages.
d) Upon receiving hCounti from both children, send hCounti to the parent.
e) If sum < τ,
• Upon receiving a hCounti from party j + 1, set sum ← sum + τ/2 j .
• Upon receiving a hFlagi, sum ← sum + 1.
3. Down Stage. If sum ≥ τ,
a) Party 1 (the root): Send hDonei to parties 2 and 3, and then terminate.
b) Party j for j > 1: Upon receiving hDonei from party b j/2c, forward it to parties 2 j and 2 j + 1 (if they exist), and
then terminate.
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2.6.4.1

Preliminaries

We first recall the following Chernoff bound for a Poisson random variable from Mitzenmacher and
Upfal [MU05].
Theorem 2.6.2 (Theorem 5.4 of [MU05]). Let Y ∼ Poisson(µ). Then,
1. for x < µ, Prob(Y ≤ x) ≤ e−µ (eµ/x) x , and
2. for x > µ, Prob(Y ≥ x) ≤ e−µ (eµ/x) x .
Lemma 2.6.3. Assume αk balls are thrown independently and uniformly at random into k bins.
Let E1 denote the event that the minimum load is less than α/2, and let E2 denote the event that the
maximum load exceeds 3α/2. Then,
√
Prob(E1 ) ≤ ek
and

√
Prob(E2 ) ≤ ek

2
αk
e

8e
αk
27

! α/2
(2.1)
! α/2
.

(2.2)

Proof. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let Xi denote the number of balls in the ith bin, and let Yi ∼ Poisson(α) be an
independent Poisson random variable with mean α. It is well known that the distribution of each Xi
is close to that of Yi , and moreover that the joint distribution of the Xi ’s is well approximated by
the joint (i.e. , product) distribution of the Yi ’s (see Chapter 5 in Mitzenmacher and Upfal [MU05]).
Indeed, Corollary 5.11 from [MU05] states that for any event E that is monotone in the number
of balls, if E occurs with probability at most p in the Poisson approximation, then E occurs with
probability at most 2p in the exact case. Since maximum and minimum load are both clearly
monotone increasing in the number of balls, applying this corollary we have:
Prob(E1 ) = Prob (∃i s.t. Xi ≤ α/2)
≤ 2 Prob (∃i s.t. Yi ≤ α/2)
k

X
α
≤2
Prob Yi ≤
2
i=1
! α/2
2
≤ 2k
,
e
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where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2.6.2 with µ = α and x = α/2. Similarly,
Prob(E2 ) = Prob (∃i s.t. Xi > 3α/2)
≤ 2 Prob (∃i s.t. Yi > 3α/2)
!
k
X
3α
≤2
Prob Yi ≥
2
i=1
! α/2
8e
,
≤ 2k
27
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2.6.2 with µ = α and x = 3α/2.
2.6.4.2



Protocol Analysis

Let σ be the number of 1-inputs. We know that τ ≤ σ ≤ n. Let s = σ/τ. For simplicity of the
analysis, we will assume that the first τ flags to be sent are marked while the remaining σ − τ
are unmarked. As we track the progress of the flags through our data structure, we pay particular
attention to the marked flags. Due to asynchrony, the marked flags need not be the first τ to arrive at
their destinations.
1
Lemma 2.6.4. Suppose τ ≥ n/2. In the Thresh-Count algorithm, with probability at least 1 − 7n log
n,

the first collection subtree satisfies all of the following:
1. Each collection node receives between 7s log n and 21s log n flags.
2. The hCounti messages generated in this tree, when they reach the root, account for τ/2
1-inputs.

3. At least τ/2 and at most τ flags are forwarded to the second collection tree.
Proof. The process of sending σ hFlagi messages to the collection nodes in the first collection tree
can be modeled as a balls and bins problem as in Lemma 2.6.3 with α = 14s log n and k = τ/14 log n.
E1 and E2 are, respectively, the events that some collection node fails to receive 7s log n flags and
that some collection node receives more than 21s log n flags. By applying the lemma, we get
! 7s log n
2τ
2
Prob(E1 ) ≤
14 log n e
2n
≤
2−0.4426×7s log n
14 log n
1
≤ 2s
7n log n
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and
! 7s log n
2τ
8e
Prob(E2 ) ≤
14 log n 27
2n
2−0.3121×7s log n
≤
14 log n
1
≤ 1.1s
7n log n
Thus, the probability that (a) fails is at most

1+n0.9s
.
7n2s log n

To see (b), we note that there are τ/(14 log n) collection nodes in the first collection subtree,
each of whom generates a hCounti message when it has received 7 log n flags. The flags correspond
to distinct 1-inputs, and hence together they account for τ/2 1-inputs. Thus, (b) fails only if some
node fails to receive at least 7 log n flags, which is already accounted for in the failure of (a).
To prove (c), we need to track the progress of the marked flags. Let E10 and E20 denote respectively,
the events that some node fails to receive at least 7 log n marked flags and that some node receives
more than 21 log n marked flags. Then, since there are τ marked flags, applying Lemma 2.6.3 with
α = 14 log n and k = τ/14 log n we see that
Prob(E10 )

! 7 log n
2
2τ
≤
14 log n e
2n
≤
2−0.4426×7 log n
14 log n
1
≤ 2
7n log n

and
Prob(E20 )

! 7 log n
2τ
8e
≤
14 log n 27
2n
≤
2−0.3121×7 log n
14 log n
1
≤ 1.1
.
7n log n

Within each collection node, by transferring the marks from some marked flags to some
unmarked flags, we may assume that the marked flags are the first to arrive. We can do this transfer
because it does not change the distribution of marked and unmarked flags between the nodes, nor
does it change the total number of marked flags across all collection nodes. The advantage of this
change is that in following the algorithm, each node will first use all its marked flags before using
unmarked flags.
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In particular, as long as E10 and E20 do not occur, each node will use 7 log n flags to generate
a hCounti message, after which it will be left with between 0 and 14 log n marked flags. Since it
forwards up to 14 log n flags to the next collection subtree, it follows that it will forward all of its
marked flags and possibly some unmarked flags to the next subtree. Since there are τ marked flags
across all the collection nodes, and the hCounti messages account for τ/2 of them, it follows that the
remaining τ/2 marked flags are forwarded. Hence, at least τ/2 flags are forwarded. Moreover, since
there are τ/(14 log n) nodes and each forwards at up to 14 log n flags, at most τ flags are forwarded,
which establishes (c).
Now, let E = E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E10 ∪ E20 be the union of all the bad events we’ve encountered. For large
enough n,
Prob(E) ≤

1
7n2s log n
+

≤

+

1
7n1.1s log n

+

1
7n2 log n

1
7n1.1 log n

1
7n log n

1
Thus, with probability at least 1 − 7n log
n , (a), (b), and (c) are all true, as desired.





We will also need to prove a similar lemma when τ < n/2. Note that when τ ≥ n/2, we have
σ ≤ 2τ, or s = σ/τ ≤ 2. When τ < n/2, σ may be much bigger than τ. Let M = min{σ/τ,2}.
1
Lemma 2.6.5. Suppose τ < n/2. In the Thresh-Count algorithm, with probability at least 1 − 7n log
n,

the first collection subtree satisfies all of the following:
1. Each collection node receives between 7 log n and 21M log n flags.
2. Each filter node receives at most 21M log n flags.
3. The hCounti messages generated in this tree, when they reach the root, account for τ/2
1-inputs.

4. At least τ/2 and at most τ flags are forwarded to the second collection tree.
Proof. When τ < n/2, the flags are not sent directly to the collection nodes, but rather to leaf nodes
of the filters below the collection nodes. We will say that a filter receives a flag if the flag is received
by any of its leaf nodes.
We first note that each party’s process of selecting a random collection node, and then selecting a
random leaf in its filter, is equivalent to simply selecting a uniformly random leaf node from among
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all the leaf nodes for all the filters. We’ve already remarked that adding the filters is equivalent
to extending the first collection subtree to depth log n − 2 while keeping the collection layer the
same. Thus, there are n/4 filter leaf nodes to choose from. Using the Poisson approximation and
an argument similar to the one in Lemma 2.6.3, it is easy to see that when σ ≤ n parties each
independently send a flag to a uniformly random filter leaf node out of n/4 choices, the probability
of the event E0 , that there is a leaf node that receives more than 21 log n flags is less than n− log log n .
Once the flags have been sent to the leaf nodes of the filters, they are forwarded up the filter
from nodes to their parents, all the way to the collection node, with the only caveat that nodes do
not forward more than 21 log n flags. Since each node has two children, it follows that each node in
the filter receives at most 42 log n flags, and the same is true of the collection nodes. At the same
time, viewing the process as first selecting a collection node, and then a filter leaf node below it,
we see as in Lemma 2.6.4 that the probability of the event E2 , that there is a filter that receives
more than 21s log n flags is at most

1
.
7n1.1s log n

Since no node in the filter can get more flags than the

filter as a whole, it follows that the filter nodes and the collection nodes all receive no more than
21M log n = min{21s log n,42 log n} flags. This shows (b) and the upper bound in (a).
To show that the collection nodes each receives at least 7 log n flags with high probability, and
that together the collection nodes receive at least τ flags, we will once again track the marked flags.
As we have remarked previously, although the marked flags are the first τ to be sent, by asynchrony,
they need not be the first τ to arrive at the filters. Thus, it need not be the case that all these marked
flags are forwarded through to the collection nodes. Nevertheless, we will argue that for every
marked flag that fails to be forwarded, at least one unmarked flag was forwarded instead. To see
this, note that as in Lemma 2.6.4, all the filters receive between 7 log n and 21 log n marked flags,
except with probability

1+n0.9
.
7n2 log n

Thus, each node in a filter can have at most 21 log n marked flags

arrive at it.
Now, suppose a filter node fails to forward one or more marked flags. It can only do this if it has
previously forwarded 21 log n flags, and since it can receive at most 21 log n marked flags, it follows
that it has already forwarded at least as many unmarked flags as it is choosing to ignore marked
ones. Once again, by transferring marks from the marked flags that are dropped to the unmarked
flags that have been sent in their place, we can ensure that except with probability

1+n0.9
,
7n2 log n

between

7 log n and 21 log n marked flags get through each filter to the corresponding collection node, and at
least τ marked flags get through all the filters together, to the collection layer of the first collection
subtree. This shows the lower bound in (a) and sets us up to show (c) and (d).
For (c), we will once again pretend, by transferring marks that at each node the marked flags
are the first to arrive and be used. As before, we do this without altering the distribution of marked
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and unmarked flags between collection nodes. Note that each newly marked flag at the collection
node corresponds to a distinct 1-input, so the 7 log n of them used by each of τ/(14 log n) collection
nodes to generate a hCounti message accounts for τ/2 1-inputs at the root. This leaves between
0 and 14 log n marked flags at each collection node which add up to τ/2 of them across all the
collection nodes. Since each collection node forwards up to 14 log n flags, all the marked flags are
forwarded, so that at least τ/2 flags are forwarded to the next collection subtree. Since each of
τ/(14 log n) collection nodes forwards up to 14 log n flags, at most τ flags are forwarded to the next
collection tree, proving (d).
Finally, adding up the probabilities of all the bad events we’ve encountered, we see that for large
enough n,

1+n0.9
7n2 log n

+ 7n1.11log n + n− log log n <

1
7n log n .

1
It follows that with probability at least 1 − 7n log
n,



(a), (b), (c), and (d) are all true, as desired.



We are now ready to study what happens further up in the data structure. We will say that the
algorithm succeeds up to level j if for all i ≤ j the following are true:
1. All the collection nodes in the ith collection subtree receive between 7 log n and 42 log n flags.
2. The hCounti messages generated in the ith subtree account for τ/2i 1-inputs at the root.
3. Between τ/2i and τ/2i−1 flags are forwarded from the ith collection subtree to the (i + 1)st
collection subtree
j
Lemma 2.6.6. Let j ≤ D. In the Thresh-Count algorithm, with probability at least 1 − 7n log
n , the

algorithm succeeds up to level j.
Proof. We proceed by induction on j. We have already established the base case j = 1 in Lemmas 2.6.4 and 2.6.5. Now suppose j ≥ 2, and for an induction hypothesis we assume that the
algorithm succeeds to level j − 1 with probability at least 1 − 7nj−1
log n . Let us condition on this event.
This means that between τ/2 j−1 and τ/2 j−2 flags are forwarded to the jth collection subtree, which
has

τ
2 j−1 14 log n

collection nodes.

Thus, we can apply Lemma 2.6.3 with α between 14 log n and 28 log n. The proof that conditioned on the algorithm having succeeded up to level j − 1, it succeeds to level j, except with
probability

1
7n log n ,

is identical to the proof of Lemma 2.6.4. By Bayes’ law and the induction

hypothesis, the unconditional probability that the algorithm succeeds to level j
!
!
j −1
1
j
1−
1−
≥ 1−
,
7n log n
7n log n
7n log n


as desired.
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1
Corollary 2.6.7. With probability at least 1 − 7n
, the root node successfully accounts for at least τ

1-inputs.

Proof. The last collection subtree is the one corresponding to j = D, and by Lemma 2.6.6, with
PD
D
j
−D ) 1-inputs, and
probability at least 1 − 7 log
j=1 τ/2 = τ(1 − 2
n the root has accounted for
moreover, between τ/2 D and τ/2 D−1 flags have been forwarded directly to the root, by the collection
nodes in the last collection subtree. Since no randomness is involved, the root eventually receives
all of these flags. Thus, conditioned on the algorithm succeeding up to level D, the root eventually
accounts for at least τ 1-inputs. Since D < log τ < log n, the success probability is at least 1 −
1
7n .





We now prove the Theorem 2.6.1. Lemmas 2.6.4 to 2.6.6 and Corollary 2.6.7 show that with
1
, the root accounts for at least τ 1-inputs while ensuring the following:
probability at least 1 − 7n

1. Filter nodes receive no more than 42 log n messages and send no more than 21 log n messages.
2. Collection nodes receive no more than 42 log n messages and send no more than 14 log n + 1
messages. (The extra 1 is for the hCounti message.)
3. The root receives no more than τ/2 D−1 = 28 log n hFlagi messages.
Additionally, the adding nodes each receive two hCounti messages and send one hCounti message,
and the root receives D ≤ log n hCounti messages, one from each of the collection subtrees. Individual parties send at most one message each, when their input is set to 1. We have already remarked
that the messages used in this algorithm can be encoded using two bits. Thus, in the Up stage
of the algorithm each party sends and receives O(log n) messages of constant size. In the Down
stage, hDonei messages are sent via a canonical complete binary tree, so each party except the root
receives exactly one hDonei message, and each party that is not a leaf in the tree sends (at most) two
hDonei messages. Since all messages that are sent are eventually received, eventually all the parties
receive the hDonei message and terminate. Since the depths of the data structure used in the Up
stage and the binary tree used in the Down stage are both log n, the longest chain of messages is of
length 2 log n, and hence the total latency is O(log n). Finally, since the computations done by each
node during the algorithm amount to counting the number of messages it receives and generating
up to 14 log n random numbers, each node performs O(log n) computations.
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2.6.5

Using Quorums as Nodes in the Count Tree

So far in this section, we have assumed that all of the nodes in the count tree follow the protocol
honestly. However, this is not the case in our MPC model, where some of the parties can play
maliciously. To fix this, we assign a quorum to each node in the tree and let the quorums perform
the roles of the parties. In our MPC protocol described in Section 2.4, we introduce Protocol 4 that
allows us run the threshold counting algorithm in a malicious setting.
Lemma 2.5.2 shows that a quorum Q can securely send a message M to another quorum Q0.
However, there is some subtlety involved in using this fact. Every party in a quorum communicates
with its parent when it has received at least half as many inputs as the parents’ threshold. However,
due to asynchrony, multiple messages may arrive simultaneously; when the threshold is set, not
all parties in the quorum may be in the same state. Some may already have more inputs than
the threshold, while others may still be waiting, because messages from their children have been
delayed. Lemma 2.5.2 tells us that if all parties in the quorum send the same message to the parent
quorum, then the parent quorum can resolve that message. Thus, in order to ensure that all parties
in the quorum send the same message to the parent quorum, we have required that even if a party’s
received inputs exceed his threshold, it should only inform the parent of having met the threshold,
not of having exceeded it. The remaining inputs are held to be sent later.

2.7

Asynchronous Quorum Formation

In this section, we describe the quorum building algorithm of King et al. [KSSV06b, KLST11],
and then adapt it to the asynchronous communication model by proving the following theorem:
Theorem 2.7.1. Consider n parties connected to each other pairwise in an asynchronous network,
where up to t < ( 14 −  )n of them are corrupted, for some small constant  > 0. If all honest parties
follow the protocol Build-Quorums, then with high probability,
1. the parties agree on n quorums,
√
2. each party sends at most Õ( n) field elements,
√
3. each party performs Õ( n) computations, and
4. the protocol latency is O(polylog(n)).
One may alternatively use the asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol of Braud-Santoni et
al. [BGH13] to build a set of n quorums. This protocol requires each party on average to send
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Protocol 14 Build-Quorums
Goal. Generate n quorums.
1. All parties run SRS-Agreement.
2. All parties run SRS-to-Quorum.

polylog (n) field elements, and perform polylog (n) computations. However, it is not load-balanced:

some parties may send a linear number of field elements. Using this result our MPC protocol needs
only logarithmic bits and computations.
We start the description of our protocol by defining the semi-random-string agreement problem,
where the goal is to agree on a single string of length O(log n) with a constant fraction for random
bits, where for any positive constant , a 1/2 +  fraction of the parties are honest. King et
al. [KLST11] present an asynchronous algorithm as an additional result that we call SRS-to-Quorum.
The SRS-to-Quorum algorithm can go from a solution for semi-random-string agreement problem
to the solution for the quorum building problem. Thus, their techniques can be extended to
the asynchronous model assuming a scalable asynchronous solution for the semi-random-string
agreement problem. We describe Build-Quorums algorithm based on SRS-to-Quorum and an
algorithm, that solves semi-random-string agreement problem in the asynchronous model with
pairwise channels that we call SRS-Agreement.
King et al. [KSSV06b] present a synchronous algorithm that a set of parties, up to 1/3 of which
are controlled by an adversary, can reach almost-everywhere1 agreement with probability 1 − o(1).
Their main technique is to divide the parties into groups of polylogarithmic size; each party is
assigned to multiple groups. In parallel, each group uses bin election algorithm [Fei99] to elect a
small number of parties from within their group to move on. This step is recursively repeated on
the set of elected parties until size of the remaining parties in this set becomes polylogarithmic. At
this point, the remaining parties can solve the semi-random-string agreement problem (similarly,
they can run a Byzantine agreement protocol to agree on a bit). Provided the fraction of corrupted
parties in the set of remaining parties is less than 1/3 with high probability, these parties succeed in
agreeing on a semi-random string. Then, these parties communicate the result value to the rest of
the parties.
Bringing parties to agreement on a semi-random string is trickier in the asynchronous model.
The major difficulty is that the bin election algorithm cannot be used in asynchronous model since
1 King

et al. [KSSV06b] relax the requirement that all honest parties reach agreement at the end of the protocol,
instead requiring that a 1 − o(1) fraction of honest parties reach agreement. They refer to this relaxation as almosteverywhere agreement.
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Protocol 15 Simple-Elect-Subcommittee
Goal. Ω(ln8 n) parties agree on a subcommittee of size Ω(ln3 n). The protocol is performed by parties P1 ,...,Pk ∈ W with k =
Ω(ln8 n).
1. Party Pi generate a vector of c ln3 n random numbers chosen uniformly and independently at random from 1 to k where
each random number maps to one party.
2. Run CMPC to compute the component-wise sum modulo k of all the vectors. Arbitrarily, add enough additional numbers
from 1 to k to the sum vector to ensure it has c ln3 n unique numbers.
3. Let W B be the set of winning parties which are those associated with the components of the sum vector.
4. Return W B as the elected subcommittee.

the adversary can prevent a fraction of the honest parties from being heard, and then prevent them
to be part of the election. We present a similar algorithm to [KSSV06b] that solves this issue in
asynchronous model with private channels. The main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 2.7.2. Suppose there are n parties, for any fix positive  constant fraction b < 1/4 −  of
which are corrupted. There is a polylogarithmic (in n) bounded degree network and a protocol such
that:
1. With high probability, a 1 − O(1/ ln n) fraction of the honest parties agree on the same value
(bit or string).
2. Every honest party sends and processes only a polylogarithmic (in n) number of bits.
3. The number of rounds required is polylogarithmic in n.
The important novelty of our method compare to King et al. [KSSV06b] is that instead of bin
election algorithm, we use CMPC to decide on the parties who move on to the next level. The simple
version of our election method is presented as Simple-Elect-Subcommittee in Protocol 15 that has
the properties described in Lemma 2.7.3. The complete protocol and its proof of correctness are
given in Section 2.7.5
Lemma 2.7.3. Let W be a committee of Ω(ln8 n) parties, where the fraction, f W , of honest parties
is greater than 3/4. Then, there exists some constant c, such that with high probability, the
Elect-Subcommittee protocol elects a subset W B of W such that |W B | = c ln3 n and the fraction

of honest parties in W B is greater than (1 − 1/ ln n) f W . The Elect-Subcommittee protocol uses a
polylogarithmic number of bits and polylogarithmic number of rounds in a fully connected network.
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Proof. The proof follows from a straightforward application of union and Chernoff bounds. Let
X be the number of honest parties in W B . By the correctness of the CMPC algorithm, each party
in W B is randomly chosen from W . Let Yi be an indicator random variable, that equals to 1 if the
i-th member of W B is honest. Then, E[Yi ] = f W and E[X] = f W c1 ln3 n. Using Chernoff bounds,
we have Pr[X < (1 − 1/ ln n) f W c1 ln3 n] = Pr[X < (1 − 1/ ln n)E[X]] ≤ e−
f W > 1/2, setting c1 = 4c, establishes the first part of Lemma 2.7.3.

E[X ]/ ln2 n
2

< 1/nc . Since





We establish a polylogarithmic bound on the number of bits used in Elect-Subcommittee protocol
since the bit cost of Elect-Subcommittee is polynomial in the number of parties participating in the
algorithm.

2.7.1

The Election Graph

Our algorithms make use of an election graph to determine which parties will participate in which
elections. This graph was described in [KSSV06a, KSSV06b] and is repeated here.
Before describing the election graph, we first present a result similar to that used in [CL95]. Let
X be a set of parties. For a collection F of subsets of X, a parameter δ, and a subset X 0 of X, let
F (X 0,δ) be the sub-collection of all F 0 ∈ F for which
T
|F 0 X 0 | |X 0 |
>
+ δ.
|F 0 |
|X |
In other words, F (X 0,δ) is the set of all subsets of F whose overlap with X 0 is larger than the
“expected” size by more than a δ fraction. Let Γ(r) denote the neighbors of node r in a graph.
Lemma 2.7.4. Let l,r,n be positive integers such that l and r are all no more than n and r/l ≥ ln1−z n.
Then, there is a bipartite graph G(L, R) such that |L| = l and |R| = r and
1. Each node in R has degree ln z n.
2. Each node in L has degree O((r/l) ln z n).
3. Let F be the collection of sets Γ(r) for each r ∈ R. Then, for any subset L0 of L,
|F (L0,1/ ln n)| < max(l,r)/ ln z−2 n.
The proof of Lemma 2.7.4 follows from a counting argument using the probabilistic method
and is omitted. The following corollaries follows immediately by repeated application of the above
lemma.
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Corollary 2.7.5. Let ` ∗ be the smallest integer such that n/ ln` n ≤ ln10 n. There is a family of
∗

bipartite graphs G(Li , Ri ),i = 0,1,. . . ,` ∗ , and constants c1 and c2 such that |Li | = n/ lni n, |Ri | =
n/ lni+1 n, and
1. Each node in Ri has degree lnc1 n.
2. Each node in Li has degree O(lnc2 n).
3. Let F be the collection of sets Γ(r) for each r ∈ R. Then, for any subset L0i of Li ,
|F (L0i ,1/ ln n)| < |Ri |/ ln6 n.
4. Let F 0 be the collection of sets Γ(l) for each l ∈ L. Then, for any subset Ri0 of Ri ,
|F 0 (Ri0,1/ ln n)| < |Li |/ ln6 n.
Corollary 2.7.6. Let ` ∗ be the smallest integer such that n/ ln` n ≤ ln10 n. There is a family of
∗

bipartite graphs G(Li , Ri ),i = 0,1,. . . ,` ∗ , such that |Li | = n/ lni n, |Ri | = n/ lni+1 n, and
1. Each node in Ri has degree ln5 n.
2. Each node in Li has degree O(ln4 n).
3. Let F be the collection of sets Γ(r) for each r ∈ R. Then, for any subset L0i of Li ,
|F (L0i ,1/ ln n)| < |Li |/ ln3 n.
Lemma 2.7.4 and its corollaries show there exists a family of bipartite graphs with strong
expansion properties which allow the formation of subsets of parties where all but a small fraction
contain a majority that are honest.
We are now ready to describe the election graph. Throughout, we refer to nodes of the election
graph as e-nodes to distinguish them from nodes of the static network. Let ` ∗ be the minimum
integer ` such that n/ ln` n ≤ ln10 n; note that ` ∗ = O(ln n/ ln ln n). The topmost layer ` ∗ has a single
e-node which is adjacent to every e-node in layer ` ∗ − 1. For the remaining layers ` = 0,1,...,` ∗ − 1,

there are n/ ln`+1 n e-nodes. There is an edge between the ith e-node, A, in layer ` and the jth
e-node, B, in layer ` + 1 if and only if there is an edge between the ith node in L `+1 and the jth

node in R`+1 from Corollary 2.7.6. In such a case, we say that B is the parent of A, and A is the
child of B. Note that e-nodes have many parents.
Each e-node will contain a set of parties known as a committee. All e-nodes, except for the one
on the top layer and those in layer 0, will contain c ln3 n parties. Initially, we assign the n parties to
e-nodes on layer 0 using the bipartite graph G(L 0 , R0 ) described in Corollary 2.7.6. The i th party is

a member of the committee contained in the j th e-node of layer 0 if and only if there is an edge in
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G between the ith node of L 0 and the j th node of R0 . Note every e-node on layer 0 has ln5 n parties
in it.
The e-nodes on higher layers have committees assigned to them during the course of the protocol.
Let A be an e-node on layer ` > 0, let B1 ,. . . , Bs be the children of A on layer ` − 1, and suppose
that we have already assigned committees to e-nodes on layers lower than `. If ` < ` ∗ , we assign a
committee to A by running Elect-Subcommittee on the parties assigned to B1 ,. . . , Bs , and assigning
the winning subcommittee to A. (Note that we can run each of these elections in parallel.) If A is at
layer ` ∗ , the parties in A, B1 ,. . . , Bs , run byzantine agreement for Byzantine agreement.

2.7.2

Static Network with Polylog-Bounded Degree

We now repeat the description of the bounded degree static network [KSSV06b] and show how
it can be used to hold elections specified by the election graph. For each e-node A, we form a
collection of parties which we call it s-node: s( A). Intuitively, the s-node s( A) serves as a central
communication point for an election occurring at e-node A. Our goal is to bound the fraction of
s-nodes controlled by the adversary by a decreasing function in n, namely 1/ ln10 n, for each layer.

As the number of s-nodes grows much smaller with each layer, we need to make each s-node
more robust. To do this, the number of parties contained in the s-node increases with the layer.
Specifically, the s-nodes for layer i are sets of lni+12 n parties. We determine these s-nodes using
the bipartite graph from Lemma 2.7.4, where L is a collection of n nodes, one for each party, R is
the set of s-nodes for layer i and the degree of each node in R is set to lni+12 n. The neighbors of
each node in R constitute a set of parties in an s-node on layer i.
We use the term link to denote a direct connection in the static network. The communications
for an election A will all be routed through s( A): a message from a party x to s( A) on layer i will
pass from the party to a layer 0 s-node, whose parties will forward the message to a layer 1 s-node
and so on, the goal being to reliably transmit the message via increasingly larger s-nodes up to s( A).
Similarly, communications to an individual party x from s( A) will be transmitted down to a layer
0 s-node whose parties will transmit the message to x. We describe the connections in the static
network.
Connections in the static network. Consider the following:
• Let A be an e-node on layer 0 in the election graph. Every party in A has a link to every party
in s( A).
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• Let A and B be e-nodes in the election graph at levels i and i − 1 respectively such that A is a
parent of B. Thus, s( A) has lni+12 n parties in it and s(B) has lni+11 n parties in it. Let G be a
bipartite graph as in Lemma 2.7.4 where L is the set of parties in s( A), R is the set of parties
in s(B) and the degree of R is set to lnc1 n and the degree of L is set to O(lnc2 n). If there is an
edge between two nodes in L and R respectively, then the corresponding party in s( A) has a
link to the corresponding party in s(B). We will sometimes say that s( A) is adjacent to s(B)
in the static network.
The following lemma follows easily from the application of Lemma 2.7.4 and its corollaries.
Item (1) follows from Lemma 3.1; items (2) and (4) from Corollary 3.2; and item (3) from Corollary
3.1. Although item (2) only makes a guarantee about layer 0 e-nodes, we will see eventually that
with high probability, the fraction of corrupted e-nodes on every layer is small.
Lemma 2.7.7. With high probability, the election graph and the static network have the following
properties:
1. (Bad s-nodes) Any s-node whose fraction of corrupt parties exceeds b + 1/ ln n will be called
bad. Else, we will call the s-node good. No more than a 1/ ln10 n fraction of s-nodes on any
given layer are bad.
2. (Bad e-nodes) Any e-node whose fraction of corrupt parties exceeds b + 1/ ln n will be called
bad. Else we call the e-node good. No more than a 1/ ln2 n fraction of e-nodes on layer 0 are
bad.
3. (Bad s-node to s-node connection) For any pair of e-nodes A and B joined in the election
graph, the parties in s-nodes s( A) and s(B) are linked such that the following holds. For any
subset W A of parties in s( A), at most a 1/ ln6 n fraction of parties in s(B) have more than a
|W A |/|s( A)| + 1/ ln n fraction of their links to s( A) with parties in W A.
4. (Bad e-node to e-node connection) Let |I | represent the total number of e-nodes on layer i
in the election graph. For any set W of e-nodes on any layer i, at most a 1/ ln2 n fraction of
e-nodes on layer i + 1 have more than |W |/|I | + 1/ ln n fraction of their neighbors in W .

The degree of the static network is polylogarithmic.

54

2.7.3

Communication Protocols

A permissible path is a path of the form P = x,s( A0 ),s( A1 ),...,.s( Ai ) where x is a party in A0 , i is
the current layer of elections being held, each A j is an e-node on layer j, and there is an edge in the
election graph between A j and A j+1 for j = 0,...,i. Each party y in an s-node s( A) on each layer j
keeps a List of permissible paths that determine which parties’ messages it will forward. The List
(for y ∈ s( A)) represents y’s view of which parties are elected (to the subcommittee) at A that are
still participating in elections on higher layers. If y’s List indicates that x is such a party, then the
List will also have the entire path for x, which stretches from x to the elections on layer i in which x

is currently participating in. We have the following definitions.
• We say a s-node knows a message [resp., knows a permissible path, or resp., knows a List
of permissible paths] if 1 − b − 2/ ln n parties in the s-node are honest and receive the same
message [resp., have the same path on their Lists, or resp., all have the same List.]
• A permissible path P is good if every s-node on the path knows P. Else the path is bad.
We will show our construction of the static network ensures at most a 1/ ln n fraction of the
permissible paths are bad.
We now describe three primitive communication subroutines: Sendhop, Send, and MessagePass. The subroutine Sendhop describes how s-nodes (with direct links) communicate

with each other, Send describes how a party communicates with an s-node, and MessagePass
describes how two parties communicate with each other.
Sendhop (s,r,m,P). A message m can be passed from s (the sender) to r (the receiver) from a level

i to a level i − 1 or from a level i to a level i + 1, where s and r are s-nodes on these layers or one
of s,r is a 0-layer s-node and the other is a party. If a party x sends a message to a layer 0 s-node
s( A) it sends the message to every party in s( A) (note by construction it will have a direct link with
every party in s( A)). Similarly if a message is sent from a layer 0 s-node s( A) to a party x, every
party in s( A) sends the message to x.
When an s-node s( A) sends a message to s-node s(B), every party in s( A) sends the message
to those parties of s(B) to which it has a direct link. When each party in s(B) receives such a set of
messages, it waits until it receives the same messages from the majority to determine the message.
If there is no majority value, the party ignores the message. Along with sending the message the
parties also send information which specifies along which path P the message is being sent. Each
time a message is received by a party of an s-node s(B) on layer j ≤ i, it checks that:
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1. The message came from the s-node previous to it in the path P; if not the message is dropped.
2. The path P (or its reverse) is on its List of permissible paths. If not, the message is dropped.
3. Only messages that conform to the protocol in size and number are forwarded up and down
the permissible paths. If more or longer messages are received from a party, messages from
that party are dropped.
Send (s,r,m,P). Of the first two parameters, one must be a party (“x”) and one must be an s-node

(“s( A)”). The path P contains the first parameter s as its start and the second parameter r as its
endpoint. Send (s,r,m,P) sends the message m from s to r along the path P via repeated application
of Sendhop.
MessagePass (x ∈ A, y ∈ B,m,Px ,Py ). Both A and B are adjacent e-nodes. Hence, s( A) and s(B)

are adjacent in the static network. A message from party x in e-node A sends message m to
party y in e-node B by first calling Send (x,s( A),m,Px ). Then, s( A) sends m to s(B) by calling
Sendhop (s( A),s(B),m,P), where P is the path consisting of two s-nodes s( A),s(B). Finally, the

message is transmitted from s(B) to y by calling Send (s(B), y,m,Pyr ), where Pyr is the reversal of
path Py .

2.7.4

SRS-Agreement Protocol

Before describing the SRS-Agreement protocol, we first adapt the Elect-Subcommittee protocol for
the static network. Let A be an e-node with children B1 ,. . . , Bs , and let X be the set of all parties
from B1 ,. . . , Bs . For each i ∈ [s] and x ∈ Bi , let Px denote a good path of s-nodes from x to s(Bi )
concatenated with s( A). At the start of the election for A, we assume that each node in Px knows
Px and s( A) knows {Px | x ∈ X }.
We now describe the implementation of the Elect-Subcommittee algorithm. Every party x ∈ X
generate a vector of random numbers chosen uniformly and independently at random where each
random number maps to one party. The parties use the CMPC protocol to determine the winners
(recall that the number of parties in e-nodes is always polylogarithmic, so this can be done sending
only polylogarithmic messages). The list of winners is sent up to s( A), where each party in s( A)
takes a majority to determine the winners. Then, s( A) sends down the list of winners along all the
permissible paths to each party x ∈ X. Parties on the path (i.e. , in s-nodes along the path) update
their Lists of permissible paths to remove those party-paths who lost as well as those party-pairs
who won too many elections (we will quantify this shortly), and make ln4 n copies of each of the
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Protocol 16 Elect-Subcommittee
Goal. Adapted version of Simple-Elect-Subcommittee for static networks.
1. For each x ∈ X: // This stage done in parallel
Party x randomly selects one of k/(c1 ln3 n) random numbers chosen uniformly and independently at random from zero
to k where each random number maps to one party.

2.

3. Parties in X run CMPC to compute the component-wise sum modulo k of all the vector. Arbitrarily, add enough additional
numbers to the vector to ensure it has c ln3 n unique numbers.
4. Let M be the set of winning parties, which are those associated with some component of the vector sum.
5.

Each y ∈ X sends M to s( A) by calling Send (y,s( A), M,Py ).

6.

Parties in s( A) determine M by waiting until they receive the majority of same messages. These become the elected
parties.

7. For each party x ∈ X that is elected, the parties in s( A) use Send (s( A), x,m,Pxr ) to tell x, along with each s-node in Px ,
that x was elected.
8. Each party in each s-node revises its list of permissible paths to:
Retain only the winners. Eliminate parties who have won more than 8 elections. Make ln4 n copies of remaining
permissive paths, concatenating each with a different s-node neighbor on layer i + 1.
9. s( A) sends its list to every adjacent s-node s(B) on layer i + 1 using Sendhop (s( A),s(B),m,P), where P is the path
consisting only of s( A), s(B).

Protocol 17 Scalable-SRS-Agreement
Goal. Parties agree on a semi-random string.
1. For l = 1 to l ∗ :
2.

For each e-node A in layer l, let B1 ,..., Bs be the children of A in layer l − 1 of the election graph, and

3.

If l < l ∗ , run Elect-Subcommittee on the parties in nodes B1 ,..., Bs . Assign winning parties to node A.

4.

Else parties in nodes B1 ,..., Bs solve semi-random-string agreement problem.

5. Let A∗ be the e-node on layer l ∗ , every party x assigned to A∗ communicates the result of Step 4 to s( A∗ ) using
Send (x,s( A∗ ),m,Px ).
6. Every party in s( A∗ ) waits for the majority of same message to determine the result of Step 4.

winners’ paths and concatenate a different layer i + 1 s-node parent onto each one. We present a
detailed description of Elect-Subcommittee in the following.
The condition in Step 5 that requires parties who have won more than 8 elections to be eliminated
is a technical condition that insures the protocol is load-balanced and parties in an s-node do not
communicate more than a polylogarithmic number of bits. We now describe the SRS-Agreement
protocol.
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Since every party is a member of s( A∗ ), steps 5 and 6 will insure the final result of the protocol
is communicated to every party.

2.7.5

Proof of Build-Quorums

To establish the correctness of the protocol presented in Section 2.7.4, we first state some claims
regarding the primitive communication protocols. Their proofs follow by straightforward probabilistic arguments and are omitted in the interest of space. Recall the fraction of corrupted parties is
b, where b < 1/4 −  for any fix positive .
Claim 2.7.8. Let s( A) and s(B) be s-nodes on consecutive layers. Assume the following conditions
hold:
1. Both s( A) and s(B) are good.
2. s( A) is on a permissible path known by s(B).
3. There exists a set W of parties from s( A) such that for every message m, all parties in W are
honest and agree on a message m. Further W consists of at least a 1 − b − 2/ ln n fraction of
the parties in s( A).
Then, there is a set W 0 of parties from s(B) such that for every message m, every party in W 0 is
honest and agrees on the message m after Sendhop (s( A),s(B),m,P) is called. (Here, P is the path
s( A),s(B).) Further, W 0 consists of all but a 1/ ln6 n fraction of the honest parties in s(B).
Proof. Every party in W is honest and sends the same massage to its connected parties in s(B).
The parties in s(B) can afford to wait for the majority of same messages, since s( A) is good and
W consists of at least 1 − b − 2/ ln n fraction of parties which is more than 1/2 and for majority we
need to receive a fraction of 1/2 same messages from the parties in s( A). Thus, all honest party
but a 1/ ln6 n fraction of parties in s(B) will eventually receive the message based on corollary
2.7.5.





Claim 2.7.9. Let x be an honest party. Assume Px is a good path. Then, after Send (x,s( A),m,Px )
is executed, there is a fixed set W of honest parties which contains all but a 1/ ln6 n fraction of the
honest parties in s( A) and every party z ∈ W agrees on m.
An election at e-node A is legitimate if the following two conditions hold simultaneously for
more than a 3/4 fraction of parties x participating in the election at A: (1) party x is honest; (2) The
path Px is good.
58

Lemma 2.7.10. For a legitimate election at node A, let X be a set of honest parties with good
permissible paths. (Note |X | > 3 ln8 n/4.) Let W be the set of honest parties in s( A) that know X.
Then, after the execution of Elect-subcommittee, the parties in W know the winners of the election
in A, as do the s-nodes that belong to good paths Px .
Proof. From Claim 2.7.9, we have that every message m sent by MessagePass (y ∈ Bi ,z ∈
B j ,m,Py ,Pz ) from y ∈ X to z ∈ X is received by some fixed set W of honest parties in s(Bi ),
such that W contains at least 1 − b − 2/ ln n fraction of the parties in s(Bi ). By Claim 2.7.8, every
message sent by y is received by z. Since X contains more than 3/4 of the total parties participating
in the election, (after running CMPC) all the parties in X will all agree on the same set of for random
parties. Thus, after the parties in X send these values to s( A), s( A) will know the winners. When
s( A) sends these winners to X, by repeated application of Claim 2.7.8, we have every x ∈ X and


every s-node in Px will know these winners.



We have shown that in a legitimate election at node A, s( A) knows the list of winners. We next
consider when paths are dropped from the permissible path Lists.
2.7.5.1

Permissible Paths Removal

Let y be a party in some s-node on layer i. A permissible path Px is removed from a party y’s List
on layer i if y receives a message from an s-node above it in Px , indicating either x has won more
than 8 elections or x lost in the election held at the last node of Px . Here, we consider when Px
is removed for the former reason, i.e. , we give an upper bound on the fraction of parties that are
reported to have won too many elections on layer i.
First we consider the effect of legitimate elections. The following lemma, a version of which
appears in [KSSV06a, KSSV06b], shows that on a given layer a very small fraction of honest parties
win more than 8 times in legitimate elections.
Lemma 2.7.11. With high probability, the parties that win more than 8 elections, counting multiplicities, account for no more than a 16/ ln3 n fraction of the honest parties that are winners of
legitimate elections.
Next, we bound the effect of elections that are not legitimate. We first consider the case where
s( A) is good, yet the fraction of honest parties participating in A with good paths is less than 3/4.
For the remainder of the proof we shall treat such an e-node A as a bad e-node.
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Claim 2.7.12. Suppose less than a 1/7 fraction of the honest parties of a good s( A) agree on a
message m. Then, after Sendhop (p( A),p(B),m,P) is executed, all but a 1/ ln6 n fraction of the
honest parties in s(B) will ignore m.

Proof. Even if the corrupted parties agree on m, since b < 1/4, the total fraction of parties in s( A)
sending the message m is less than 11/28. Thus, at most a 1/ ln6 n fraction of the parties in s(B)
will receive m from a majority of parties in s( A).





Hence, a good s( A) can only communicate with seven different sets of winners to the s-nodes
below it. Since each honest party will send ln3 n winners, the total number of winners sent is at most
7 ln3 n. Therefore, a bad e-node can cause at most 7 ln3 n parties to have their permissible paths
removed.
Next, we consider the effect of a bad s-node. We will assume one bad s-node s( A) on layer i
can cause the removal of all the permissible paths for every party participating in the election at
A. Since ln8 n parties participate in an election, and fewer than a 1/ ln10 n fraction of the s-nodes
are bad on a layer, the fraction of honest winners affected is less than 1/ ln2 n. Thus, we can bound
the fraction of the honest winners on any layer i that have their permissible paths removed by
1/ ln2 n + 1/ ln3 n + 7 βi ; where βi represents the fraction of bad e-nodes on layer i. Thus, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7.13. Assume the fraction of bad e-nodes on layer i is bounded by c/ ln2 n, for some
constant c. Then, the fraction of honest winners that have their permissible paths removed on layer
i is bounded by 8c/ ln2 n.
2.7.5.2

Proof of Theorems 2.7.2

We now complete the proof of Theorem 2.7.2 which follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7.14. On layer i, with high probability, at least a 1 − 4/ ln2 n fraction of s-nodes s( A j )
have the following properties:
1. s( A j ) is good.
2. At least a 1 − b − 4i/ ln n fraction of the parties in node A j are honest and have good paths to
s( A j ) (note this implies s( A j ) knows this path). That is, A j is a good e-node.
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Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. On all layers and particularly layer 0, only a 1/ ln10 n
fraction of the s-nodes are bad. If s( A) is good, then every party in A has a good path to s( A).
Further by construction all but a 1/ ln2 n fraction of the e-nodes on layer 0 consist of at least a
1 − b − 1/ ln n fraction of honest parties. So the lemma is true on layer 0.
Assume the lemma is true for layer i. Then, a 1 − 4/ ln2 n fraction of e-nodes are good, more
specifically these e-nodes have at least a 1 − b − 4i/ ln n fraction of honest parties that have a good
path to their corresponding s-node. Since the election is legitimate by Lemmas 2.7.3 and 2.7.10,
with high probability, after Elect-Subcommittee at least a 1 − b − 4i/ ln n − 1/ ln n fraction of the
parties elected are honest and have a good path to any good parent of their s-node. Thus, at least
a 1 − b − (4i + 1)/ ln n fraction of the parties elected at layer i are honest and have good paths to
good parent s-nodes on layer i + 1. By Lemma 2.7.13 this fraction is reduced by at most 32/ ln2 n.
Thus, at least a 1 − b − (4i + 2)/ ln n fraction of the parties elected at layer i are honest and have
good paths to good parent s-nodes on layer i + 1. Since the fraction of bad s-nodes on layer i + 1 is
at most 1/ ln10 n, by Corollary 2.7.6 at least a 1 − 1/ ln2 n − 1/ ln10 n fraction of the e-nodes (and
their corresponding s-nodes) are good on layer i + 1, and have at least a 1 − b − (4i + 2)/ ln n − 1/ ln n
fraction of honest parties that have good paths to their corresponding s-nodes.





By Lemma 2.7.14, with high probability the layer ` ∗ e-node is good. Thus, the parties in
this e-node succeed in solving the semi-random-string agreement problem (Step 4 of algorithm
SRS-Agreement). Since all the parties are in the s-node (though they may appear multiple times)

corresponding to A on ` ∗ , by Claim 2.7.9 all but a O(1/ ln n) fraction of the honest parties learn the
final result. To prove the number of bits sent by each party is polylogarithmic we note each party is
in a polylogarithmic number of e-nodes and s-nodes on each layer i, and participates in at most a
polylogarithmic number of election on layer i. Since the number of layers is O(ln n) Theorem 2.7.2
follows. Finally, the correctness of Theorem 2.7.1 follows from Theorem 2.7.2 and the correctness
of SRS-to-Quorum protocol.

2.8

Conclusion

We described a Monte Carlo algorithm to perform asynchronous MPC in an scalable manner. Our
√
protocols are scalable in the sense that they require each party to send Õ(m/n + n) messages
√
and perform Õ(m/n + n) computations. They tolerate a static adversary that controls up to a
1/8 −  fraction of the parties, for  any positive constant. We showed that our protocol is secure in
the universal composability framework. We also described efficient algorithms for two important
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building blocks of our protocol: threshold counting and quorum building. These algorithms can be
used separately in other distributed protocols.
The following problems remain open. Can we prove lower bounds for the communication and
computation costs for Monte Carlo MPC? Can we implement and adapt our algorithm to make it
practical for a MPC problem such as the beet auction problem described in [BCD+ 09]. Finally, can
we prove upper and lower bounds for resource costs to solve MPC in the case where the adversary
is adaptive, able to take over parties at any point during the algorithm?
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Chapter 3
Scalable Mechanisms for Rational Secret
Sharing
Secret sharing is one of the most fundamental problems in security, and is an important primitive in
many cryptographic protocols. In t-out-of-n secret sharing, we are interested in designing a protocol
to distribute shares of a secret to each n players and to reconstruct the secret ensuring that: (1) if any
group of t players follow the protocol, they will all learn the secret; and (2) knowledge of less than
t of the shares reveals nothing about the secret. In rational secret sharing, all players are rational.
Moreover, we want our protocol to be a Nash equilibrium in the sense that no player can improve
its utility by deviating from the protocol, given that all other players are following the protocol.
Recently, there has been interest in solving rational secret sharing [KN08, GK06, HT04,
ADGH06, LT06]. Unfortunately, all previous solutions to this problem require each agent to send
O(n) messages in expectation, and so do not scale to large networks.
In this chapter, we address this issue by designing scalable mechanisms for rational secret
sharing. Our main result is a protocol for rational n-out-of-n secret sharing that (1) requires each
agent to send only an expected O(log n) bits; and (2) has O(log n) expected latency. We also design
a scalable mechanism for t-out-of-n rational secret sharing when the parties are computationally
bounded.

3.1

The Problem

Shares of a secret are to be dealt to n rational players, who will later reconstruct the secret from the
shares. The players are learning-preferring, in the sense that each player prefers every outcome in
which he learns the secret to any outcome in which he does not learn the secret. However, a player
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may prefer the situation where he learns the secret and other players do not to the situation where
all players learn the secret.
The secret is an arbitrary element of a large (fixed) finite field Fq . At the beginning of the game,
a dealer provides the shares to the players. The dealer has no further role in the game. The players
must then communicate with each other in order to recover the secret.
Communication between the players is point-to-point and through secure private channels. In
other words, if player A sends a message to player B, then a third player C is not privy to the
message that was sent, or indeed even to the fact of a message having been sent. Communication is
synchronous in that there is an upper-bound known on the maximum amount of time required to
send a message from one player to another. However, we assume non-simultaneous communication,
and thus allow for the possibility of rushing, where a player may receive messages from other
players in a round before sending out his own messages.
Our goal is to provide protocols for the dealer and rational players such that the players following
the protocol can reconstruct the secret. Moreover, we want a protocol that is scalable in the sense
that the amount of communication and the latency of the protocol should be a slow growing function
of the number of players.

3.2

Related Work

The problem of secret sharing with rational players was introduced by Halpern and Teague in [HT04].
They showed that, rational secret sharing is possible using randomized mechanisms with constant
expected running time and it is impossible using a mechanism that has a fixed running time. They
also show that there is no practical mechanism for 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing even with an
infinite game tree. A mechanism is practical if it is a Nash equilibrium that survives iterated deletion
of weakly-dominated strategies. Since then, there has been significant work on the problem of
rational secret sharing, including results of Gordon and Katz [GK06], Abraham et al. [ADGH06],
Lysyanskaya and Triandopoulos [LT06], Asharov and Lindell [AL09], Kol and Naor [KN08] et
al. [ZTW11] and Fuchsbauer et al. [FKN10].
Most of this related work except for [KN08, AL09, FKN10, ZTW11], assume the existence
of simultaneous communication, either by broadcast or private channels. Several of the protocols
proposed [GK06, ADGH06, LT06, ZTW11] require cryptographic assumptions and achieve an
equilibrium under the assumption that the players are computationally bounded. In contrast, our
results do not assume simultaneous communication and our n-out-of-n algorithm does not make
any cryptographic assumptions.
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Fuchsbauer et al. [FKN10] proposed protocols for 2-out-of-2 and t-out-of-n rational secret
sharing. Similarly to our model, they assume the players only have point-to-point channels and
they do not require broadcast channel. Unlike us, the proposed protocols in [FKN10] are based
on cryptographic assumptions and the authors introduce the notion of a computational strict Nash
equilibrium, that is a Nash equilibrium when all players are polynomial time bounded. They show
that their protocols are both computational strict Nash. A caveat is that the protocols are susceptible
to backwards induction.
Zhang, Tartary, and Wang in [ZTW11], propose a protocol for rational t-out-of-n secret sharing
scheme based on the Chinese reminder theorem. Their protocol works in a communication model
similar to our model. Their protocol requires a synchronous but not simultaneous broadcast
channel and synchronous but not simultaneous point-to-point private channels. They assume some
computational hardness related to the discrete logarithm problem and RSA. The proposed protocol
is a (t − 1)-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium that is stable with respect to trembles.
Their protocol runs in time polynomial in k and has shares of size O(k) bits where k is the protocol
security parameter.
The work of Kol and Naor [KN08] is closest to our own work and our protocols make use of
several clever ideas from their result. Kol and Naor show that in the non-simultaneous broadcast
model (i.e. , when rushing is possible), there is no Nash equilibrium that ensures all agents learn the
secret, at least for the case of two players. They thus consider and solve the problem of designing
an -Nash equilibrium for the problem in this communication model. Furthermore, the equilibrium
they achieve is everlasting.
The impossibility of a Nash equilibrium for two players carries over to the setting with secure
private channels, since there is no difference between private channels and broadcast channels
when there are only two players. However, one might hope that the algorithm of [KN08] could
be efficiently simulated over secure private channels to give an everlasting -Nash equilibrium.
Unfortunately, simulation of broadcast over private channels is expensive. To the best of our
knowledge, a single broadcast requires each player to send Θ(n) messages.
In [DMRS11], Dani et al. overcame this difficulty, by providing a scalable protocol for rational
secret sharing, in which each player only sends O(1) bits per round and the expected number of
rounds is constant (although each round takes O(log n) time). Moreover, following the protocol
is an -Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, a certain bad event with small but constant probability
caused some players, when they recognized it, to deviate from the protocol so that the equilibrium
from [DMRS11] is not everlasting.
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3.3

Our Results

The main result of this chapter is presented as Theorem 3.3.1.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let n ≥ 3. There exists a protocol for rational n-out-of-n secret sharing with the
following properties.
• The protocol is a Nash equilibrium in which all players learn the secret.
• In expectation, the protocol requires each player to send O(log n) bits, and has latency
O(log n).
• The protocol is not robust to coalition on any size.
This chapter is the full version of the extended abstract in [DMRS11]. Additionally, it improves
on the work in [DMRS11] in two ways. First, the new proposed algorithm for n-out-of-n secret
sharing is correct with probability one and there is no probability of error. Second, we show that our
new protocol for n-out-of-n is a Nash equilibrium, not just an -Nash equilibrium, as long as n ≥ 3.
t-out-of-n secret sharing We also consider the problem of t-out-of-n rational secret sharing for the
case where t < n. Scalable rational secret sharing for the t-out-of-n case may also be of interest
for applications like the Vanish peer-to-peer system [GKLL09]. Vanish uses secret sharing in a
peer-to-peer system with churn in order to provide data that vanishes over time. In this setting we
prove the following.
Theorem 3.3.2. Let n ≥ 3 and t ≤ n. Assuming the players are computationally bounded to
polynomial-time algorithms, there exists a protocol for rational t-out-of-n secret sharing with the
following properties.
• The protocol is an everlasting -Nash equilibrium in which all active players learn the secret,
where  can be any arbitrary positive value.
• In expectation, the protocol requires each player to send O(log n) bits, and has latency
O(log n).
• The protocol is not robust to coalition of any size.
This is an improvement to the Θ(n)-out-of-n result we proved in [DMRS11], in the sense that
in this new result, t can be any number smaller than n. However, in our new t-out-of-n protocol,
we require a cryptographic digital signature scheme with security parameter κ = max j
Section 3.6.2 for definitions

of U j+

and U j .
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U j+ +U j
2U j + .

See

3.4

Our Approach

The difficulty in designing a Nash equilibrium in a communication model where rushing is possible,
is that the last player to send out his share has no incentive to actually do so. He already has the
shares of all the other players and can recover the secret alone. To get around this, it is common (see
[HT04, ADGH06, GK06, LT06, KN08]) for the protocol to have a number of fake rounds designed
to catch cheaters. The uncertainty in knowing which is the “definitive” round, during which the true
secret will be revealed causes players to cooperate.
In the work of [KN08] this uncertainty is created by dealing one player only enough data to
play until the round preceding the definitive one. Thus, there is a single “short” player and n − 1
“long” players. None of the players know whether they are short or long. The long players must
broadcast their information every round, since they cannot predict the definitive round in advance.
The short player knows the definitive round in advance, but has no information about the secret in
that round. In the definitive round the short player is the last to speak so that he (and all the other
players) receives the shares of all the long players and can recover the secret. The short player’s
failure to broadcast a message is what cues the other players to the end of the game, and they too
can recover the secret.
Moreover, having learned the secret, the short player cannot pretend that he actually had a share
for that round as the messages sent by all the players are verified by a tag and hash scheme (see, e.g.,
[WC81, RBO89, KN08]). In fact, it is the small but positive chance of cracking the tag and hash
scheme that results in the protocol from [KN08] being an -Nash equilibrium rather than a Nash
equilibrium. In this chapter for the n-out-of-n case, we overcome this problem by ensuring there are
at least two short players when n ≥ 3. Thus, our protocol is a Nash equilibrium for this case since
if a single short player breaks the tag and hash scheme, he cannot prevent any other player from
learning the secret. See Section 3.8 for complete analysis.
Unfortunately, the same trick of having more than one short player to achieve a Nash-equilibrium
cannot be easily applied to the t-out-of-n case. Since the dealer is not aware of the identity of the
active players, he cannot choose short players in a way to make sure there are at least two short
players active in the game. Since there is a chance that there is only one active short player, a short
player will now have some incentive to try to forge the tag and hash scheme.
Due to the using of short and long players, both of our protocols are susceptible to coalitions of
any size. Consider a long player who is the first one that learns the secret. He can join together with
a short player to learn that this round is definitive. Thus, both players in this coalition will learn the
secret early, and the remaining players will be fooled into thinking that the previous round was the
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definitive round.
We introduce two novel techniques to ensure scalable communication. The first technique is
to arrange players at the leaves and nodes of a complete binary tree, and require that the players
only communicate with their neighbors in the tree. The assignment of players to the leaves is
independently random in every round, and their assignment to internal nodes is related to their
assignment to leaves according to a predefined scheme. Every round of the game, information
travels up to the root where it is decoded and then travels back down again to the leaves. We also
use short and long players to determine the definitive round. The short players are the players who
are parents of the leaves in the definitive round and all other players are long players. So, every
player is a child of a short player in the definitive round. In the definitive round, the short players
will fail to send messages to all the leaf nodes. Thus, every player, upon not receiving a message,
will learn that this is the definitive round and so will learn the secret.
The second main idea is that we make use of an iterated secret sharing scheme over this tree in
order to divide up shares of secrets among the players. This scheme is similar to that used in recent
work by King and Saia [KS10] on the problem of scalable Byzantine agreement, and suggests a
deeper connection between the two problems.
One drawback of our both protocols is vulnerability to coalitions of any size. The player who is
at the root in the definitive round can team up with a short player and learn the secret early without
telling it to others.
As in previous work [WC81, RBO89, KN08] we use a information-theoretic message authentication codes (also referred as tag-and-hash scheme) to ensure that players cannot forge messages in
the protocol in our n-out-of-n protocol.

3.5

chapter Organization

The rest of this chapter is laid out as follows. In Section 3.6, we give notation and preliminaries. In
Section 3.7, we describe our algorithm for scalable n-out-of-n secret sharing. In Section 3.8, we
analyze this algorithm; the main result of this section is a proof of Theorem 3.3.1. In Section 3.9,
we give our algorithm and analysis for scalable t-out-of-n secret sharing; the main result of this
section is a proof of Theorem 3.3.2. Finally in Section 3.10, we conclude and give directions for
future work.
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3.6

Notation and Preliminaries

The secret to be shared is an arbitrary element of a set S. There are n players with distinct player ids
in [n] = {1,2,. . . n}. During the course of the algorithm, we will want to do arithmetic manipulations
with player ids and shares of the secret, including adding in, or multiplying by random elements to
preserve secrecy. In order to be able to do these sorts of manipulations, we embed the sets S and
[n] into a finite field F of size q > max{n,|S|}. The latter embedding will be the canonical one; the
former may be arbitrary, but is assumed to be known to all parties.
The messages sent by players in the algorithm will be elements of F. The length of any such
message is log q = Ω(log n). Since our goal is to provide a scalable algorithm we cannot afford the
message lengths to be much bigger than that. We will choose F to be a prime field of size q = O(n).
We remark that although generally S is of constant size, we can tolerate |S| = O(n).

3.6.1

Utility Functions

We will denote the utility function of player j by u j . As mentioned before, we assume that the
players are learning preferring, i.e. , each player prefers any outcome in which he learns the secret
to every outcome in which he does not learn the secret. More formally, for outcome o of the game,
let R(o) denote the set of players who learn the secret. If o and o0 are outcomes of the game such
that j ∈ R(o) \ R(o0 ), then u j (o) > u j (o0 ). As in [KN08], we denote
U j+ = max{u j (o) | j ∈ R(o)}
U j = min{u j (o) | j ∈ R(o)}
U j− = max{u j (o) | j < R(o)}.
Thus U j+ is the utility to player j of the best possible outcome for j, U j is the utility to j of the worst
possible outcome in which j still learns the secret, and U j− is the best possible utility to j when he
does not learn the secret. By the learning-preferring assumption, we have for all j,
U j+ ≥ U j > U j− .
We will denote by U , the quantity
U := max
j∈[n]

U j+ − U j−
U j − U j−

.

Note that U ≥ 1. We assume that U is constant, i.e. , that it does not depend on n.1
1 Technically,

we can achieve scalable (polylog) communication even if we allow U to be as big as polylog(n).
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Similar to previous work on rational secret sharing [KN08], we also assume that the utilities are
such that the players have an incentive to play the game rather than just guess the secret at random.
Moreover, as in previous works, we assume that the prior distribution of the secret is uniform for
all players. Thus, if player j decides to guess the secret, with probability 1/|S| he can get at most
the maximum utility of U j+ and with probability of 1 − 1/|S| can get at most the maximum utility
of U j− . Thus, player j’s utility is at most

U j+ −(1−|S|)U j−
|S|

if he guesses instead of running the protocol.

On the other hand, if the protocol runs correctly, he has utility at least U j . Hence, we require
U j+ −(1−|S|)U j−
|S|

< U j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. To satisfy these inequalities we need: |S| > max j∈[n]

U j+ −U j−
.
U j −U j−

Thus we require,
U < |S|.

3.6.2

(3.1)

Game Theoretic Concepts

In this section, we review a few game-theoretic background concepts. We adapt the standard
concepts here from the previous work (e.g. see [HT04, ADGH06]). We describe a game with a tree,
where each node represents the local states of players based on their moves in previous rounds. The
local state of player j describes player j’s initial information and messages sent and received by
player j. At each round, all the players move to a new state by deciding which messages to send.
This decision can happen after receiving other players’ messages. Each message takes exactly one
round to arrive.
A strategy or protocol for player j is a function from player j’s information set (i.e. , player j’s
→
local state) to actions. A strategy can be a randomized function. A joint strategy σ = (σ1 ,. . . ,σn ) is
→

→

→

a tuple of strategies, one for each player. We let σ = ( σ − j ,σ j ), where σ − j denotes a tuple consisting
→
→
→
of each player’s strategy in σ other than player j’s. Ur j ( σ ) is player j’s expected utility if σ is
played. Thus, the utility function depends on the path in the tree that starts from the root.
Recall that a joint strategies for a game is called a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive
→
to unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium strategy, when all others are following it. Formally, σ is
a Nash equilibrium if,
→

→

∀j,∀σ0j ,U j ( σ − j ,σ j ) ≥ U j ( σ − j ,σ0j ).
→

In the same way, σ is an -Nash equilibrium if,
→

→

∀j,∀σ0j ,U j ( σ − j ,σ j ) +  ≥ U j ( σ − j ,σ0j ).
In games of incomplete information which have multiple rounds, there is the further question of
whether the players are forced to commit to their strategies before the start of the game or whether
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they have the option to change strategies in the middle of the game, after some rounds have been
played and they may learn some new information. Kol and Naor [KN08] defined a equilibrium to be
everlasting if after any history that is consistent with all players following the equilibrium strategy,
it is still true (despite whatever new information the players may have learned over that history) that
a player choosing to deviate unilaterally cannot gain in expectation, i.e. , following the prescribed
strategy remains in equilibrium. For some equilibrium concepts such as -Nash, everlastingness is a
stronger concept than the same equilibrium where the strategies are committed to up front [KN08].
However, when the underlying equilibrium is Nash, everlastingness does not make a difference.
That is, an everlasting Nash equilibrium is the same as a Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium cannot
→
fail to be an everlasting equilibrium. Consider a Nash equilibrium joint strategy σ and a path related
to this joint strategy in the game tree. If this joint strategy is not an everlasting equilibrium, then
→
→
along the path, there is some node consistent with σ = ( σ − j ,σ j ) at which some player, say player j,
has an incentive to deviate and follow strategy σ0j . Thus, the strategy σ0j would dominate strategy
→

σ j , contradicting the assumption that the original σ is Nash.
Linger Avoiding Assumption: In this chapter, we make the standard linger avoiding assumption.
This means that our mechanisms do not require players to continue after they learn the secret. Without this assumption, there are trivial but fragile mechanisms that are Nash equilibria. See [KN08]
for details.

3.6.3

Information-Theoretic Message Authentication Codes

A Message Authentication Code (MAC) scheme consists of three algorithms Key-Generation, Mac
and Verification. The key-generation algorithm generates a key as its name suggests. The Mac
algorithm takes a key and a message from a field as input and outputs a tag. The Verification
algorithm takes a key, a message and a tag as input, and verifies the tag. In our algorithm we use
the following information theoretic MAC scheme in field F with q elements. The Key-Generation
algorithm outputs c ∈ F and b ∈ F∗ = F \ {0} independently, uniformly at random. (b,c) is the
verification vector, to be given to the recipient of the message y. The Mac algorithm takes an
F-element message y and generates the tag, a = c − b · y, which will be given to the sender of
message y to send it along with the message. The recipient of the message y can run the Verification
algorithm to verify the tag by testing if c − b · y is equal to a.
Next, we discuss the properties of the above information theoretic MAC scheme. This scheme
makes it hard for a sender to successfully fool the intended recipient of a message by sending a
faked message. At the same time, it does not give the recipient of the message any information about
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the message prior to receiving it. Such schemes have been used before (see e.g. [WC81, RBO89,
KN08]); we include the following proposition for completeness. See Lemma 1 of [RBO89] for the
proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6.1. The MAC scheme described above has the following properties:
• The verification vector contains no information about the message, i.e. , the probability of
correctly guessing the message given the verification vector is the same as the unconditional
probability of guessing the message.
• The probability that a faked message will satisfy the verification function is

3.7

1
q−1 .

Algorithm for n-out-of-n Secret Sharing

We now describe our scalable mechanism for n-out-of-n secret sharing. First, in Section 3.7.1 and 3.7.2
we describe the communication tree and how to label it that is used by the dealer and players. An
informal description of the mechanism follows in Section 3.7.3. The formal descriptions of the
dealer’s and players’ protocols appear respectively as Algorithms 19 and 20.

3.7.1

The Communication Tree

Communication between the players in our protocol will be restricted to sending messages to their
neighbors in a communication tree. The communication tree is a complete binary tree with n leaves.
Recall that a complete binary tree is a binary tree in which all the internal nodes have exactly two
descendants, all the leaves are at the two deepest levels, and the leaves on the deepest level are as
far left as possible.
The communication tree is used to build iterated shares of a value. The dealer sends these
iterated shares to the players, so they can reconstruct the value later. The iterated shares players
receive are constructed by starting with the value to be reconstructed at the root and recursively
constructing 2-out-of-2 Shamir shares down the tree, all the way down to the leaves. The shares at
the leaves are the iterated shares the players receive. See Figure 3.1 and Algorithm 18 for details
of how the iterated shares are constructed. At reconstruction time, shares are sent up the tree. At
each internal node, a pair of shares received from the two children is reconstructed into a degree 1
polynomial which is used to obtain the value to be sent further up the tree. At the root, the original
symbol is reconstructed and transmitted down the tree. Note that the advantage of this scheme
over simply using n-out-of-n Shamir shares is that the size of the messages does not increase as the
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hS11 i2

Figure 3.1: Construction of the iterated shares. We define hSi1 as the first share and hSi2 as the
second share generated from the 2-out-of-2 Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
messages are transmitted up the tree. Lemma 3.7.1 describes that shares resulted from Algorithm 18
is an n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme.
Lemma 3.7.1. Let σ ∈ F be a value that is encoded into n iterated shares, σ1 ,. . . ,σn , by Algorithm 18. Then, σ can be decoded from all n of the shares, but knowledge of fewer than n of the
shares reveals no information about σ.
Proof. Starting with the shares σ1 ,. . . ,σn at the leaves of the tree, we can recursively reconstruct
the values bottom-up using 2-out-of-2 Shamir’s secret sharing reconstruction algorithm. Since this
is exactly the reverse of the process used to create these shares, the value at the root will be σ.
To see why fewer than n shares give us no information about σ, observe that the values at
the two children of the root were created by 2-out-of-2 secret sharing algorithm. Both of these
values together determine the secret, but a single one of them does not reveal any information
about the secret. Thus the values at the children of the root individually contain no information
about the value of the root, and in order to decode the value at the root, we need both the values at
its children. But now, this reasoning applies recursively to all the internal nodes, relative to their
children. Suppose there is a leaf of the tree at which the share is missing. Then, the share of its
parent cannot be decoded because it is equally likely to be any element of the F. This propagates
up to its grandparent, and then its great-grandparent and so on all the way to the root, so that the
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Protocol 18 RecursiveShares (node w , F-element y):
Parameters: V is a n-leaf complete binary tree global data structure; for node w, V (w) denotes the
location for the data associated with w.
Usage: Initially called with the root node and the value for which shares are to be created, this
function populates V with intermediate values. The values at the leaves are the shares for the players
at the corresponding leaves of the communication tree.
1. V (w) ← y.
2. If w has children L(w) and R(w):
a) share y using 2-out-of-2 secret sharing. Let the shares be y L , y R
b) RecursiveShares(L(w), y L ).
c) RecursiveShares(R(w), y R ).

root cannot be decoded. Thus, if even one of the shares is missing, the remaining shares provide no
information about the value of σ.

3.7.2



Labeling the Communication Tree: Short and Long Players

Recall that the short players are the players who are parents of the leaves in the communication
tree in the definitive round and all other players are long players. To make the definition easier, we
devise a specific labeling for the communication tree. We have exactly n labels and thus, the labels
may be repeated in the tree. The leaves will be labeled 1 to n from left to right. Next every internal
node which is a parent of two leaves is labeled with the odd label from among its two children.
Finally, the remaining internal nodes are labeled in order with even numbers, proceeding top to
bottom and left to right, starting with 2 at the root. If n is odd, then each even number appears at
some internal node. If n is even, we will place the last even number, n at the root, along with 2, so
the root will have two labels. Figure ?? illustrates the labeling scheme for five and six players. The
tree thus labeled has the following properties:
1. Every even label occurs at some internal node. If n is odd, there will be an odd label that
occurs only at a leaf and not at any internal node. This will not matter.
2. No even labeled internal node has an odd labeled node above it.
3. Every path from root to leaf has exactly one odd label (the same odd label may occur once or
twice on the path).
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Figure 3.2: Communication trees for 5 players (left) and 6 players (right)

We generate a permutation of players and assign players to n labels based on his permutation
position. We use this permutation to assign players to the nodes of the tree. A player is assigned to
a node if they have the same labels. Thus, each player can be assigned to multiple nodes of the tree
and two players may assign to the root node of the tree. Based on this labeling, the short players are
ones in odd positions in the permutation in the definitive round and all the other players are long
players 1.
As discussed in Sections 3.7.4 and 3.8, it is critical in our analysis that the players themselves
do not know which are short or long until the definitive round. Further, each player must have as
a priori equal chance to be short or long. Thus, the permutation and the definitive round must be
random and unknown to the players. Therefore, in our protocol, the dealer first generates random
trees based on random permutations and chooses a definitive round randomly. Then, he assigns the
long and short players accordingly to the choice of the tree in the definitive round.

3.7.3

Our Algorithm

The dealer is active only once at the beginning of the game, and during this phase of the game the
players’ inputs are prepared.
The dealer independently samples two random variables X and Y from a geometric distribution
with parameter β (to be determined later). X will be the definitive iteration, or the round of the
game in which the true secret is revealed. Y will be the amount of padding on the long players’
input. We have two kinds of players: short players will receive enough input to last for X rounds of
the game while long players will receive enough input to last for X +Y rounds of the game.
1 Note

that the above numbered properties for odd and even labeled nodes in the tree are also correct for short and
long players in the definitive round.
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Protocol 19 Dealer’s Protocol
Parameters: F is a field of size q > n (to represent messages in the algorithm) n players with
distinct identifiers 1,2,. . . n ∈ F. β ∈ (0,1) is geometric distribution parameter. Complete binary tree
with n leaves, labeled as described in Section 3.7.1 known to everyone.
1. Choose X,Y, independently from a geometric distribution with parameter β and let L = X +Y .
Round X is the definitive one. Short players will receive full input for X − 1 rounds and
partial input for round X. Long players will receive full input for L − 1 rounds and partial
input for round L. For convenience we will create all the inputs for L rounds, and truncate
them appropriately before sending them to the players.
2. for round r = 1 set m1 = 0
3. For each round r between 1 and L:
a) If r < L, then choose a random permutation πr ∈ Sn . Else, randomly choose a permutation π L which is random subject to the constraint that all the long players (determined
by π X ) are assigned to odd labels under π L .
b) Preparing labeling information:
For all players j
i. Set player j’s label to πr ( j). player j will be assigned to all nodes marked πr ( j) in
the tree.
ii. Let νr ( j) be the set of all neighbors of nodes labeled πr ( j) in the tree. πr ( j) has a
constant number of neighbors.
iii. Let πr−1 (νr ( j)) be the tuple of identities of all the players assigned to a node in set
νr ( j). Thus, it is the tuple of identities of all neighbors of j.
iv. Generate the labeling information tuple, (πr ( j),πr−1 (νr ( j))).
v. Mask the labeling information tuple,
j
Pr = (πr ( j),πr−1 (νr ( j))) + mr .
c) Preparing shares of the secret:
i. If r = X, then sr ← true secret.
Else, sr ← random element of S
ii. Create shares of sr by calling RecursiveShares (root,sr ).
d) Preparing mask shares for the next round:
i. Choose a random mask mr+1 ∈ Fc .
ii. Create shares of mr+1 by calling RecursiveShares (root,mr+1 ).
e) Create tags and verification functions for all the messages to be sent in round r
j

j

f) For each player j, j’s (full) input Ir for round r consists of Pr , shares of mr+1 and
sr corresponding to node πr ( j), tags76to authenticate all messages to be sent by j and
j
verification vectors for all the messages to be received by j. Partial input I˜r consists of
all of the above except the authentication tags for sending messages to your children (in
the down-stage).
4. Identify the short players as those players j who are at odd numbered nodes in the definitive

Protocol 20 Protocol for Player j
Parameters: S=0; M=0
If at any time you receive spurious messages (messages not expected under the protocol), ignore
them.
On round r:
Up-Stage:
1. mr = M
j

2. Subtract mr from Pr to find out your position in the tree and the identities of your
neighbors for round r.
3. (as a player at a leaf) Send your shares of sr and mr+1 along with their tags to your
parent in the tree.
4. (as a player at an internal node)
a) Receive (intermediate) shares of sr and mr+1 and tags from left and right chidren.
Use the appropriate verification vectors to check that correct messages have been
sent. If a fault is detected (missing or incorrect message) output S and quit.
b) For each of sr and mr+1 : interpolate them from their shares. This is your share.
c) If you are not at the root, send the above reconstructed shares of sr and mr+1 to
your parent(s) along with the appropriate tags. If you are at the root, these shares
are the actual values of sr and mr+1 .
Down-Stage:
1. (as a player at the root) Set S = sr and M = mr+1 and send these values along with
authentification tags to your left and right children.
2. (as a player at a non-root node)
a) Receive sr and mr+1 and tags from your parent and use verificaton vectors to check
them. If fault detected, output S and quit.
b) Set S = sr and M = mr+1 .
3. (as a player at a non-root internal node) Send sr and mr+1 to your children along with
the appropriate tags. If you are a short player and have no authentication tags, output sr
and quit.
r ← r +1
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In order not to reveal which players are the short players, the players will be reassigned to new
random positions in the tree in each round. This is accomplished by choosing a random permutation
of the players and label them for each round. Again recall that the short players are the ones who
are at odd labeled nodes in the definitive round.
Since the players must be at different nodes in the tree each round, their input must contain this
information. At the same time, the positions of the players for all the rounds cannot be revealed
up front, since this may give away information about who the short players are. A naive idea to
solve this problem is, in each round, to distribute shares of the permutation for the next round.
Then, during each round, the players could reconstruct the permutation from the shares and use it to
reposition for the next round. Unfortunately, there is a problem with this approach. To represent
permutations of n symbols, we need a field of size at least n!. To transmit elements of such a field,
players would need to send messages of length log(n!) ∼ n log n. This is unacceptable if we desire
scalability.
To get around this problem, we note that it is not really necessary for players to know the entire
permutation. Each player only needs to know its own position and the identities of its neighbors.
We only need a field of size order n to encode this, and so, symbols of this field may be transmitted
with messages of length O(log n). Since it is dificult via share reconstruction to transmit different
messages to the leaves of the tree, we simply provide each player with a list of positional data for the
entire game. But in order that players do not know their positional data for a round before actually
getting to that round, this data is masked by adding in a random element of the field. Positional data
for the first round is sent unmasked. The players also receive iterated shares of the masks for the
next round. Thus, in each round, players reconstruct a mask, and use it to unmask the positional
data and reposition themselves for the next round.
For each round, the full input consists of the following:
• iterated shares of a purported secret (the true secret in the definitive round);
• masked versions of positional data for the current round (position and identities of neighbors
in the tree);
• shares of the mask for the next round of positional data;
• tags for all the messages to be sent; and
• verification vectors for all the messages to be received.
As mentioned earlier, round X is the definitive round, when the encoded symbol is the true
secret. Short players receive full input for every round prior to this round. For round X they only
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receive partial input. Long players receive input for X +Y rounds. However, they, too receive only
partial input for their last block of input. Otherwise, a player would be able to distinguish whether
or not he is a short player by looking at his last block of input. Here, partial input consists of all of
the pieces of data from the full input, except the tags to send the decoded message to your children
in the down stage of the round.
Since in the definitive round the short players (with odd labels) are in the level above the leaves,
and all the long players are at internal nodes higher than that in the tree, the long players have
learned the secret before the short players, although since they have input for more rounds of the
game, they do not know (i.e. , cannot guess) that it is the definitive round, and that the secret they
have learned is in fact the true secret. Thus, they send the secret down the tree, and eventually it
gets to the short players. Thus, the short players learn the secret as well. Since they have no more
input they know that the game is over and the secret is the true one. However, since they do not
have any more authentication data, they cannot gain by remaining in the game and trying to fool the
others into thinking that the secret has not yet been reconstructed. Finally, when the long players do
not receive a message at the end of the definitive iteration, they too realize the game has ended and
output the correct secret.

3.7.4

Discussion

A careful reader may ask why it is necessary to permute the players. First, we note that if we never
permute the players, then the short and long players know who they are at the beginning of the
game. In the game, there is an event with small probability that the short players have an array of
size exactly one less than the long players (e.g. short players have array of size one and long players
have array of size two). If there are only two rounds remaining in the list of long player, he learns
the one to last (the current) round is the definitive round since Y is at least 1. It is crucial for our
analysis that long players do not know if the current round is the definitive round. Since, in this
case, the long player at the root node can learn the secret without revealing it to any other players.
What if the players are only permuted in the definitive round? Then, when the players see that a
permutation occurs, they know they are in the definitive round. Thus, again the long player(s) at the
root node will be able to learn the secret without allowing other players to learn it. Hence, we need
more than one random permutation during the algorithm. For simplicity of algorithmic presentation
and analysis, we permute the players at every round.
A careful reader might wonder why we do not first construct a new scalable protocol for rational
broadcast and then use it in the existing protocols for RSS. They are two main reasons. First of all,
we note that composing two mechanisms that are Nash equilibria does not necessarily give a new
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mechanism that is a Nash equilibrium. In general, composability of mechanisms and generating a
new one with specific properties is not an easy problem. Second, it seems difficult to come up a
mechanism that can broadcast in a scalable manner, because of the linger avoiding assumption we
make. In particular, it seems that all players must participate in the broadcast and learn the result of
the broadcast at the same time. We achieve scalability by never performing broadcast.

3.8

Analysis of Algorithm for All Players Present

In this section, we show that the secret sharing scheme we have described is in fact a scalable
n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme, and that it is a Nash equilibrium in which all the players learn the
secret.
Recall that in Lemma 3.7.1 we show our rescursive scheme for encoding a value into n iterated
shares (Algorithm 18) is an n-out-of-n scheme.
We will focus our attention on showing that it is a Nash equilibrium for all the players to follow
our protocol. Consider player j and suppose that all other players are committed to following the
protocol. The next lemma gives a necessary criterion for j to have an incentive to cheat.
Lemma 3.8.1. If all other players are following the protocol, player j prefers to also follow the
protocol, unless his probability of successfully cheating is at least

U j −U j−
.
U j+ −U j−

Proof. Suppose j is considering deviating from the protocol. We will consider the deviation to
be successful if either j learns the secret right away, with or without being caught, or he does
not get caught and is therefore still in a position to learn it later. The deviation will have failed
if it is detected, causing the game to end without j learning the secret. Let p j be the probability
that the deviation succeeds. The maximum utility that j can get is U j+ . With probability 1 − p j ,
the game ends without j learning the secret, in which case the maximum payoff possible is U j− .
Thus, a player’s expected utility from cheating while everyone else follows the protocol is at most
p j U j+ + (1 − p j )U j− .
On the other hand, if everyone else follows the protocol, then following the protocol guarantees
a utility of at least U j . Thus, the protocol will be a Nash equilibrium if U j > p j U j+ + (1 − p j )U j− . By
rearranging the terms, we have a Nash equilibrium if
pj <

U j − U j−
U j+ − U j−

.
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When and how might a player cheat? We note that since players are not required to commit to
their strategy before starting the game, and since the progression of the game reveals information, a
player may as well defer his decision to cheat in a future round until that future round. Thus, at any
given time, the decision facing the player is whether to cheat in the current round. In order to weigh
the benefits of such a decision, the player needs an estimate of whether the current round is likely to
be the definitive one.
As remarked earlier, the purpose of having short and long players is to create uncertainty about
when the definitive round of the game is, until it is too late to gain from this information.
The players know that X is chosen from a geometric distribution with parameter β. Thus, a
priori the probability that X takes on any particular value is at most β, the most likely being X = 1,
whose probability is exactly β. As the game progresses, players receive partial information about
the value of X; as soon as they receive their inputs they can eliminate all values of X larger than
their input length, if the game did not end on the first round, they learn that X , 1 and so on. Clearly,
when a player reaches his last block of input, he knows that the current round is definitive. The next
lemma shows that until that stage, a player’s estimate that the current round is definitive remains
small.
Lemma 3.8.2. Let j be a player who initially received input for k > 1 rounds of the game, and
let 1 ≤ r < k be the current round. Then, j’s estimate of the probability that the current round is
definitive, conditioned on all the information he has learned, is at most 2 β.
Proof. Let L j denote the random variable which is the initial input length of player j. Then, we
know that


X
Lj = 

 X +Y


if j is a short player,

(3.2)

if j is a long player.

Also, let L j denote the event that j is a long player and L Cj the event that j is a short player. By
hypothesis, the current round is r ≥ 1, and player j received an initial input of length k > r. What
information does player j know in round r?
• Since his initial input was of length k he knows that L j = k and X ≤ k and moreover, that
X = k if and only if L Cj .
• Since the game has entered round r he knows that X ≥ r.
• He knows his position πr ( j) and the identities of his neighbors in round r.
• He also has learned sr , mr+1 and using the latter to unmask his positional data, he knows
πr+1 ( j) and the identities of his neighbors in round r + 1. Technically, he learns these just
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prior to his turn in the downstage in round r, but this is fine, as we will argue later that no
player ever has any reason to cheat during the upstage of a round.
We note that knowing sr does not benefit player j in any way as far as estimating the probability
that X = r goes, since sr is equally likely to be any element of S, independently of X. Similarly,
knowing the identities of his neighbors does not affect his estimate, since all other players are
equally likely to be his neighbors independently of X.
On the other hand, knowing πr ( j) and πr+i ( j) does affect the estimate. By construction:
• In the definitive iteration, short players have odd labels, and long players have even labels;
and
• Each player has an odd label in his last round of input.
Thus, if πr ( j) is odd, then player j knows that the current round is not definitive, since if X = r,
then k > r implies that j is a long player and should have an even label. In particular, conditioned
on everything he knows, Pr(X = r) = 0. Since 2 β > 0 the lemma is proved in this case.
For the remainder of the proof, we will assume that πr ( j) is even and denote this event Er .
Consider the case πr+1 ( j). If k = r + 1, then we know that πr+1 ( j) is odd by construction and
knowing this contains no additional information over knowing L j = k. On the other hand, when
k > r + 1, if πr+1 ( j) is odd, then player j knows that X cannot be r + 1 and this affects the probability
that X = r.
b denote the event that the parity of
Let b ∈ {0,1} be the observed parity of πr+1 ( j) and let Er+1

πr+1 ( j) is b. Note that if k = r + 1 we must have b = 1.
Let P j,r be player j’s estimate that the current round, r, is definitive, conditioned on everything
he knows. Then,
P j,r
b
)
= Pr(X = r | L j = k ∧ r ≤ X ≤ k ∧ Er ∧ Er+1

=
≤

b )
Pr(X = r ∧ L j = k ∧ Er ∧ Er+1
b )
Pr(L j = k ∧ t ≤ X ≤ k ∧ Er ∧ Er+1
b )
Pr(X = r ∧ L j = k ∧ Er ∧ Er+1
b )
Pr(L j = k ∧ X ∈ {r,k} ∧ Er ∧ Er+1

,

where the inequality follows from the fact that the event X ∈ {r,k} is a subset of the event r ≤ X ≤ k.
If the current round is definitive i.e. , X = r, then j is not a short player, and L j = X +Y . So the
b is the same as the event L ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k − r ∧ E b . Note
event X = r ∧ L j = k ∧ Er ∧ Er+1
j
r+1

that Er is implied by L j ∧ X = r and can therefore be dropped.
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b can be split into the union of
For the denominator, the event L j = k ∧ X ∈ {r,k} ∧ Er ∧ Er+1
b and L ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k −r ∧ E b . The latter summand
disjoint events L Cj ∧ X = k ∧ Er ∧ Er+1
j
r+1

is the same as the numerator, and loses the Er term for the same reason. Making these substitutions
in the above expression, we get
P j,r ≤ A/B,
where
b
A = Pr(L j ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k − r ∧ Er+1
)

and
b
B = Pr(L Cj ∧ X = k ∧ Er ∧ Er+1
)
b
+ Pr(L j ∧ X = t ∧ Y = k − t ∧ Er+1
).

The random variables X, Y and the indicator that j is a long player are independent. Thus the
numerator of the above expression becomes
b
Pr(L j ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k − r ∧ Er+1
)
b
|L j ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k − r)×
= Pr(Er+1

Pr(L j ) Pr(X = r) Pr(Y = k − r)
b
= Pr(Er+1
|L j ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k − r)×
bn/2c
(1 − β)r−1 β(1 − β) k−r−1 β
n
b
= Pr(Er+1
|L j ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k − r)×
bn/2c
(1 − β) k−2 β 2 .
n

Similarly we tackle the first term in the denominator. Since X and all the πi are independent and
k , r, then πr and π X are independent conditioned on X = k. It follows that the events L Cj = π X ( j)
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is odd; Er = πr ( j) is even; and X = r are independent. Thus, we have the following.
b
Pr(L Cj ∧ X = k ∧ Er ∧ Er+1
)
b
= Pr(Er+1
|L Cj ∧ X = k ∧ Er )×

Pr(L Cj ∧ X = k ∧ Er )
b
= Pr(Er+1
|L Cj ∧ X = k ∧ Er )×

Pr(L Cj ) Pr(Er ) Pr(X = k)
b
= Pr(Er+1
|L Cj ∧ X = k ∧ Er )×
dn/2e bn/2c
(1 − β) k−1 β
n2
b
≥ Pr(Er+1
|L Cj ∧ X = k ∧ Er )×
bn/2c
(1 − β) k−1 β.
2n

If k > r + 1 then π X and πr+1 are independent conditioned on X being either r or k, and
b and L ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k − r are independent, as are the events E b and
hence, the events Er+1
j
r+1
b |L ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k −r) and Pr(E b |L C ∧ X = k ∧ E )
L Cj ∧ X = k ∧ Er . It follows that Pr(Er+1
j
r
j
r+1
b ). On the other hand if k = r + 1 then b = 1 and E b is implied in both cases
both equal Pr(Er+1
r+1
b |L ∧ X = r ∧ Y = k − r) and Pr(E b |L C ∧ X = k ∧ E ) are both 1. Either way,
Thus, Pr(Er+1
j
r
j
r+1

they are equal, and since their common value occurs in the numerator as well as in both terms in the
denominator, it simply cancels out.
Putting everything together we see that
P j,r ≤
=

bn/2c
2n (1 −

β

1
2 (1 −

bn/2c
k−2 β 2
n (1 − β)
β) k−1 β + bn/2c
n (1 −

β) k−2 β 2

β) + β

≤ 2 β.

We remark that although in the above proof we have bounded player j’s estimate during the
down-stage, a nearly identical proof shows the same bound for the up-stage (when πr+1 ( j) is
unknown). We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
of Theorem 3.3.1. We will begin by showing that the protocol is a Nash equlibrium in which all the
players learn the secret.
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Suppose all the players follow the protocol. In every round, during the up-stage, players send
their shares up toward the root where they are decoded. During the down-stage, the reconstructed
secret and mask are sent back toward the leaves. If the odd players in the round do not drop out at
the end of the round, then the game continues into the next round. In the definitive round, the real
secret is reconstructed at the root and all the even labeled players, who are long players learn it first.
Once it gets to the short players with odd labels, they drop out of the game since they have no tags to
send any more messages. This signals the end of the game to the long players who then realize that
the current reconstructed secret is the true one. Thus if all the players follow the protocol, everyone
learns the secret.
Suppose all players other than j are following the protocol. We want to show that player j
prefers following the protocol over deviating.
At the beginning of the game, each player has set their current guess for the secret to 0. If no
cheating occurred before the current round r then during round r − 1 all the players set their current
guess to sr−1 . Thus, at the beginning of round r, all players have the same guess for the secret.
(Round r − 1 has been eliminated as the definitive one, but sr−1 still has probability 1/|S| of being
the true secret). Moreover, since by Lemma 3.7.1 partial information about the shares reveals no
information about the symbol they encode, throughout the up-stage player j has no better guess than
sr−1 for the secret. Since U < |S|, it is strictly better for j not to leave the game in the up-stage. If j
sends incorrect messages in the up-stage, then even if he is not caught(which results in not learning
the secret), this deviation will cause an incorrect value to be decoded instead of sr . This results in j
not learning the secret if r happened to be the definitive round. Thus, j has no incentive to deviate
in the up-stage.
Now, what about the down-stage? If j is on his last round of input, then he is a short player, and
knows that the current round is definitive. At the same time, this means that he is an odd-labeled
player and by the construction of the communication tree he cannot prevent anyone from learning
the secret. Moreover, even if he successfully fakes a tag in order to convince the unique long player
below him that the game has not ended, that player will detect in the next round that all other players
have left the game and will therefore still output the correct secret. Thus this deviation does not
change the outcome of the game, namely that all players learn the secret. It follows that j does not
gain anything by this deviation (although he also does not lose anything by it). Effectively, if j is a
short player on his last round of input, it is too late for him to improve his payoff by deviating.
If j is not on his last round of the input and is at an odd labeled node, then, as remarked in
the proof of Lemma 3.8.2, he knows the current round is not definitive. So, cheating would be
equivalent to randomly guessing the secret that is correct with probability only 1/|S|. This is worse
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than following the protocol by Equation (3.1).
Now, suppose that the current round, r, is not j’s last round of the input and j is at an even
labeled node. Note that any spurious messages sent by player j to players that are not expecting
them, will be ignored. Also, any action involving not sending a message that is expected will be
detected immediately, only by the involved players at first, but the knowledge will quickly propagate
to all the players, before the end of the up-stage of the next round. Since detection of deviation
causes other players to quit immediately, effectively such actions amount to player j leaving the
game. Thus, the possible deviations we need to analyze for player j are:
• Leave the game with or without sending fake messages first, and;
• Send fake messages to one or both children and hope to stay in the game by not being caught.
Let P j,r be j’s estimate of the probability that the current round is definitive. Then, by
Lemma 3.8.2, P j,r ≤ 2 β.
If player j leaves the game and outputs the value sr then the probability that he has output the
right value is P j,r + (1 − P j,r )/|S|, and since he has left the game, he has no later opportunity to
improve that probability. By Lemma 3.8.1, in order to discourage this deviation it is sufficient if
−
(1 − P j,r ) U j − U j
P j,r +
≤ +
.
|S|
U j − U j−

(3.3)

Now consider the other kind of deviation. Suppose instead of sending sr to his descendents,
player j sends a fake value to one or both of them. Let α be the probability that he is not caught. By
Proposition 3.6.1 we know that α =

1
q−1

if he sends a fake message to only one of his children, and,

since the two verification functions are chosen independently by the dealer, α =

1
(q−1) 2

if he fakes

both messages. If he is not caught, and if the current round is definitive, then player j has learned
the true secret and has prevented some of his descendants from learning it. If the current round
was not definitive and his deviation was not detected, the game continues and since the values si
are all independent, it does not affect the next round.1 This means that player j can either revert to
following the protocol and guarantee learning the secret along with everyone else, or he may find
further opportunities to cheat.
On the other hand, if the faked message is detected, which happens with probability 1 − α, then
the game ends right away and player j outputs sr . In this case, there is still a P j,r chance that the
current round was definitive and an additional (1 − P j,r )/|S| chance that the value sr was correct
1 This

is why player j does not try to fake the mask mr +1 - a successfully transmitted incorrect mr +1 will wreak
havoc in the next round, since some players will be talking to the wrong players.
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despite the current round not having been definitive. So the probability that the deviation succeeds
is

!
(1 − P j,r )
α + (1 − α) P j,r +
.
|S|

As this quantity is bigger when α =

1
q−1 ,

faking only one message dominates faking both messages.

Thus, again by Lemma 3.8.1, to discourage this deviation, it is sufficient if
! U − U−
j
(1 − P j,r )
1
q−2
j
+
P j,r +
≤ +
.
q−1 q−1
|S|
U j − U j−

(3.4)

Moreover, note that (3.4) implies (3.3). Thus for a Nash equilibrium, it is sufficient to show (3.4).
For the remainder of the proof, we are going to assume that n is sufficiently large, specifically
that n ≥

2 U |S|
|S|−U .

We will discuss the modifications required when 3 ≤ n <

2 U |S|
|S|−U

in Section 3.8.1.1.

We have so far not specified β. We do this now. Let
β=

|S| − U
.
4 U |S|

Then, 1/ β = O(1) so that the expected number of rounds in the game is constant.
To show (3.4), recall that q > n, so that q − 1 ≥ n. We have
!
(1 − P j,r )
1
q−2
+
P j,r +
q−1 q−1
|S|
!
(1 − P j,r )
1
< + P j,r +
n
|S|
1 |S| − 1
1
= +
P j,r +
n
|S|
|S|
|S| − U
1
≤
+2β +
2 U |S|
|S|
|S| − U
|S| − U
1
≤
+2
+
2 U |S|
4 U |S| |S|
|S| − U
1
+
=
U |S|
|S|
1
=
U
as desired.
Finally, we analyze the resource costs of our protocol. The communication tree has 2n − 1 nodes.
In each round, each player is mapped to one leaf and one internal node. Players only communicate
with their neighbors in the tree. So on each round, during the up-stage each player sends up to three
messages: one to his parent when he is a leaf; one to his parent when he is a non-root internal node;
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and if he is a child of the root and n is even, he has to send an additional message because there are
two players at the root.
During the down stage, each player sends two messages, to his two children. Thus, each player
sends at most five messages per round. Each message consists of four elements of F (shares of
sr , mr+1 and two tags) each of which is represented as O(log n), since n < q ≤ 2n. Thus, each
player send O(log n) bits per round. Since the expected number of rounds is 1/ β, which is constant,
each player sends only O(log n) bits during the course of the game. Finally, since the tree has
depth O(log n), the number of rounds is constant (in expectation). Note that the communication is
synchronous, which follows that the expected latency is O(log n).

3.8.1

Some Remarks

3.8.1.1

The Case of a Small Number of Players



When the number of players is a constant greater than 2, then scalability is not an issue, and one
might hope to simply use the algorithm of Kol and Naor [KN08] by simulating non-simultaneous
broadcast channels with secure private channels. Unfortunately their algorithm only provides an
-Nash equilibrium, since the unique short player has a small chance of successfully pretending the
game has not ended.
In our algorithm, dn/2e players are short players. In particular, even for n = 3, there are at least
two short players, and none of the short players can increase their expected payoff by cheating alone.
Thus, we obtain a Nash equilibrium, provided that we can prove inequality (3.4). The above proof
used the fact that n was at least

2 U |S|
|S|−U ,

so we need a separate argument.

However, scalability is immediate when n is constant. Thus, we have more leeway to choose a
larger field to work with.1 So, we can work in a prime field of size q where
max{|S|,

2 U |S|
2 U |S|
} < q ≤ 2 max{|S|,
}
|S| − U
|S| − U

and the proof of (3.4) goes through as before, giving us a Nash equilibrium.
3.8.1.2

Nash Equilibria vs. Strict Nash Equilibria

An n-tuple of strategies is called a strict Nash equilibrium if when all other players are following
the prescribed strategy, a player unilaterally deviating achieves a strictly worse expected payoff than
he would by following the equilibrium strategy.
1 The

upper bound of O(n) on the field size came from the desire to keep 4 log q, which is the size of an individual
message, small.
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Our algorithm fails to be a strict Nash equilibrium, for the following reasons:
• Any player may, at any time, send spurious messages that are not part of the protocol, to
players that are not his neighbors in the tree. Such messages will be ignored by their recipients,
who are following the protocol.
• At the end of the definitive round, a short player may try to fake a tag and send a message to
the long player below him. This may go undetected with some small probability, but as noted
in the proof, even in this case, it cannot fool that long player into outputting the wrong secret.
Our proof shows that our algorithm does have the property that any player deviating from the
protocol in one of the above ways does not increase his payoff, and moreover does not affect any
other player’s payoff either. In other words, if a player deviating unilaterally from our protocol, does
so in a manner that changes some other player’s payoff, then he strictly reduces his own expected
payoff. In this weaker sense, the equilibrium is strict.
3.8.1.3

A Note on Backwards Induction

The backwards induction problem arises when a multi-round protocol has a last round number that
is known to all players. In particular, if it is globally known that the last round of the protocol is
`, then on the `-th round, there is no longer any fear or reprisal to persuade a player to follow the
protocol. But then if no player follows the protocol in the `-th round, then in the (` − 1)-th round,
there is no reason for any player to follow the protocol. This same logic continues backwards to the
very first round.
As in [KN08], we protect against backwards induction by having both long and short players.
As the above analysis shows, we can ensure that the probability of making a correct guess as to
when the protocol ends is too small to enable profitable cheating for any player. Thus, even when a
player gets to the second to the last element in all his lists, he can not be very sure that the protocol
will end in the next round. All players are aware of these probabilities at the beginning of the
protocol, and thus each player knows that no other player will be able to accurately guess when the
protocol ends.
The backwards induction problem may occur with protocols that make cryptographic assumptions. If there is a round, `, in which enough time has passed, so that even a computationally
bounded player can break the cryptography, then it is globally known that the protocol will end
at round `. Thus, even though ` may be far off in the future, by backwards induction, there is no
incentive for a player to follow the protocol even at the beginning. We note that in out t-out-of-n
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protocol, there is no such round since the keys are refreshed every round. Moreover, the information
about the key for each round is shared until that round and nobody knows it beforehand.

3.9

Algorithm for t-out-of-n Secret Sharing

In this section, we discuss t-out-of-n secret sharing where t < n. Here, we want any subset of t or
more of the players to be able to reconstruct the secret. However, fewer than t players should not be
able to reconstruct the secret on their own.
We will assume, as in previous work, that the set of active players is known to all the active
players, before the start of the players’ protocol. However, this set is not known to the dealer at the
time of share creation.
Our algorithm will be a hybrid of the Kol and Noar [KN08] scheme for t out of n players and
our scheme described above for n out of n players. As in [KN08], we now have a single short player
and the secret shares now include an indicator bit to enable any subset of t players to reconstruct
the secret, even if that subset does not contain the short player. The existence of the short player is
necessary to avoid backwards induction. See the work of Kol and Naor [KN08] for details.
Since the algorithm is a variant of the n-out-of-n scheme, for conciseness, we briefly describe
the protocol focusing only on the places where the two algorithms differ. We first describe sharing
and reconstruction (Sections 3.9.1 and 3.9.2) without authentication, and then show how to modify
to ensure authentication in Section 3.9.3.

3.9.1

Creating the Shares

We assume each player has an id that is known to all other players. Moreover, each player initially
has a label from 2 to n + 1 based on their sorted ids. These labels may change during the course of
the protocol. In particular, in each round, exactly one player will have its label change to 1, and
the player player previously labeled 1 will revert to its initial label. At the start, the dealer selects a
random player to be labeled 1 in the first round and sends its id to all players.
To ensure reconstructability, in addition to the secret, the shares will need to encode some more
information. Specifically, they will also encode an indicator bit to identify the definitive round, and
they will also encode the label of the player that will be labeled 1 for the following round. For a
given round r, we let sr be the potential secret, br be the indicator bit, and `r be the label of the
player who will have label 1 in round r + 1.
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The dealer samples values X and Y independently from a geometric distribution with parameter
β and lets L = X +Y . The game will have L rounds, and round X will be the definitive one.
The player labeled 1 in the definitive round is the short player.
For each round 1 ≤ r ≤ L, the dealer proceeds as follows. The value `r is set to a number
selected uniformly at random between 2 and n + 1. Then, if r = X, sr is set to be the true secret,
br ← 1. Otherwise if r , X, sr is set to a random value in the set S and br ← 0.
The dealer prepares the players’ inputs as follows. For rounds, 1 ≤ r ≤ L, the dealer uses
Shamir’s (t,n)-secret sharing to generate n different shares of the tuple r,sr ,br ,`r and also the
hash and tags for each message as described in Section 3.9.3. For rounds 1 ≤ r ≤ X, the dealer
sends out shares to all the players. For rounds X + 1 ≤ r ≤ L, the dealer sends out shares to all
players except the short player.

3.9.2

Reconstruction phase

For the reconstruction phase, we will make use of the following property of the t-out-of-n Shamir’s
secret sharing: For every set of shares s1 ,. . . ,st 0 of cardinality t 0 ≥ t, there exist coefficients
(Lagrange coefficients) λ 1 ,. . . ,λ t 0 , which depend only on the identities of the active players, such
P0
that s = it λ i si . See [Sha79, Knu97] for details.
Let T be the group of t players who are active, and let pi be the i-th player in T in the sorted
order based on their labels. Every active player knows the id and label of all players in T, and the id
of the player labeled 1 for the first round. In each round, players generate a complete binary tree
with t leaves and assign player pi to the i-th leaf node, going from left to right. For all 1 < i ≤ t,
player pi is also assigned to an internal node of the tree from root node, going from top to bottom
and from left to right.
Each player i at a leaf node multiplies his shares of r,sr ,br ,`r by λ i and sends the result to his
parent in the tree. Players at internal nodes of the tree add the received shares together and send the
result up. The root node learns the tuple r,sr ,br ,`r , and sends it down in the tree. Subsequently,
each player sends the result down until everybody learns it. If a player does not receive the correct
messages from his children or parent, or if he receives a message with indicator 1, he outputs the
last secret that was associated with an indicator 0.

3.9.3

MAC Scheme for t-out-of-n

In the t-out-of-n setting, the set of active players, and hence, the position of the players in the
reconstruction tree are unknown to the dealer. Thus, unlike the n-out-of-n case, the dealer cannot
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generate a tag for the sender and a unique matching verification vector for the potential receiver of
the message. Instead, the dealer uses the fact that the same message is propagated in the tree for the
down stage. Thus, he uses digital signature to sign messages before sharing them.
Moreover, as in the n-out-of-n case, no player has an incentive to cheat in the up stage of a
round, since that results in nobody recovering the secret, including, in particular, the cheater. Thus
there is no need to have a verification scheme for the messages in the up stage.
We now formally describe this scheme. For each round r of the protocol, the dealer generates
a pair of keys for a digital signature scheme, a secret key SKr and a public key PKr . The public
key PK1 is sent to all the players as the first part of their input share. For round r ≥ 1, after
constructing the tuple r,sr ,br ,`r , the dealer appends it with the private key PKr+1 . He then signs
the resulting message r,sr ,br ,`r ,PKr+1 using his private key SKr , and then creates Shamir shares
of the resulting signed message. These shares are then sent to the players. During the reconstruction
phase, the player at the root node recovers the signed tuple r,sr ,br ,`r ,PKr+1 and uses the dealer’s
public key PKr to verify that it was indeed generated by the dealer, and not forged. If it passes
the verification, he forwards the signed tuple to his children. Otherwise, he quits the game and
outputs the last secret that was associated with an indicator zero. This process of checking and
forwarding is repeated by all internal nodes in the tree until all the players have learned the tuple
r,sr ,br ,`r ,PKr+1 for round r. Thus, each key pair is used to sign only one message. Based on the
security of digital signatures, the probability that a player who does not know the dealer’s secret key,
can successfully forge a message and make it look like it came from the dealer is negligible. Thus
this scheme gives us cryptographic security for our algorithm. We note that, unlike in the n-out-of-n
case, we do not achieve information theoretic security.

3.9.4

Analysis

In this section, we will prove Theorem 3.3.2.
Lemma 3.9.1. Let j be any player who initially received input for k > 1 rounds of the game, and
let r be the current round 1 ≤ r < k such that r , X + 1. Then, j’s estimate of the probability that
round r is definitive, conditioned on all the information he has learned, is at most 2 β.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the n-out-of-n case. Let L j denote the random variable
which is the initial input length of player j. Then, we know that


X
Lj = 

 X +Y


if j is a short player,
if j is a long player.
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(3.5)

Also, let L j denote the event that j is a long player and L Cj the event that j is a short player. By
hypothesis, the current round is r ≥ 1, and player j received an initial input of length k > r. What
information does player j know in round r? He knows the following.
• Since his initial input was of length k he knows that L j = k and X ≤ k and moreover, that
X = k if and only if L Cj .
• Since the game has entered round r he knows that X ≥ r − 1.
• He knows his position and the identities of his neighbors in the tree.
• He also has learned sr−1 , sr , br−1 , br . Technically, he learns these just prior to his turn in the
downstage in round r, but this is fine, as we argued before, no player ever has any reason to
cheat during the upstage of a round.
We note that knowing sr−1 , sr , does not benefit player j in any way as far as estimating the probability
that X = r goes, since both sr−1 , sr , are equally likely to be any element of S, independently of X.
Similarly, knowing the identities of his neighbors does not affect his estimate, since positions of the
players are independent of X.
On the other hand, knowing his label does not affect player j’s chance of successful cheating.
By construction in the definitive round, the short player has label 1, and long players have other
labels larger than 1. However, in the definitive round, the short player already reached its last input,
and he knows that this round is the definitive round (without the help of knowing its label).
Moreover, each player thinks that he can have label 1 in his last round of inputs and long players
never play until the last round to figure out it is not the case for them. Thus, if the label is 1 but
k > r, then player j knows that the current round is not definitive, since if X = r, then k > r implies
that j is a long player and should not have label 1 in definitive round. In particular, conditioned on
everything he knows, Pr(X = r) = 0. Since 2 β > 0 the lemma is proved in this case.
Similarly, knowing that the values of br−1 , and br are both zero (since r , X + 1) also does not
affect the estimate since that just indicates that the game has not reached the definitive round yet.
The remainder of the proof is exactly like the proof for n-out-of-n case (see Lemma 3.8.2) and we


do not repeat it here.
Now we can complete the proof for Theorem 3.3.2, which we recall here.

Theorem 3.9.1. Let n ≥ 3 and t ≤ n. Assuming the players are computationally bounded to
polynomial-time algorithms, there exists a protocol for rational t-out-of-n secret sharing with the
following properties.
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• The protocol is an everlasting -Nash equilibrium in which all active players learn the secret,
where  can be any arbitrary positive value.
• In expectation, the protocol requires each player to send O(log n) bits, and has latency
O(log n).
• The protocol is not robust to coalition of any size.
Proof. In this proof, we use case analysis for different values of r (r < X, r = X and r = X + 1) and
different kinds of players (short and long).
• When r < X, both short and long players have no incentive to deviate the protocol based on
Lemma 3.9.1.
• When r = X and player j is the short player, then in round r player j is in his last round of
his input. Hence, player j knows he is in definitive round. However, he is not willing to cheat
in the game since he wants to find the secret of this round and he will be the last one who
learns it.
• When r = X and player j is a long player, he has no incentive to cheat in this round based on
Lemma 3.9.1.
• When r = X + 1 and player j is a short player, he does not have enough information to
participate in the this round, and the only way he can cheat is to successfully forge the
messages for the game.
• When r = X + 1 and player j is a long player who learns the last round was definitive based
on br sooner than others since he is in the root, the only way he can cheat in this round is to
successfully forge the messages for the game.
Therefore, the only way a player can cheat is to successfully forge a message by breaking the
digital signature scheme. Player j gains the largest utility if he cheats in the definitive round after he
learns the secret. The probability that a player can successfully break the digital signature scheme is
at most

1
2κ

where κ is the security parameter for digital signature. Thus, if player j decides to cheat

and forge a message at the definitive round, with probability 1/2 κ he can get at most the maximum
utility of U j+ and with probability of 1 − 1/2 κ can get at most the maximum utility of U j . The player
who decides to cheat before the definitive round gets the utility of Uminus j which is less than U j .
Thus, player j’s utility is at most

U j+ +(1−2κ )U j
.
2κ

On the other hand, if the protocol runs correctly, he
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has utility at least U j . Therefore, our protocol is an -Nash where  is
U j+ + (1 − 2 κ )U j
2κ

− Uj =

Solving this equation for κ, we have κ = max j

U j+ +U j
2U j + .

U j+ + (1 − 2 κ+1 )U j
2κ

.

Finally, similar to [KN08], since player j gains

the largest utility if he cheats in the last round, our protocol is an everlasting -Nash equilibrium. 

3.10

Conclusion

We have presented scalable mechanisms for rational secret sharing problems. Our algorithms are
scalable in the sense that the number of bits sent by each player is O(log n) and the latency is at
most logarithmic in the number of players. For n-out-of-n rational secret sharing, we give a scalable
algorithm that is a Nash equilibrium to solve this problem. For t-out-of-n rational secret sharing
where, we give a scalable algorithm that is a -Nash equilibrium.
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Chapter 4
Interactive Communication with Unknown
Noise Rate
How can two parties run a protocol over a noisy channel? Interactive communication seeks to
solve this problem while minimizing the total number of bits sent. Recently, Haeupler [Hae14]
gave an algorithm for this problem that is conjectured to be optimal. However, as in previous
work [Sch92, BN13, BK12, BR11, Bra12b, GMS11, GHS14, GH13], his algorithm critically relies
on the assumption that the algorithm knows the noise rate in advance, i.e. , the algorithm knows in
advance the number of bits that will be flipped by the adversary.
In this chapter, we remove this assumption. To do so, we add a new assumption of privacy. In
particular, in our model, an adversary can flip an unknown number of bits, at arbitrary times, but he
never learns the value of any bits sent over the channel. This assumption is necessary: with a public
channel and unknown noise rate, the adversary can run a man-in-the-middle attack to mislead either
party (see Theorem 4.9.1, Section 4.9).
Problem Overview We assume that Alice and Bob are connected by a noisy binary channel.
Our goal is to build an algorithm that takes as input some distributed protocol π that works over a
noise-free channel and outputs a distributed protocol π0 that works over the noisy channel.
We assume an adversary chooses π, and which bits to flip in the noisy channel. The adversary
knows our algorithm for transforming π to π0. However, he neither knows the private random bits
of Alice and Bob, nor the bits sent over the channel, except when it is possible to infer these from
knowledge of π and our algorithm.
We let T be the number of bits flipped by the adversary, and L be the length of π. As in previous
work, we assume that Alice and Bob know L.
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Our Results Our main result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.0.1. Algorithm 3 tolerates an unknown number of adversarial errors, T, succeeds
with high probability in the transcript length1, L, and if successful, sends in expectation L +
p

O
L(T + 1) log L + T bits.
The number of bits sent by our algorithm is within logarithmic factors of optimal, assuming a
conjecture from [Hae14] (see Theorem 4.9.3).
Results in this chapter first appeared in conference proceedings [DHM+ 15].

4.1

Related Work

For L bits to be transmitted from Alice to Bob, Shannon [Sha48] proposes an error correcting code
of size O(L) that yields correct communication over a noisy channel with probability 1 − e−Ω(L) .
At first glance, this may appear to solve our problem. But consider an interactive protocol with
communication complexity L, where Alice sends one bit, then Bob sends back one bit, and so forth
where the value of each bit sent depends on the previous bits received. Two problems arise. First,
using block codewords is not efficient; to achieve a small error probability, “dummy” bits may be
added to each bit prior to encoding, but this results in a superlinear blowup in overhead. Second,
due to the interactivity, an error that occurs in the past can ruin all computation that comes after it.
Thus, error correcting codes fall short when dealing with interactive protocols.
The seminal work of Schulman [Sch93, Sch92] overcame these obstacles by describing a
deterministic method for simulating interactive protocols on noisy channels with only a constantfactor increase in the total communication complexity. This work spurred vigorous interest in the
area (see [Bra12a] for an excellent survey).
Schulman’s scheme tolerates an adversarial noise rate of 1/240. It critically depends on the
notion of a tree code for which an exponential-time construction was originally provided. This
exponential construction time motivated work on more efficient constructions [Bra12b, Pec06,
MS14]. There were also efforts to create alternative codes [GMS11, ORS09]. Recently, elegant
computationally-efficient schemes that tolerate a constant adversarial noise rate have been demonstrated [BK12, GH13]. Additionally, a large number of powerful results have improved the tolerable
adversarial noise rate [BN13, BR11, GHS14, FGOS15, BE14].
The closest prior work to ours is that of Haeupler [Hae14]. His work assumes a fixed and known
adversarial noise rate , the fraction of bits flipped by the adversary. Communication efficiency
1 Specifically

with probability at least 1 −

1
L log L
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is measured by communication rate which is L divided by the total number of bits sent. Haeup
pler [Hae14] describes an algorithm that achieves a communication rate of 1 − O(  log log(1/ ),
which he conjectures to be optimal. We compare our work to his in Section 4.9.
Feinerman, Haeupler and Korman [FHK14] recently studied the interesting related problem of
spreading a single-bit rumor in a noisy network. In their framework, in each synchronous round,
each agent can deliver a single bit to a random anonymous agent. This bit is flipped independently at
random with probability 1/2 −  for some fixed  > 0. Their algorithm ensures with high probability
that in O(log n/ 2 ) rounds and with O(n log n/ 2 )) messages, all nodes learn the correct rumor.
They also present a majority-consensus algorithm with the same resource costs, and prove these
resource costs are optimal for both problems.

4.2

Formal Model

Our algorithm takes as input a protocol π which is a sequence of L bits, each of which is transmitted
either from Alice to Bob or from Bob to Alice. As in previous work, we also assume that Alice and
Bob both know L. We let Alice be the party who sends the first bit in π.
Channel Steps We assume communication over the channel is synchronous and individual
computation is instantaneous. We define a channel step as the amount of time that it takes to send
one bit over the channel.
Silence on the Channel When neither Alice nor Bob sends in a channel step, we say that the
channel is silent. In any contiguous sequence of silent channel steps, the bit received on the channel
in the first step is set by the adversary for free. By default, the bit received in subsequent steps of the
sequence remains the same, unless the adversary pays for one bit flip in order to change it. In short,
the adversary pays a cost of one bit flip each time it wants to change the value of the bit received in
any contiguous sequence of silent steps.

4.3

Overview of Our Result

Challenges Can we adapt prior results by guessing the noise rate? Underestimation threatens
correctness if the actual number of bit flips exceeds the algorithm’s tolerance. Conversely, overestimation leads to sending more bits than necessary. Thus, we need a protocol that adapts to the
adversary’s actions.
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One idea is to adapt the amount of communication redundancy based on the number of errors
detected thus far. However, this presents a new challenge because the parties may have different
views of the number of errors. They will need to synchronize their adaptions over the noisy channel.
This is a key technical challenge to achieving our result.
Another technical challenge is termination. The length of the simulated protocol is necessarily
unknown, so the parties will likely not terminate at the same time. After one party has terminated, it
is a challenge for the other party to detect this fact based on bits received over the noisy channel.
A high-level overview of how we address these challenges is given in Section 4.5.4.

4.4

Chapter Organization

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.5, we describe a simple algorithm
for interactive communication that works when T = O(L/ log L). We analyze this algorithm in
Section 4.6. In Section 4.7, we describe an algorithm for interactive communication that works for
any finite T; we prove this algorithm correction in Section 4.8. Section 4.9 gives some relevant
remarks, including justifying private channels and comparing our algorithm with past work. Finally,
we conclude and give directions for future work in Section 4.10.

4.5

Bounded T - Algorithm

In this section, we describe an algorithm that enables interactive communication problem when
T = O(L/ log L).

4.5.1

Overview, Notation and Definitions

Our algorithm is presented as Algorithm 21. The overall idea of the algorithm is simple: the parties
run the original protocol π for a certain number of steps as if there was no noise. Then, Alice
determines whether an error has occurred by checking a fingerprint from Bob. Based on the result
of this verification, the computation of π either moves forward or is rewound to be performed again.

4.5.2

Helper Functions

Before giving details of the algorithm, we first describe some helper functions and notation (see
Figure 4.1).
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The length of the protocol to be simulated.
 j k
The L-bit protocol to be simulated, augmented by random bits to length 1 + RL0 R0 .
The result of the computation of the next ` bits of π after history T .
√
Initial
√ round size in√the algorithm. This is the smallest power of 2 that is greater than LF.
So LF ≤ R0 ≤ 2 LF
F
The length of the fingerprint.
Ta
Alice’s tentative transcript.
Tb
Bob’s tentative transcript.
Ta ∗
Alice’s verified transcript.
∗
Bob’s verified transcript.
Tb
T [0 : `] The first ` bits of T . If |T | < L this is null
L
π
π[T ,`]
R0

Figure 4.1: Glossary of Notation

Fingerprinting To verify communication, we make use of the following well-known theorem.
Theorem 4.5.1. [Naor and Naor [NN93]] For any positive integer L and any probability p, there
exists a hash function F that given a uniformly random bit string S as the seed, maps any string
of length at most L bits to a bit string hash value H, such that the collision probability of any two
strings is at most p, and the length of S and H are |S| = Θ(log(L/p)) and |H | = Θ(log(1/p)) bits.
We define two functions based on this theorem, h and MatchesFP. In this section, we will write
h L to denote that the probability of error p is polynomial in L. In particular, we can set p = 1/L 2 ,
with fingerprints of size O(log L). The function h L (T ) takes a transcript T and returns a tuple (s, f ),
where s is uniformly random bit string and f is the output of the hash function F in the theorem
above when given inputs s and T. We refer to this tuple as the fingerprint of T.
The function MatchesFP((s, f ),T ) takes a fingerprint (s, f ) and a transcript T. It returns true if
and only if the output of F when given bit string s and transcript T is equal to the value f . In both
of these functions, the total length of the fingerprint is given by the value F, which will be defined
later.

Algebraic Manipulation Detection Codes Our result makes critical use of Algebraic Manipulation (AMD) Codes from [CDF+ 08]. These codes provide three functions: amdEnc, IsCodeword
and amdDec. The function amdEnc(m) creates an encoding of a message m. The function
IsCodeword(m0 ) returns true if and only if a received message m0 is equal to amdEnc(m) for
some sent message m. The function amdDec(m0 ) takes a received value m0, where IsCodeword(m0 ),
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and returns the value m such that amdEnc(m) = m0. Intuitively, AMD Codes enable detection of bit
corruptions on encoded words, with high probability.
We make use of the following theorem about AMD codes. This is a slight rewording of a
theorem from [CDF+ 08].
Theorem 4.5.2. [CDF+ 08] For any δ > 0, there exists functions amdEnc, IsCodeword and amdDec,
such that, for any bit string m of length x:
• amdEnc(m) is a string of length x + C log(1/δ), for some constant C;
• IsCodeword(amdEnc(m)) and amdDec(amdEnc(m)) = m;
• For any bit string s , 0 of length x, Pr (IsCodeword(amdEnc(m) ⊕ s)) ≤ δ
In this section, we set δ = 1/L 2 and add O(log L) additional bits to the message word. Also in
this section, we will always encode strings of size O(log L), so the AMD encoded messages will be
of size O(log L).
In the algorithm, we will denote the fixed length of the AMD-encoded fingerprint by F.

4.5.3

Remaining Notation

Transcripts We define Alice’s tentative transcript, TA , as the sequence of possible bits of π that
Alice has either sent or received up to the current time. Similarly, we let TB denote Bob’s transcript.
For both Alice or Bob, we define a verified transcript to be the longest prefix of a transcript for
which a verified fingerprint has been received. We denote the verified transcript for Alice as TA∗ ,
and for Bob as TB∗ . The notation T 4 T 0 signifies that a transcript T is a prefix of a transcript T 0.
Rounds We define one of Alice’s rounds as one iteration of the repeat loop in Alice’s protocol.
Alice’s round consists of r a channel steps, where r a is the round size value maintained by Alice.
Similarly, we define one of Bob’s rounds as one iteration of the repeat look in Bob’s protocol. Such
a round consists of r b channel steps, where r b is the round size for Bob.
Other Notation For a transcript T and integer i, we define T [0 : i] to be the first i bits of T . For
two strings x and y, we define x

y to be the concatenation of x and y.
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4.5.4

Algorithm Overview

To facilitate discussion of the algorithm, we first state some important properties of rounds (proven
in Section 4.6). First, the size of any round is always a power of two. Second, the start of each of
Bob’s rounds always coincides with the start of one of Alice’s rounds. This ensures that whenever
Bob is listening for the message Fa0, Alice will be sending such a message.
We first describe one of Alice’s rounds in which 1) neither Alice nor Bob terminate; and 2) there
are no adversarial bit flips. In such a round, Alice sends an encoded message containing two pieces
of information. These are ma , which is the number of failed rounds Alice has counted so far; and
|Ta ∗ |, which is the size of Alice’s verified transcript.
When Bob decodes this message, he synchronizes several values with Alice. In particular, he
sets his round size value, r b , and mistake estimate value, mb , so they equal the values Alice sent.
Then, based on |Ta ∗ |, Bob either increases the length of his verified transcript, or else decreases
the length of his tentative transcript. After this synchronization, Alice and Bob both compute a
certain number of bits of π and add these to their tentative transcripts. Finally Bob sends an encoded
fingerprint to Alice. She verifies this fingerprint, and then adds the bits of π computed during this
round to her verified transcript.
There are two key ways in which adversarial bit flips can alter the above scenario. First, when
the encoded message Alice sends containing ma and |Ta ∗ | is corrupted. In this case, Bob will send
random bits for the remainder of the round. This ensures two things. First, whenever Alice is
listening for a fingerprint from Bob, Bob will either be sending a fingerprint or random bits. Thus,
w.h.p., the adversary will be unable to forge an encoding of a fake fingerprint by flipping bits.
Second, Bob’s error count updates at the same time as Alice’s.
The other key way in which adversarial bit flips can alter the ideal scenario is as follows. The
adversary flips bits in such a way that the encoded fingerprint, Fb0 that Bob sends to Alice, fails
to be a valid fingerprint for Alice’s tentative transcript. In this case, Alice rewinds her tentative
transcript, increments her error count, and updates her block size.
Handling Termination In previous work, since  and L0 are known, both parties know when to
terminate (or leave the protocol), and can do so at the same time. However, since we know neither
parameter, termination is now more challenging.
In our algorithm, π is augmented with a certain number of additional bits that Alice sends to
Bob. Each of these bits is set independently and uniformly at random by Alice. Alice terminates
when her verified transcript is of length greater than L. Bob terminates when he receives a value
Fa0, where all bits are the same. This conditions ensures that 1) Bob is very unlikely to terminate
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Protocol 21 Bounded Error Interactive Communication
Protocol for Bob

Protocol for Alice
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:

R2

while ma = 4F02 − 1 do
Fa ← amdEnc(ma ,r a ,|Ta ∗ |)
Send Fa
Append π[Ta ,r a − 2F] to Ta
Receive Bob’s F-bit message, Fb0
if IsCodeword(Fb0 ) then
if |Ta ∗ | ≥ L then
Output Ta ∗ [0 : L]
Terminate
F ← amdDec(Fb0 )
if MatchesFP(F ,Ta ) then
// successful round
Ta ∗ ← Ta
else
// round failed
Ta ← Ta ∗
ma ← ma + 1
if 1 + ma is a power of 4 then
r a ← r a /2

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:

Tb ← null; Tb ∗ ← null mb ← 0; r b ←
R0
R2
while mb = 4F02 − 1 do
Receive Alice’s F-bit message,
0
Fa
if all bits of Fa0 are equal then
// Alice has likely left
Output Tb ∗ [0 : L] and
Terminate
if IsCodeword(Fa0 ) then
(m,r,`) ← amdDec(Fa0 )
// synchronize values
rb ← r
mb ← m
if ` > |Tb ∗ | then
Tb ∗ ← Tb
else
Tb ← Tb ∗
Append π[Tb ,r b − 2F] to Tb
Fb ← amdEnc(h L (Tb ))
Send Fb
else
// corruption occurred
Send random bits for r b − F
steps
mb ← mb + 1
if 1 + mb is a power of 4 then
r b ← r b/2

before Alice; and 2) Bob terminates soon after Alice, unless the adversary pays a significant cost to
delay this.

4.6

Bounded T - Analysis

We now prove that with high probability, Algorithm 1 correctly simulates π when T is promised to
be O(L/ log L). Before proceeding to our proof, we define two bad events.
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Hash Collision. Either Alice or Bob incorrectly validates a fingerprint and updates their
verified transcript to include bits not in π.
Failure of AMD Codes The adversary corrupts an encoded message into the encoding or a
different message. Or the encoding of some message, after possible adversary corruption,
equals a bit string of all zeroes or all ones.
Throughout this section, we will assume neither event occurs. At the end of this section, we will
show that the probability that either even occurs is polynomially small in L.
Lemma 4.6.1. Each player’s round size is always a power of two.
Proof. This is immediate from the fact that the round size starts out as a power of 2 and the fact
that each time it decreases, it decreases by a factor of 2.



Lemma 4.6.2. ma is monotonically increasing, and hence Alice’s round size never increases.
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that the only time ma changes is on Line 15 of


Alice’s protocol, when it is incremented by 1.
Lemma 4.6.3. Algorithm 21 has the following properties:
1. When Bob starts a round, Alice starts a round,
2. mb ≤ ma at all times that Alice remains in the protocol.
Proof. This follows by induction on ma .

Base Case We first show that the lemma holds while ma = 0. Note that mb can only increase after
Bob has spent a round sending random bits. During such a round, Alice will increment ma before
Bob increments mb . Next, note that while mb = ma = 0, Alice and Bob both have the same round
sizes, and so when Bob starts a round, Alice starts a round.
Inductive Step Consider the channel step, t, at which Alice increases ma to some value j > 0.
We must show that the lemma statement holds throughout the time while ma = j. By the inductive
hypothesis, up to time t, mb ≤ ma , and when Bob started a round, Alice started a round. There are
two cases for the value of mb at the end of channel step t.
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Case 1 mb < j. In this case, Bob must not have received Fa at the beginning of the round he is
in at channel step t. Hence, Bob transmits random bits during this entire round. Bob’s round size
is an integer multiple of Alice’s round size (by Lemma 4.6.1). Thus, Bob will transmit random
bits throughout Alice’s round begun at channel step t + 1. So Alice will not receive a matching
fingerprint at the end of the round she began at step t + 1, and so she will increment ma before
Bob increments mb . This will happen before Bob completes the round he is in at time t, so both
conditions of the lemma hold while ma = j.
Case 2 mb = j. Note that mb can only increase after Bob has spent a round sending random bits.
During such a round, Alice will increment ma before Bob increments mb . Thus, while ma = j,
mb = j. Next, note that, if mb = ma = j at step t, then Alice and Bob both ended their rounds at step
t. Hence, during the time that ma = j, when Bob starts a round, Alice starts a round.



The following corollaries are immediate from the above lemma.
Corollary 4.6.4. When Bob ends a round, Alice ends a round.
Corollary 4.6.5. Bob’s rounds are at least as large as Alice’s rounds.
The following corollary holds from the above lemma and the fact that Bob’s round sizes are at
least as large as Alice’s.
Corollary 4.6.6. While both parties remain in the protocol, whenever Bob is listening for a Fa ,
Alice is sending it. Also, whenever Alice is listening for Fb , either Bob is sending it, or Bob is
sending random bits.
The following lemma also follows from Lemma 4.6.3.
Lemma 4.6.7. Let R be one of Alice’s rounds which starts and ends at the same time as one of
Bob’s rounds. Then, at the end of R, either ma − mb is the same as it was at the beginning of R or it
equals 0 or 1.
Proof. If Fa is corrupted at the beginning of R, Bob transmits random bits for the rest of R, and
both Alice and Bob increment their error counts at the end, so ma − mb stays the same.
If Fa is not corrupted at the beginning of R, then Bob sets mb to ma at the beginning of R, so at
the end, ma − mb ≤ 1. By Lemma 4.6.3 (2), ma − mb ≥ 0.
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4.6.1

Phases

We now give some definitions.
Definition 4.6.8. We define phase j to be all of Alice’s rounds of size R0 /2 j .
Definition 4.6.9. We define ∆ j , for all j > 0, to be the value ma − mb at the end of phase j.
Note that at the beginning of phase j, Alice’s error count is 4 j − 1. We now give a few lemmas
about phases.
Lemma 4.6.10. For any j > 0, phase j contains at least 3∆ j−1 of Alice’s rounds,
Proof. Consider any j > 0. At the beginning of phase j, ma = 4 j − 1. Also, at the beginning of
phase j, by Lemma 4.6.3 (2), mb ≤ ma . Hence, 0 ≤ ∆ j−1 ≤ 4 j − 1. Note that ma increases by at
most 1 in each of Alice’s rounds. Thus, 3∆ j−1 rounds after the beginning of phase j, the value of
ma is at most:

4 j − 1 + 3∆ j−1 ≤ 4 j − 1 + 3(4 j − 1)
< 4 j+1 − 1
Thus after 3∆ j−1 rounds, ma is not large enough for Alice to advance to phase j + 1.



Progressive, Corrupted and Wasted Rounds Let R be one of Alice’s rounds. We call R
progressive if Alice does not update her error count during the round, or equivalently if her verified
transcript length increases. We call R corrupted if the adversary flipped at least one bit in the round.
We call R wasted if it is neither progressive nor corrupted. We want to bound the number of wasted
rounds since this number represents amount by which ma is potentially an overestimate of T.
We note that wasted rounds occur only when r b > r a . In this case, Bob is not listening when
Alice sends him Fa . As a result, Bob does not send Alice a valid fingerprint at the end of her round,
and so her verified transcript does not increase, even though the adversary has not flipped any bits.
The following lemma bounds the number of wasted rounds in a phase, and gives other critical
properties.
Lemma 4.6.11. Suppose at the beginning of phase j, j > 0, Bob is at the start of a round and his
round size is at most R0 /2 j−1 . Then
1. There are at most ∆ j−1 wasted rounds in phase j;
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2. ∆ j ∈ {0,1,2∆ j−1 }; and
3. Bob ends a round at the end of phase j.
Proof. If Bob’s round size initially less than R0 /2 j−1 , then it must equal R0 /2 j in order to be a
power of two. Hence Alice and Bob will have rounds that are the same size for the entire phase, and
the lemma holds trivially.
We now consider the harder case where Bob’s round size equals R0 /2 j−1 .
By Definition 4.6.8, Alice has round size R0 /2 j throughout phase j. By Lemma 4.6.3 (2),
Bob’s round size is always greater than or equal to Alice’s round size. Thus, as soon as 1) Bob
receives Fa in one of his rounds in phase j, or 2) Bob sets mb equal to Alice’s error count at the
beginning of phase j, then Bob’s round size will be R0 /2 j for the remainder of the phase. Finally,
by Lemma 4.6.3 (1), from that point on, Alice and Bob will begin, and thus end, all rounds at the
same time.
Now consider Bob’s rounds in phase j. Assume the adversary corrupts Fa in Bob’s rounds 1
through i for some value i ≥ 0, and then the adversary does not corrupt Fa in Bob’s round i + 1. We
consider two cases.
Case 1: i < ∆ j−1

Each of the first i rounds of Bob spans two rounds of Alice. By Lemma 4.6.10,

these rounds are all contained in phase j. Consider each pair of Alice’s rounds spanned by one of
Bob’s rounds. The first round in the pair is corrupted, but during the second, Bob is transmitting
random bits and Alice will not receive a fingerprint from him. Thus, this round is wasted. Hence,
there are i wasted rounds.
In round i + 1, Bob synchronizes his round size with Alice since he receives Fa . Thus, there are
no more wasted rounds. Applying Lemma 4.6.7 for the remaining rounds of the phase, we see that
at the end of the phase, ma − mb = ∆ j is either 0 or 1.
Case 2: i ≥ ∆ j−1

Bob increases mb by 1 in each of his first i rounds. Note that at the beginning

of phase j, Alice’s error count is 4 j − 1. Thus, after Bob’s first i rounds, mb = (4 j − 1) − ∆ j−1 + i.
Hence when i = ∆ j−1 , mb = (4 j − 1). At that time, Bob sets his round size to R0 /2 j , and so Alice
and Bob will have the same round sizes, and will hence begin and end all rounds at the same step,
for the rest of phase j. Thus, there are no more wasted rounds. Note that in this case, at Bob’s ∆ j−1
round, ma − mb will be 2∆ j−1 . Applying Lemma 4.6.7 for the remaining rounds of the phase, we
see that ∆ j = 2∆ j−1 , or ∆ j is 0 or 1.



Lemma 4.6.12. For every j ≥ 0:
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1. There are at most 2 j−1 wasted rounds in phase j;
2. ∆ j ≤ 2 j ; and
3. Bob ends a round at the end of phase j.
Proof. We prove this by induction on j.
Base Case At the beginning of phase 0, Bob is at the start of a round and his round size is R0 .
Thus, by Lemma 4.6.11: there are 0 wasted rounds in phase 0; ∆0 ≤ 1; and Bob ends a round at the
end of phase 0.
Inductive Step Consider some j > 0. By the inductive hypothesis, ∆ j−1 ≤ 2 j−1 . At the beginning
of phase j, mb = ma − ∆ j−1 ≤ (4 j − 1) − ∆ j−1 , so that r b = R0 /2 blog4 (1+mb )c ≤ R0 /2 blog4 (4
R0

/2 j−1 .

The last line holds since 0 ≤ ∆ j−1 ≤

j −∆

j−1 )c

≤

2 j−1 .

Also, by the inductive hypothesis, Bob ended a round at the end of phase j − 1, and so is starting
a round at the beginning of phase j. Hence, we can apply Lemma 4.6.11 to phase j. From this
lemma, it follows that 1) the number of wasted rounds in phase j is at most 2 j−1 ; 2) ∆ j ≤ 2∆ j−1 ≤ 2 j ;


and 3) Bob ends a round at the end of phase j.

Note from the above lemma that Bob’s rounds are never more than double the size of Alice’s
rounds. The following lemma sums up what we now know about Alice and Bob’s rounds.
Lemma 4.6.13. The following are always true.
1. Bob’s round size is either equal to Alice’s round size or double Alice’s round size.
2. If Bob’s round size equals Alice’s round size, then when Alice starts a round, Bob starts a
round.
3. If Bob’s round size is twice Alice’s round size, then when Alice starts a round, either Bob
starts a round, or Bob is in the middle of a round.
Proof. The lemma follows from Corollary 4.6.5, Lemma 4.6.3, and Lemma 4.6.12.

4.6.2

Correctness and Termination

Lemma 4.6.14. It is always the case that Ta ∗ 4 π, where π is the padded transcript.
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Proof. This holds by Lemma 4.6.25 and Lemma 4.6.26 and the fact that Alice never adds any string
to Ta ∗ that is not verified by an encoded fingerprint from Bob.



Lemma 4.6.15. At the beginning and end of each of Alice’s rounds,
Tb ∗ 4 Ta ∗ = Ta 4 Tb ;
where at most one of the inequalities is strict. Moreover, at the end of a channel step in which Bob
receives Fa correctly,
Tb ∗ = Tb = Ta ∗ .
Proof. We prove this by induction on Alice’s round number.
Base Case At the beginning of the algorithm, all transcripts are null, so Tb ∗ = Ta ∗ = Ta = Tb .
Moreover if Bob receives Fa correctly in this round, then Tb ∗ = Tb = Ta ∗ .
Inductive Step We must show that the lemma holds for the j-th round. By the inductive hypothesis, at the end of the j − 1-th round,
Tb ∗ 4 Ta ∗ = Ta 4 Tb ,
with at most one of the inequalities being strict. Clearly the statement about the inequalities will
thus hold at the beginning of the j-th round.
Alice’s j-th round starts with Alice sending Bob Fa .
Case 1: Bob does not receive Fa

If Bob does not receive Fa , then either 1) he was listening and

it was corrupted; or 2) he was not listening for it. If he was listening and Fa was corrupted, then
Bob transmits random bits for the remainder of his round, which will be the remainder of Alice’s
round by Lemma 4.6.13. By the same lemma, if Bob was not listening, then he must be in the
middle of a round that is twice as large as Alice’s. In either case, Bob transmits random bits for the
remainder of Alice’s j-th round.
Thus, Alice does not receive a matching fingerprint from Bob at the end of her j-th round. Thus,
at the end of her round, Ta ← Ta ∗ and Tb and Tb ∗ are unchanged. Hence, it continues to hold that:
Tb ∗ 4 Ta ∗ = Ta 4 Tb ;
and at most one of the inequalities is strict.
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Case 2: Bob receives Fa

If Bob receives Fa , then he learns the length of Ta ∗ and also Alice’s

round size. By the inductive hypothesis, either Ta ∗ = Tb ∗ or Ta ∗ = Tb . Based on the length of Ta ∗ ,
Bob either updates Tb ∗ or rewinds Tb , so that Tb ∗ = Tb = Ta ∗ . This establishes the second part of the
lemma for the j-th round.
Next Alice and Bob continue their rounds which are the same size. If Alice receives a correct
fingerprint from Bob at the end of her round, then the following holds:
Tb ∗ 4 Ta ∗ = Ta = Tb .
If Alice does not receive a correct fingerprint from Bob at the end of her round, then the
following holds:
Tb ∗ = Ta ∗ = Ta 4 Tb .
In either case, the first part of the lemma statement holds at the end of Alice’s j-th round.



Lemma 4.6.16. Bob leaves after Alice. When Alice leaves, |Tb ∗ | ≥ L.
Proof. Bob leaves only when he receives an Fa0 that is all zeroes or all ones. By Lemma 4.6.26, Fa0
is never such a string, and the adversary cannot convert Fa to such a string by bit flipping. It follows
that Bob receives such a string only after Alice has left.
Alice leaves only when 1) she has received an encoded fingerprint from Bob; and 2) |Ta ∗ | ≥ L.
If Alice receives a correctly encoded fingerprint from Bob, then by Lemma 4.6.26, Bob must have
sent one, and hence Bob must be in a round where he received Fa correctly. By Lemma 4.6.15, at
that channel step, Tb ∗ = Tb = Ta ∗ . Hence at the step when Alice receives the encoded fingerprint
from Bob, Tb ∗ = Ta ∗ . Thus, when Alice leaves, |Tb ∗ | ≥ L.



Lemma 4.6.17. When either party terminates, their output is correct.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmas 4.6.14, 4.6.15, and 4.6.16, and the fact that when either
party terminates, they output the first L bits of their verified transcript.

4.6.3



Cost

Lemma 4.6.18. After Alice leaves, the adversary must flip at least one bit for each of Bob’s rounds
that does not result in Bob leaving.
Proof. After Alice has left, there is silence on the channel in the steps when Bob is listening for
Alice’s encoded message. This means that if there is no bit flipping by the adversary, the channel
transmits the same bit in every channel step, causing Bob to read a string of all zeroes or all
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ones, and terminate. Thus, the adversary must flip at least one bit each time Bob is listening for a


codeword.
Lemma 4.6.19. There are at most 2 j − 1 wasted rounds prior to the end of phase j, for all j ≥ 0.
Proof. This follows trivially by repeated applications of Lemma 4.6.12 (1).



Throughout this section, we assume the worst case, that the adversary corrupts at most one bit
per corrupted round.
√
T. In particular, there are no more than T wasted rounds.
√
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume ma > T + T at some step, in some phase j, j ≥ 0. Then
√
the number of wasted rounds at this step must be greater than T. But by Lemma 4.6.19, the
√
number of wasted rounds at the end of phase j is no more than 2 j − 1. Thus, we have T < 2 j − 1,
Lemma 4.6.20. At all times, ma ≤ T +

√

or T < (2 j − 1) 2 .
But ma is no larger than the number of corrupted rounds plus the number of wasted rounds. By
the above paragraph, T < (2 j − 1) 2 and the number of wasted rounds is no more than 2 j − 1. Thus
ma < (2 j − 1) 2 + (2 j − 1). Moreover, we know that in phase j, ma ≥ 4 j − 1. Thus, we know
4 j − 1 < (2 j − 1) 2 + (2 j − 1).
Simplifying, we get 2 j < 1, which is a contradiction for any j ≥ 0.



Let m∗a denote Alice’s error count when she leaves the algorithm, and m∗b denote Bob’s error
count when he himself leaves the algorithm.
Lemma 4.6.21. Alice terminates in at most L + O(

p

LF (1 + m∗a )) steps.

Proof. We first calculate the cost of the rounds that are not progressive for Alice. The number
of non-progressive rounds that she has executed is m∗a . Her cost for these rounds is at most the
following.
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∗

ma
X
i=1

∗

R0
2 blog4 ic

≤ 2R0
= 2R0

ma
X
i=1
m∗a
X

1
2log4 i
1
√
i

i=1
m∗a

Z
≤ 2R0

1
√

0

= 4R0

p

i

m∗a
∗

In every progressive round, except possibly the last, Alice’s block size is at least R0 2− log4 (1+ma ) .
Thus in all but possibly the last progressive round, Alice always adds bits to her verified transcript
at a rate of at least
∗

R0 2− log4 (1+ma ) − 2F
.
∗
R0 2− log4 (1+ma )
Thus, the total number of bits Alices sends in all but the last progressive round is no more than
∗

R0 2− log4 (1+ma )
.
L·
∗
R0 2− log4 (1+ma ) − 2F
We will make use of the inequality
1
≤ 1 + 2δ
1−δ

for 0 < δ ≤ 1/2

∗

and let δ = 2F/R0 2− log4 (1+ma ) . Note that δ ≤ 1/2, since Alice’s round size is always at least 4F.
Then we have that the total number of bits sent by Alice in all but the last progressive round is
no more than
L+

4LF

∗ .
R0 2− log4 (1+ma )
Adding in the last progressive round, we get that the total number of bits sent by Alice in

progressive rounds is no more than
L+

4LF

∗

− log4 (1+m∗a )

+ R0 2− log4 (1+ma ) .

R0 2
Putting this together with the number of bits send in non-progressive rounds, we have that the
total number of bits send by Alice is no more than
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L + 4R0

p

m∗a +

4LF
∗

R0 2− log4 (1+ma )

√
p
∗
∗
+ R0 2− log4 (1+ma ) ≤ L + 5R0 m∗a + 4 LF (2log4 (1+ma ) )
p
p
≤ L + 10 LFm∗a + 4 LF (1 + m∗a )
p
≤ L + 14 LF (1 + m∗a )

Lemma 4.6.22. Bob terminates in at most L + 14

p

LF (1 + m∗a ) + 8

q



LFm∗b steps.

Proof. Since Bob never leaves before Alice, Bob’s cost must be at least as much as Alice’s. We
now compute Bob’s additional cost.
∗

∗

At the time of Alice’s departure, r a = R0 /2 blog4 (1+ma )c . By Lemma 4.6.13, r b ≤ 2R0 /2 blog4 (1+ma )c .
∗

Let m0b denote Bob’s error count when Alice leaves the algorithm. Then 1 + m0b ≥ 4 blog4 (1+ma )c−1 .
Bob’s final error count is m∗b . Thus, Bob’s additional cost is at most
m∗b −1

X

i=mb0

∗

R0
2 blog4 (1+i)c

≤ 2R0

mb
X
i=1

1
2log4 i

∗

mb
X
1
= 2R0
i2
i=1
q
≤ 4R0 m∗b
q
≤ 8 LFm∗b



Combining this with Alice’s cost gives the result.

Lemma 4.6.23. The algorithm ends in at most 12L time steps.
q
p
∗
Proof. By Lemma 4.6.22, Bob terminates in at most L + 14 LF (1 + ma ) + 8 LFm∗b steps. Moreover, m∗a and m∗b are no more than R02 /4F 2 − 1. Thus, the algorithm terminates in at most the
following number of steps.
s
L + 14

p

LF (1 + m∗a ) + 8

q

LFm∗b ≤ L + 22

4F 2
r

= L + 22
= 12L .
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LF R02
L2
4


L
Lemma 4.6.24. If T ≤ 8F
− 1 then both players terminate with the correct output in at most
√
L + O( LF (T + 1)) steps.

Proof. Let Ta denote the number of bits flipped by the adversary while Alice is still in the protocol,
and Tb the bits flipped after Alice has left. Then Ta + Tb = T.
√
By Lemma 4.6.20, m∗a ≤ Ta + Ta . By Lemmas 4.6.3 and 4.6.18, m∗b ≤ m∗a +Tb . Since Ta +Tb = T
it follows that
m∗a

≤T+

√

R02
L
T ≤ 2T ≤
−2 <
−1
4F
4F 2

and similarly
m∗b

<

R02

−1
4F 2
Thus, Alice and Bob will both terminate by outputting the bits of π by Lemma 4.6.17.
Plugging m∗a ≤ 2T and m∗b ≤ 3T into Lemma 4.6.22 gives the total number of steps required.



Lemma 4.6.25. With high probability in L, there are no hash collisions.
Proof. By Lemma 4.6.23, the algorithm ends in at most 12L steps. Also, there are at least 4F =
Θ(log L) steps in a round. Thus, the algorithm has at most O(L log L) rounds. Each round has one
fingerprint. By Theorem 4.5.1 and the setting of our fingerprint sizes, each fingerprint fails with
probability at most 1/L 2 . Thus, a simple union bound gives the result.



Lemma 4.6.26. With high probability in L, any bit flipping of a AMD encoded message is detected.
Proof. We noted in the previous lemma that the algorithm terminates in O(L log L) rounds. Each
round has two AMD encoded messages. By Theorem 4.5.2 and the setting of our encoding sizes,
each AMD encoding fails with probability at most 1/L 2 . Again, a union bound gives the result.

4.7



Unbounded T - Algorithm

Algorithm 1 uses fingerprints of a fixed size, F in order to check its transcripts. Each of these has a
1/L 2 chance to fail due to a hash collision. Since the algorithm only computes about O(L/ log L)
fingerprints, a union bound tells us that with high probability the algorithm succeeds, below its
threshold value of T. When T is large, many more checks may need to be made, and eventually
there will be a good chance that there is a hash collision. Since the algorithm cannot really recover
from a hash collision, we cannot afford this. On the other hand, we cannot simply start out with
larger fingerprints, both because this would be too expensive if T turned out to be small, and also
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because even bigger fingerprints are still of a fixed size and eventually become unreliable. A natural
solution is is to allow the fingerprints to grow, adapting the size to the value of T seen so far, and
this is indeed what we will do.
Protocol 22 Interactive Communication: Iteration j
Protocol for Alice

Protocol for Bob

Parameters: N j ,Fj , ρ j
for i = 1 to N j do
Fa ← ecEnc(amdEnc(|Ta ∗ |))
Send Fa
if |Ta ∗ | < L then
for the next bFj /ρ j c bits of π do
if sender then
Send next bit ρ j times
Append to Ta
else
Receive ρ j bits
Append majority bit to Ta
12:
else
13:
Transmit Fj random bits.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:

Receive Bob’s cFj -bit message, Fb0
if IsCodeword(Fb0 ) then
if |Ta ∗ | ≥ L then
Output Ta ∗ [0 : L]
Terminate
F ← amdDec(Fb0 )
if MatchesFP(F ,Ta ) then
// successful round
21:
Ta ∗ ← Ta
22:
else
// round failed
23:
Ta ← Ta ∗

14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:

19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
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Parameters: N j ,Fj , ρ j
for i = 1 to N j do
if |Tb ∗ | ≥ L then
Wait cFj channel steps
Receive Fj bits
if fewer than Fj /3 alternations in the
received string then
Output Tb ∗ [0 : L]
Terminate
else
Fb ← ecEnc(amdEnc(h j (Tb ∗ )))
Send Fb
else
Receive Alice’s cFj -bit message Fa0
if IsCodeword(ecDec(Fa0 )) then
` ← amdDec(ecDec(Fa0 ))
if ` > |Tb ∗ | then
Tb ∗ ← Tb
else
Tb ← Tb ∗
for the next bFj /ρ j c bits of π do
if sender then
Send next bit ρ j times
Append to Tb
else
Receive ρ j bits
Append majority bit to Tb
Fb ← ecEnc(amdEnc(h j (Tb )))
Send Fb
else
Transmit (c + 1)Fj random bits.

Protocol 23 Interactive Communication
Protocol for Bob

Protocol for Alice

1:
2:
3:

4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

10:

// Iteration 0
Run Alice’s protocol from Alg 1
if not terminated then
transmit random bits until channel step
12L
// End of Iteration 0
j ←1
while still present do
// Iteration j
Fj ← β( j + log L)
F
ρ j ← 2 j d Fj e ∧ Fj
N j ← 2 j−1 d8L/Fe
Run Alice’s protocol from Algorithm 2,
with parameters N j ,Fj , ρ j
// End of Iteration j
j ← j +1

4.7.1

1:
2:
3:

4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

10:

// Iteration 0
Run Bob’s protocol from Alg 1
if not terminated then
transmit random bits until channel step
12L
// End of Iteration 0
j ←1
while still present do
// Iteration j
Fj ← β( j + log L)
F
ρ j ← 2 j d Fj e ∧ Fj
N j ← 2 j−1 d8L/Fe
Run Bob’s protocol from Algorithm 2,
with parameters N j ,Fj , ρ j
// End of Iteration j
j ← j +1

Helper Functions

As in Algorithm 1, we make black-box use of the Naor and Naor hash family, as well as AMD
codes to protect information. However, in Iteration j we need the failure probabilities for both these
primitives to be 1/(2 j L 2 ). Thus, we want the fingerprint size to grow with j. We will denote the
hash function which has a collision probability of at most 1/(2 j L 2 ) by h j . 1 It is easy to see that
O( j) extra bits are required for this, so that the fingerprint size is O( j + log L).
Algorithm 1 works well when the adversary can only afford to flip a fraction of a bit per block
of the algorithm. In this case, it doesn’t matter that he can corrupt an entire round of the protocol by
flipping a single bit. However, when the adversary has a larger budget, it becomes crucial to force
him to pay a larger price to corrupt a round. To this end, we wrap each fingerprint and protocol bit
in a linear error-correcting code.
To be concrete, we will use a repetition code for each protocol bit, and a Reed-Solomon
code [RS60] to provide the already AMD-encoded messages with a degree of error correction. This
enables us to encode a message so that it can be recovered even if the adversary corrupts a third
1 By

abuse of notation, we will not subscript all the other helper functions with j; it should be clear from context
that the version of the function used is the one that operates on strings of the correct size and has the correct failure
probability
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of the bits. We will denote the encoding and decoding functions by ecEnc and ecDec respectively.
The following theorem, a slight restatement from [RS60], gives the properties of these functions.
Theorem 4.7.1. [RS60] There is a constant c > 0 such that for any message m, | ecEnc(m)| ≤ c|m|.
Moreover, if m0 differs from ecEnc(m) in at most one-third of its bits, then ecDec(m0 ) = m.
Finally, we observe that the linearity of ecEnc and ecDec ensure that when the error correction
is composed with the AMD code, the resulting code has the following properties:
1. If at most a third of the bits of the message are flipped, then the original message can be
uniquely reconstructed by rounding to the nearest codeword in the range of ecEnc.
2. Even if an arbitrary set of bits is flipped, the probability of the change not being recognized is
at most δ, i.e. the same guarantee as the AMD codes.
This is because ecDec is linear, so when noise η is added by the adversary to the codeword x,
effectively what happens is the decoding function ecDec(x + η) = ecDec(x) + ecDec(η) = m + D(η),
where m is the AMD-encoded message. But now ecDec(η) is an obliviously selected string added
to the AMD-encoded codeword.

4.7.2

Algorithm

Let N1 := d8L/Fe be the number of rounds in Iteration 1. Let N j := 2 j−1 N1 be the number of rounds
in Iteration j > 1. Let Fj = 2 β j + F be the size of the fingerprints in Iteration j, where β is the
constant from the Naor and Naor hash function. Thus the hash collision probability of a single
fingerprint is 2−2 j L −2 . Each round of the iteration begins with Alice sending Bob a (1/3)-errorcorrected, AMD-encoded synchronization message of length cFj , followed by simulation of the
protocol for Fj channel steps, followed by Bob sending Alice a (1/3)-error-corrected, AMD-encoded
fingerprint of length cFj . Here c is the constant factor blowup we get from the ECC and AMD
encodings, but for technical reasons we will further ensure that it is at least 5. Thus, the total round
length is (2c + 1)Fj ≥ 11Fj . We will let α equal (2c + 1).
As in Algorithm 1, Alice will decide whether to update her verified transcript and advance to the
next block of π or to rewind to redo the current block, based on whether she receives a fingerprint
from Bob that matches the fingerprint of her own transcript. Similarly, Bob will decide whether to
join in the simulation of π or to transmit random bits until the end of the round based on receiving or
failing to receive Alice’s synchronization message at the round’s start. Where the round differs from
a round in Algorithm 1, is in the actual simulation of π. For the whole iteration, a fixed number of
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bits of π will be simulated per round. Each bit will be repeated ρ j = 2 j−1 dFj /Fe ∧ Fj times 1. The
receiving party will use majority filtering to infer the transmitted bit. Since Fj time steps in the
round are allocated to protocol simulation, this allows bFj /ρ j c bits of π to be simulated.
Notice that the number of rounds doubles from one iteration to the next. Also, the number of
repetitions of each simulated bit also roughly doubles between iterations, at least until it hits its cap,
which is a constant fraction of the length of the round. This is the so-called doubling trick, (though
in our case perhaps it should be quadrupling) which results in the overall cost being dominated by
the cost in the last (or second to last) iteration.

4.8

Unbounded T - Analysis

We now analyze the main algorithm presented in Section 4.7. As in Section 4.6, we begin by noting
that a hash collision or an AMD code failure will cause the algorithm to fail. Additionally, the
algorithm could fail during the padding rounds, if the adversary happens to flip bits in such a way
as to cause Alice’s random bits to look like silence, resulting in Bob’s premature departure.
In Section 4.8.3 we will show that with high probability each of these events does not occur.
Meanwhile, throughout this section we will assume without further mention that we are in the good
event where none of the undesirable events occur.

4.8.1

Alice and Bob are both present

Lemma 4.8.1. For every j ≥ 1, Alice and Bob are always synchronized. That is, they begin the
iteration as well as every round therein at the same time.
Proof. Alice and Bob synchronize themselves after Iteration 0 by both starting Iteration 1 at channel
step 12L + 1. Thereafter, for each j ≥ 1, they have the same round sizes αFj and number of rounds
N j in Iteration j, so that they remain synchronized.



We will call a round corrupted if enough bits are flipped in the round that the bits of π being
simulated cannot be recovered or verified by Alice. We will call it uncorrupted or progressive if it
is not corrupted in the above sense.
Lemma 4.8.2. Each round is either corrupted at a cost of at least ρ j /2 to the adversary or results in
bFj /ρ j c bits of progress in π.
1 We

remind the reader that x ∧ y denotes the minimum of x and y, while x ∨ y denotes their maximum.
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Proof. Since each simulated protocol bit is sent ρ j times, with majority filtering at the receiving
end, it costs the adversary ρ j /2 to corrupt the repetition-encoded bit. It costs the adversary at
least cFj /3 ≥ ρ j /2 to corrupt Alice’s synchronization message or Bob’s fingerprint since these
are protected by error-correction. Thus it costs the adversary at least ρ j /2 to corrupt the round.
Otherwise, since there are Fj steps allocated to sending protocol bits, and each one is repeated ρ j
F

times, the protocol is successfully simulated for b ρ jj c bits.



The following lemma is the equivalent of Lemmas 4.6.14 to 4.6.17 for Iteration j. Its proof is
nearly identical to the proofs in Section 4.6.2 (indeed, it is simpler, since Iteration j does not have
the synchronization problems faced by Algorithm 1) and we omit it.
Lemma 4.8.3. Iteration j has the following properties:
1. It is always the case that Ta ∗ 4 π, where π is the padded transcript.
2. At the beginning and end of each round,
Tb ∗ 4 Ta ∗ = Ta 4 Tb ;
where at most one of the inequalities is strict. Moreover, at the end of a channel step in which
Bob receives Fa correctly,
Tb ∗ = Tb = Ta ∗ .
3. Bob leaves after Alice. When Alice leaves, |Tb ∗ | ≥ L.
4. When either party terminates, their output is correct.
Lemma 4.8.4. There are at most N j /4 uncorrupted rounds in Iteration j
Proof. Since each uncorrupted round results in bFj /ρ j c bits of progress in π, dL ρ j /Fj e rounds are
sufficient for Alice’s transcript length to exceed L. One additional uncorrupted round is sufficient
for Bob to catch up to Alice if necessary, using her synchronization message, and for Alice to infer
from Bob’s fingerprint that Bob’s transcript length has exceeded L, resulting in Alice’s departure.
After that, if a round is uncorrupted, then Bob will perceive silence on the channel, resulting in
Bob’s departure. Thus dL ρ j /Fj e + 2 uncorrupted rounds are enough for both parties to terminate.
Finally note that for all j ≥ 1,

ρ j 2 j−1
2 j−1
≤
∧1 ≤
Fj
F
F

It follows that (for sufficiently large L) there are at most 2 j L/F = N j /4 uncorrupted rounds in


Iteration j.
119

The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 4.8.5. If j is not the last iteration, then at least 3/4 of the rounds are corrupted.
Although the adversary can flip any number of bits in a round, we will only charge him the
minimum number of bit-flips required for the outcome we see in the round, i.e. , we will charge him
0 for uncorrupted rounds and ρ j /2 for corrupted rounds. Let T j denote the number of corruptions
charged to the adversary in Iteration j. Clearly, for j > 0
Tj ≤

1
Nj ρ j
2

(4.1)

Also, we know from Section 4.5 that if the algorithm does not end in Iteration 0, then T0 ≥ L/8F.
In this case, we will generously only charge the adversary that amount. In other words, if Iteration 1
is reached, either by both Alice and Bob, or by Bob alone, T0 = dL/8Fe.
Lemma 4.8.6. If j is not the last iteration then T j ≥ 38 N j ρ j
Proof. This follows from Corollary 4.8.5, since it costs the adversary at least ρ j /2 to corrupt a


round.
Lemma 4.8.7. If j is not the last iteration then
3T j−1 /2 ≤ T j ≤ 64T j−1
Proof. If j = 1
T1 ≥

3L
3
N1 ρ1 ≥
≥ 24T0 > 3T0
8
F

and
T1 ≤ N1 ρ1 /2 ≤

8L
= 64T0 .
F

If j > 1, then by (4.1) and Lemma 4.8.6,
Tj
N j ρ j/2
3 3N j ρ j /8
≤
≤
≤ 64
2 N j−1 ρ j−1 /2 T j−1 3N j−1 ρ j−1 /8
since N j−1 = N j /2 and ρ j−1 ≤ ρ j ≤ 4ρ j−1 .



Lemma 4.8.8. The cost to either player due to uncorrupted rounds in Iteration j ≤ log F is at most
q
7α LT j−1 F
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Proof. Each uncorrupted round costs the players αFj . Since there are at most N j /4 uncorrupted
rounds, the resulting cost is no more than α4 N j Fj . Since j ≤ log F, ρ j = 2 j−1 dFj /Fe and Fj ≤ 2F.
Combining these we have
q
Fj ≤ F

22− j ρ j

so that
α
N j Fj ≤ αN j−1 Fj−1
4
q

≤ αN j−1 F 23− j ρ j−1
q
q
≤ αF N j−1 23− j N j−1 ρ j−1
q
p
≤ αF 2N1 8T j /3
q
≤ α 128LT j F/3
q
≤ 7α LT j F .



Lemma 4.8.9. If j > log F, the cost to either player due to uncorrupted rounds in Iteration j is at
most
3αT j−1
Proof. When j > log F, Fj = ρ j and by Lemma 4.8.6,
α
α
8α
N j Fj = N j ρ j ≤ αN j−1 ρ j−1 ≤
T j−1 ≤ 3αT j−1 .
4
4
3



p
Lemma 4.8.10. The cost to the players from corrupted rounds in Iteration j is at most 4α 2LT j F
if j ≤ log F and 2αT j otherwise.
Proof. Suppose there are k corrupted rounds. Then the cost to the players is kαFj , while the
adversary’s cost is k ρ j /2. If j ≥ log F + 1, Fj = ρ j and we easily see that the players’ cost is at most
2αT. When j ≤ log F, since k ≤ N j ,
q

q
k ρ j F21− j N j Fj
q
p
≤ α T j F22− j 2 j N1 F
q
≤ 2α 8LT j F .

kαFj = α



Collecting the various costs and noting that T j ≤ 64T j−1 , we see that for a suitably large constant
γ, we have
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Lemma 4.8.11. The total cost to the players from Iteration j is at most γ

p

LT j−1 log L if j ≤ log F

and γT j−1 otherwise.

4.8.2

Bob plays alone

After Alice’s verified transcript has length at least L, in each subsequent round, she transmits her
synchronization message, and then random bits to indicate her continued presence. Once Alice has
left, there is silence on the channel. To corrupt this silence, the adversary must make it look like
a corrupted synchronization message followed by random bits. Since a random string of length
Fj has, on average, Fj /2 alternations of bits, Bob considers the string to represent silence if it has
fewer than Fj /3 alternations. Thus, to corrupt such a round the adversary must pay at least Fj /3.
Alice leaves when she has received word that Bob has a verified transcript of length at least L,
and a single extra uncorrupted round thereafter will cause Bob to leave as well. Thus, if iteration j
was not Bob’s last one, the adversary must have corrupted every round. If 1 ≤ k < N j rounds are
corrupted, Bob pays at most (k + 1)αFj ≤ 2kαFj and the adversary pays kFj /3. If k = 0, we will
generously account for the lone uncorrupted round from Iteration j in Iteration j − 1 by noting that
α(N j−1 Fj−1 + Fj ) ≤ 2α(N j−1 Fj−1 ) Finally a calculation identical to that in Lemma 4.8.10 shows
that Bob’s cost for an iteration j that he played alone is no more than
q
γ LT j−1 log L
if j < log F and
γT j−1
otherwise.

4.8.3

Failure Probabilities

In this section we bound the probabilities of the events that cause the algorithm to fail.
Lemma 4.8.12. With high probability in L, there is no hash collision during Iteration j.
Proof. The fingerprint size has been selected large enough that the probability of a hash collision
Since there are N j = 2 j+2 L/F rounds in Iteration j, by a union bound, the


probability of a hash collision during the iteration is O 2 j L 1log L .

for a single hash is

1
.
22 j L 2

Lemma 4.8.13. With high probability in L, any bit flipping of an AMD encoded message during
Iteration j is detected.
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Proof. The size of the AMD encoding has been selected so that the probability of a failure to detect
1
.
22 j L 2

Since there are two AMD encodings per round and 2 j+2 L/F


rounds, again the probability that such a failure occurs during the iteration is O 2 j L 1log L .


a single instance of tampering is

Lemma 4.8.14. With high probability in L, Alice leaves before Bob.
Proof. Bob does not terminate until he thinks Alice has left, and he does not even start checking for
whether she seems to have left until after his transcript has length at least L. Since Bob’s transcript
lags behind that of Alice, this means that by the time Bob is checking for whether Alice has left,
Alice either really has left, in which case it is fine for Bob to leave, or she is transmitting i.i.d.
random bits in batches of length Fj , between fingerprints. Since the adversary cannot see the bits,
any bit flips on his part do not alter the fact that the string received by Bob is a uniformly random bit
string of length Fj . Such a string has Fj /2 alternations (consecutive bits that differ) in expectation.
Bob leaves if he sees fewer than Fj /3 alternations. If the string is random, the likelihood of Bob
seeing fewer than Fj /3 alternations is, by Chernoff’s bound, at most e−Fj /18 ≤
β=

Fj
2 j+log L

1
22 j L 2

provided

was chosen suitably large. Since there are at most N j chances in Iteration j for the

adversary to try
a union bound again shows that Bob leaves after Alice, except with

 this attack,
probability O

4.8.4

1
2 j L log L



.

Putting everything together

We will now prove our main theorem by putting all these costs together and calculating the total
cost to either player and the failure probability of the algorithm. As before, T denotes the number
of bits flipped by the adversary.
Theorem 4.8.15. The algorithm succeeds with probability at least 1 − 1/L log L. If it succeeds, then
each player’s cost is at most
L + O(

p

LT log L + T )

Proof. First we note that for each j ≥ 0 (Iteration
0 being
Algorithm 1), the probability that


1
Algorithm 3 fails during iteration j is at most O 22 j L log L . Thus the overall probability that it fails
at all is
!
∞
X
1
1
+
*
/=O
O.
L log L
2 j L log L
j=0
,
Thus, with high probability the algorithm succeeds.
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Let J denote the last iteration in which the player participates. If J = 0 then Lemma 4.6.24
p
already proves that the players’ total cost is at most L + O( L(T + 1) log L). Suppose J ≥ 1. For
each j, let Cost( j) denote the player’s cost from Iteration j. We know that
p
• Cost(0) = 12L ≤ L + γ LT0 log L where T0 = L/(8F)
p
• Cost( j) ≤ γ LT j−1 log L if 1 ≤ j ≤ log F
• Cost( j) ≤ γT j−1 if j > log F
When J ≤ log F, the player’s total cost is
J
X

Cost( j) ≤ Cost(0) +

j=0

J
X

Cost( j)

j=1

≤ L+γ

p

J
q
X
γ LT j−1 log L
LT0 log L +
j=1

≤ L+γ

p

q
L log L *.
,

(2/3) J−1T

J−1 +

J q
X
j=1

(2/3) J−1− j TJ−1 +/
-

q
J−2 q
X
*
J−1
(2/3) j +/
≤ L + γ LTJ−1 log L . (2/3) +
j=0
,
√
p
3γ
≤ L+ √
LTJ−1 log L
√
3− 2
p
= L + γ0 LTJ−1 log L
p
≤ L + γ0 LT log L
p
On the other hand, Tblog Fc = Θ(Nblog Fc ρ blog Fc ) = Θ(L log L), so that LTblog Fc log L = Θ(Tblog Fc )
p

and for J > log F we have
J
X

Cost( j) ≤ Cost(0) +

j=0

blog
XFc

Cost( j) +

j=1

≤ L + γ0

q

J
X

Cost( j)

j=blog Fc+1
J
X

LTblog Fc log L +

γT j−1

j=blog Fc+1
J
X

≤ L + γ00Tblog Fc +

γT j−1

j=blog Fc+1

≤ L + O(T )

p
L(T + 1) log L + T .
Thus the players’ cost is always L + O
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4.9

Some Additional Remarks

Need for Private Channels
The following theorem justifies our assumption of private channels.
Theorem 4.9.1. Consider any algorithm for interactive communication over a public channel that
works with unknown T and always terminates in the noise-free case. Any such algorithm succeeds
with probability at most 1/2.
Proof. The adversary chooses some protocol π with transcript length L and some separate “corrupted” protocol πc such that 1) πC has transcript length L and 2) Bob’s individual input for πc is
equivalent to his individual input for π. The goal of the adversary will be to convince Bob that πc is
the protocol, rather than π. Note that we can always choose some appropriate pair π and πc meeting
the above criteria.
Assume that if πc is the protocol and there is no noise on the channel, then Bob will output πc
with probability at least 1/2; if not, then the theorem is trivially true. Then, the adversary sets π to
be the input protocol. Next, the adversary simulates Alice in the case where her input protocol is πc ,
and sets the bits received by Bob to be the bits that would be sent by Alice in such a case.
Since the the algorithm eventually terminates, Bob will halt after some finite number of rounds,
X. Using the above strategy, Bob will incorrectly output πc with probability at least 1/2 and the
value of T will be no more than X.
Note that in the above, we critically rely on the fact that T is unknown to Bob.



Communication Rate Comparison.
In Haeupler’s algorithm [Hae14], the noise rate  is known in advance and is used to design an
p
algorithm with a communication rate of 1 − O(  log log 1/ ). Let L0 be the length of π0. Then in
his algorithm, L0 = O(L), and so the adversary is restricted to flipping  L0 = O(L) bits. Thus, in his
model, T and L0 are always O(L). In our model, the values of T and L0 are not known in advance,
and so both T and L0 may be asymptotically larger than L.
How do our results compare with [Hae14]? As noted above, a direct comparison is only possible
when T = O(L). Restating our algorithm in terms of , we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9.2. If the adversary flips O(L) bits and! the noise rate is  then our algorithm guarantees
q
p
log L
a communication rate of 1 − O
 log L .
L +
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Proof. When T < L we also have T <

p

L(T + 1) log L and our algorithm guarantees that for some

γ > 0,
L0 = L + γ

p

L(T + 1) log L

Let  = T/L0 and R = L/L0 be the effective noise and communication rates respectively. Then,
L0 − L
L
=
1
−
L0
L0
p
γ L(T + 1) log L
≥ 1−
L0 p
p
L log L + LT log L
≥ 1−γ
L0
p
R log L p
≥ 1−γ* √
+ R log L +
0
L
,
!
p
√
1
≥ 1 − γ log L √ +  ,
L
√
√

where the last line follows because 1/ L0 ≤ 1/ L and R ≤ 1.
q
We note that the additive term logL L arises from the fact that because we do not know the error
R=

rate ahead of time, we cannot get a communication rate of 1 even when the effective error rate turns
out to be zero.

A Note on Fingerprint Size.
A natural question is whether more powerful probabilistic techniques than union bound could enable
us to use smaller fingerprints as done in [Hae14]. The variability of block sizes poses a challenge to
this approach since Alice and Bob must either agree on the current block size, or be able to recover
from a disagreement by having Bob stay in the listening loop so he can receive Alice’s message. If
their transcripts diverge by more than a constant number of blocks, it may be difficult to make such
a recovery, and therefore it seems challenging to modify our algorithm to use smaller fingerprints.
However, it is a direction for further investigation.

A Lower Bound
In this section, we prove a lower bound that demonstrates the near optimality of our upper bound
by assuming the following conjecture by Haeupler holds [Hae14]. We now restate Haeupler’s
conjecture.
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Conjecture 1. (Haeupler [Hae14], 2014) The maximal rate achievable by an interactive coding
√
scheme for any binary error channel with random or oblivious errors is 1 − Θ(  ) for a noise
rate  → 0. This also holds for for fully adversarial binary error channels if the adversary is
computationally bounded or if parties have access to shared randomness that is unknown to the
channel.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that Haeupler’s conjecture holds for any algorithm
that succeed with high probability in L with an expected cost of at most L0 under adversarial noise.
For ease of exposition, we omit such statements in all of our claims below. By robust interactive
communication, we mean interactive communication tolerates T errors.
We begin by showing the near optimality with respect to the communication rate achieved:

√ 
Theorem 4.9.3. Any algorithm for robust interactive communication must have L0 = L +Ω T + LT
for some T ≥ 1.
Proof. Let T ≥ 1 be any value such that T/L0 = o(1). Then, Haeupler’s Conjecture applies and
√
the expected total number of bits sent is L0 ≥ L/(1 − d  ) for some constant d > 0. Noting
√
√
that 1/(1 − d  ) ≥ 1 + d  by the well-known sum of a geometric series, this implies that
√
√
√
L0 ≥ L/(1 − d  ) ≥ (1 + d  )L = (1 + d T/L0 )L since  = T/L0.
√
This implies that L/L0 ≤ 1/(1 + d T/L0 ). Now observe that 1/(1 + x) = 1/(1 − (−x)) ≤ 1 − x +
√
x 2 for |x| < 1, again by the sum of a geometric series. Plugging in d T/L0 for x, we have 1/(1 +
√
√
√
√
d T/L0 ) ≤ 1 − d T/L0 + d 2 (T/L0 ). Therefore, L/L0 ≤ 1 − d T/L0 + d 2 (T/L0 ) = 1 − d T/L0 (1 −
√
√
d T/L0 ) ≤ 1 − d 0 T/L0 for some d 0 > 0 depending only on d.
√
√
√
We then derive: L ≤ L0 (1 − d 0 T/L0 ) = L0 − d 0 L0T. It follows that L0 ≥ L + d 0 L0T =
√
L + Ω( LT ) since L0 ≥ L.
√
√
Finally, we show that LT = Θ(T + LT ). Assume that given any algorithm A for interactive
computation, we create a new algorithm A’ that has expected value of L0 = O(L). To do this, A’
checks based on  and L whether or not Haeupler’s algorithm [Hae14] will send fewer bits in
expectation than A. If so it runs Haeupler’s algorithm. Note that the expected number of bits sent by
A’ is no more than the expected number of bits sent by A.
Note that T =  L0 and for algorithm A’, the expected value of L0 = O(L). This implies that
√
√
implies that T = O(L) or T = O(L). Since T < L, it holds that LT = Θ(T + LT ) which


completes the proof.
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4.10

Conclusion

We have described the first algorithm for interactive communication that tolerates an unknown
but finite amount of noise. Against an adversary that flips T bits, our algorithm sends L +
p

O
L(T + 1) log L + T bits in expectation where L is the transcript length of the computation. We
prove this is optimal up to logarithmic factors, assuming a conjectured lower bound by Haeupler.
Our algorithm critically relies on the assumption of a private channel, an assumption that we show
is necessary in order to tolerate an unknown noise rate.
Several open problems remain including the following. First, can we adapt our results to
interactive communication that involves more than two parties? Second, can we more efficiently
handle an unknown amount of stochastic noise? Finally, for any algorithm, what are the optimal
tradeoffs between the overhead incurred when T = 0 and the overhead incurred for T > 0?
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Open Problems
In this dissertation, we have studied secure distributed protocols in the unbounded adversarial model
and the rational model. We designed a protocol that solves the MPC problem in polylogarithmic
communication and computation cost and is secure against an adversary than can corrupt a third
of the parties. We adapted our synchronous MPC protocol to the asynchronous setting when the
fraction of the corrupted parties are less than 1/8. Additionally, we presented a scalable protocol
that solves the secret sharing problem between rational parties in polylogarithmic communication
and computation cost.
Furthermore, we presented a protocol that can solve the interactive communication problem over
a noisy channel when the noise rate in unknown. In this problem, we have focused on the cost of the
protocol in the resource-competitive analysis model. Unlike classic models, resource-competitive
models consider the cost that the adversary must pay to succeed in corrupting the protocol.
In the rest of this chapter, we propose a few open problems related to the research done in this
dissertation. Our final goal is to build a resource-competitive MPC that works over noisy channels.
Each subsection is a step toward this goal.

5.1

Two Party Computation Over a Noisy Channel

Can we run a secure two party computation (2PC) over a noisy channels? Most 2PC papers assume
the channel between the parties is noise-free. However, in practice that is not the case and there
might be random or even adversarial noise over the channel. This means that we need a mechanism
to simulate the 2PC protocol that is correct and secure over a noise-free channel such that it is also
correct and secure over noisy channel. One simple method for that is to use error-correcting code
for each message of the 2PC protocol. As we talked about it in Section 4, this method is not efficient
129

since we need to send at least log n extra bits for each message even if the message itself is only one
bit.
The idea is how to adapt an efficient protocol for interactive communication such as our result
in Section 4 to simulate a secure 2PC. Note that this method and similar methods critically rely on
computing blocks of the protocol more than once. Since the overall picture of the algorithm is that
compute one block of the protocol, if an error happens, compute the same block again. If there is no
error, move to the next block.
However, if parties have a 2PC protocol that is correct over a noise-free channel, they cannot
simply use a recent and efficient algorithm to simulate it over the noisy channel. This is because it
might breach the privacy by computing some part of the 2PC protocol twice or more. Therefore, the
interesting question is to see if we can extend our results for interactive communication while make
sure we do not give up privacy. Our goal here is to design a 2PC protocol that works over noisy
channel.

5.2

Cost-Competitive MPC Over Secure Channels

One interesting direction is to see if a standard MPC protocols can be analyzed in the costcompetitive setting. The cost to the adversary in MPC can be modeled as the cost of obtaining
control over each node for each round. The goal is designing a protocol that costs more when the
adversary is making many corruptions and costs less when the adversary remains passive. The
difference between interactive computation and MPC is that in interactive computation, we assume
parties are honest, but the channel is not reliable. In MPC, however, the computation is performed
in the presence of dishonest parties but with secure channels. Thus, addressing privacy is the most
challenging problem in this setting since it is not easy to detect when the adversary eavesdrops. We
suggest two approaches for this problem.
Cheap Curiosity Versus Expensive Bysantine: The first approach is to design a MPC protocol
that handles Byzantine nodes as efficiently as honest-but-curious nodes. Our intuition for this
approach is that most algorithms cost less in dealing with honest-but-curious parties and addressing
Byzantine faults is more expensive. To deal with the Byzantine case, the verification step is the
most expensive part. The idea is to start the protocol with a weak but cheap verification scheme by
assuming the parties are honest but curious in the start. Then parties can check if the other parties
cheat or not. The hope is to develop an easy sub-protocol for this check. Parties keep a measure for
how honest other parties are. Then, based on this honesty measure, they can run a more complicated
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but more expensive method for verification. Our goal is to decrease the cost in practice or at-least
have a protocol in which enforces the parties to remain honest by making it expensive for them to
cheat.
Limited Communication Model: The second approach is to exploit the similarities between
taking control over a node to do active corruptions and flipping bits of its channels, specifically
when the degree of each nodes and the message size is logarithmic. This modeling can help us to
reduce the problem to the interactive computation problem over noisy channels and use a parametric
algorithms. We assume our algorithm spends α (a parameter) and we like to guarantee that any
adversary must spend ω(α) (e.g. α 3 ) to break privacy.

5.3

Cost-Competitive MPC over Noisy Channels

Finally, is it possible to build a scheme for MPC in the cost-competitive model, where the adversary
is able to take control over both parties and channels? In this setting, the adversary’s total cost is the
cost of obtaining control over a party plus the cost of corrupting channels in each round. Generally
speaking, solving MPC when the adversary has the power to corrupt the channels is a difficult task.
Jain et al. [JKL11] show how to convert any n-party protocol into one that is resilient to a 1/nfraction of adversarial error while increasing the communication by only a constant factor. They
prove that this result is optimal.
The difference between their work and what we propose here is threefold. First, the goal here is
solving the problem not for any n-party protocol but for a specific MPC problem in mind. Designing
a specialized solution might be easier than a generalized case. Second, we assume the channels
are private, while Jain et al. consider a general noisy channel. As we showed in Section 4, privacy
might be a crucial assumption here. Third, the focus of this problem is on the cost-competitive
model, which probably allows the protocol to spend more resources if the adversary is willing to
spend more.
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